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ABSTRACT  
 
Lane, Sarah, M.A., Spring 2015            English Literature 
 
 
The Bioscience-Industrial Complex, Radical Materialist Aesthetics, and Interspecies Political 
Ecologies: The Unforeseen Posthuman Future in Mary Shelley’s Frankenstein and Margaret 
Atwood’s MaddAddam Trilogy. 
 
Chairperson:  Louise Economides 
 
  This project traces how Mary Shelley’s Frankenstein and Margaret Atwood’s MaddAddam 
Trilogy, science fiction novels from the Romantic and contemporary literary periods 
respectively, contest the problematic relationships between subjecthood, science, ecological 
health, and patriarchal, capitalist societies by crafting radical materialist alternatives to such a 
system and its dualistic and destructive interpersonal/interspecies relations. Through the 
theoretical framework of ecofeminism that recognizes the conceptual linkages between women 
and nature in Western systems of thought, as well as psychoanalytical feminist critiques of the 
masculinization of scientific epistemology, this project examines the developmental and 
ontological overlaps between literary “masculine” and “scientific” subjects socialized under 
Western patriarchal capitalism and their exploitatively destructive responses to things associated 
with the “feminine” (i.e. the sensual body, nonhuman animals, people of color, ecological 
systems, spirituality).  
  The second half of this thesis investigates how the environmental group of Atwood’s trilogy 
practices a kind of radical materialist philosophy that resembles Deleuze and Guattari’s notion of 
“becoming-animal” and Jane Bennett’s apprehension of the enchanted materialism of the world 
of things to elucidate the inadequacy of dualist, patriarchal culture’s models for lived experience. 
The God’s Gardeners’ belief system advocates practicing a curious “attentiveness,” or sensual 
receptiveness, to nature in which an energetic, agential wilderness of nonhuman intentionality 
might be perceived and thereby enable a more interconnected across-species co-existence. The 
intercommunications between the transgenic animals, humanoid Crakers, and bizarre cult-like 
humans are a source of hope in that they suggest that our human-nature relation must henceforth 
be more carefully considerate of more-than-human interests than it has been, more biocentric in 
its scope as opposed to narrowly homocentric. This newfound sense of continuity helps one 
begin to think of nature as composed of living, breathing others with unique interests, which then 
propels one to engage in dialogic ethical responses to and interactions with nonhumans over the 
more unfortunate and historically popular dialectic between so-called free humans and 
mechanistic nonhuman natures. The combination of Atwood’s vision of interspecies alliances, 
Deleuze and Guattari’s politics of becoming, and Bennett’s enchanted stance toward nature 
provide a viable model of resistance to the continued destruction of the planet.  
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INTRODUCTION:  
It is not just that science and technology  
are possible means of great human satisfaction,  
as well as a matrix of complex dominations.  
Cyborg imagery can suggest a way out of the maze 
 of dualisms in which we have explained  
our bodies and our tools to ourselves. 
 
Donna Haraway, “A Cyborg Manifesto” (1991) 
 
 This thesis is broadly concerned with tracing how Mary Shelley’s Frankenstein and 
Margaret Atwood’s MaddAddam Trilogy, science fiction novels from the Romantic and 
contemporary literary periods respectively, contest the problematic relationships between 
subjecthood, science, ecological health, and patriarchal, capitalist societies by crafting radical 
materialist alternatives to such a system and its dry and destructive interpersonal/interspecies 
relations. I am broadly concerned with comparatively tracing these novels’ representations of the 
“scientist” and “his” ideological construction composed of the discourses of Enlightenment 
humanism, sociobiology, deep ecology, and transhumanism. Influenced by Val Plumwood’s 
ecofeminism that recognizes the conceptual linkages between women and nature in Western 
systems of thought, as well as Evelyn Fox Keller’s psychoanalytical feminist critiques of the 
masculinization of scientific epistemology, the first three chapters of this project will specifically 
examine the developmental and ontological overlaps between literary “masculine” and 
“scientific” subjects socialized under Western patriarchal capitalism and their destructive 
responses to things associated with the “feminine” (i.e. the sensual body, nonhuman animals, 
people of color, ecological systems, spirituality). I will elucidate the links between patriarchal 
and scientific constructions of subjectivity and the exploitation of feminized-others and nature in 
science fiction across these literary periods through an analysis of Mary Shelley’s Frankenstein 
and Oryx and Crake, the first book of Margaret Atwood’s MaddAddam trilogy.  
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 In light of Donna Haraway’s work, an additional part of my project is to look at the 
contradictory ways posthumanism can function as an emancipatory discourse, in its critique of 
human exceptionalism and reconfiguration of who counts as an ethical subject, as well as how it 
can be coopted to serve the exploitative interests of militarism and patriarchal capitalism. My 
fourth chapter uses Atwood’s Oryx and Crake as a kind of case study to explore how the 
conceptual framework of this darker scientific enterprise contains residual vestiges of traditional 
humanist thought that reproduce the belief in essential differences between humans and animals, 
distinctions that underlie Western epistemology’s logic of domination that assumes the moral 
superiority of the masculine-subject and justifies the consumption of so-called inferior, 
mechanized women, people of color, animals, and nature. Moreover, the humanist emphasis on 
“freedom” and perfectibility as critical to human subjectivity has left its mark in transhumanist 
biotechnology’s transcendental drive to develop immortal, artificial intelligences and/or Bacon’s 
“blessed race of Heroes and Supermen,” which is an expression of the masculine-subject’s desire 
to both repress and appropriate feminine “nature.” I will explore how these ambitions show up in 
Shelley and Atwood’s texts as a Freudian “father of oneself” fantasy manifested in the image of 
the laboratory scientist simultaneously in the throes of childbirth and rebirth à la Frankenstein 
and Oryx and Crake, which interestingly has many parallels with the simultaneous feminization 
and virilization of the male poet in his experience of the sublime in Romantic literature. 
 My final chapter will investigate how the God’s Gardeners/MaddAddamite radical 
environmental group of the second and third novels of Margaret Atwood’s trilogy, The Year of 
the Flood and MaddAddam, practice a kind of radical materialist philosophy. I will look at the 
way this vital materialist outlook is used to re-enchant this group’s mechanized world that has 
been systematically stripped of agency, spirituality, sensuality, and uncertainty. This chapter will 
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delineate the various ways the novels do the work of re-enchantment by populating their fictional 
landscapes with figures of embodied desire, spiritual/communicative openness, and an almost 
mystical corporeal-genetic permeability/indeterminacy or “plastic” identity as represented by 
characters such as Shelley’s creature and Atwood’s human and nonhuman “cyborgs.” My 
objective is to demonstrate how these narratives employ materialist aesthetics (aesthetics that 
resemble Deleuze and Guattari’s notion of “becoming-animal” or “pack” affiliated, Jane 
Bennett’s apprehension of the enchanted materialism of the world of things, and Haraway’s 
interspecies camaraderie) to elucidate the inadequacy of dualist culture’s models for lived 
experience. I will end my discussion by using Atwood’s MaddAddam to think through the ways 
these ecological aesthetics (both critical and literary versions) might provide the grounds for 
deconstructing and transforming the idea of the human subject in order to form a more 
ontologically heterogeneous ethics and sustainable future.  
 In sum, this thesis project will investigate the ways in which Mary Shelley’s 
Frankenstein and Margaret Atwood’s MaddAddam trilogy address issues concerning the ways 
that biotechnology, as developed under patriarchal-capitalism, leads to the commodification and 
destruction of nature and feminized-others as well as to unexpected emancipatory possibilities. 
Shelley’s Frankenstein follows the degenerative trajectory of the young scientist, Victor, as his 
mind dissolves under his escalating obsession to discern the innermost secrets of nature, the 
enigma behind the animation of life. Victor’s motivation is purely based on the will to power due 
to the style of domestic life he develops under that encourages isolated ego differentiation for 
male children and the objectification of m(others). His “masculine” education continues as he 
trains in a science that emphasizes dominion over a female gendered nature via knowledge 
accumulation. He quickly succeeds in animating the “lifeless matter” of a creature that he 
	  
	   4 
constructs out of the fleshly material collected from slaughterhouses and the bones from charnel 
houses. Horrified upon the first sight of the newly living creature, Victor abandons him to an 
isolated life of misery and perpetual rejection, which propels the creature to commit a series of 
murders to avenge the cruelty inflicted upon him by Victor. Overall, this text is read as a 
cautionary tale against uncritical faith in the progressivism of scientific technology as well as an 
attempt to call attention to the subjective “culture” of science, the pernicious problem of its 
saturation with the value-laden assumptions and prejudices of patriarchy.    
 Atwood’s Oryx and Crake explores the possible dystopian twenty-first century 
consequences for a late-capitalist patriarchal culture that, like a mutated growth, has risen out of 
the very domestic and scientific conditions depicted in Frankenstein. Atwood’s speculative 
future consists of a dramatically stratified world in which the technocratic elite dwell in the 
militantly guarded Corporation Compounds and the rest of society lives in the “pleeblands” or 
poverty-stricken, run-down, disease-ridden slums. The novel focuses on the socialization and 
unfolding of Jimmy and Crake’s personalities and professional aspirations while living in the 
privileged technocratic part of society whose sole purpose is to turn out as many for-profit 
genetically engineered organisms, diseases, cosmetic surgery options, human organs, etc. for 
consumption by the pleebland class as possible. Jimmy and Crake lead emotionally estranged 
childhood and adolescent lives bonding over torture porn, voyeuristic reality TV shows, for-
entertainment live executions, and online games. Crake grows up to develop the BlyssPluss pill, 
a prescription advertised as a one-time swallow that works to secure its consumer youth, 
prophylactic benefits, and sexual ecstasy but which in reality hides a hemorrhagic, rapid-
spreading virus that eradicates most of the human species. However, Crake considers the 
Paradice Project the crown of his lifework. The Paradice Project consists of his genetically 
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engineered humanoid species called Crakers who are composed of the most beautiful human, 
animal, and machine adaptations. The Crakers are Crake’s attempt to genetically remove the 
most volatile aspects of human nature and are meant to replace humankind. The Crakers have a 
limited lifespan of 30 years. They have no understanding of racial nationalism, hierarchy, or 
possessive monogamy. Their diet consists mainly of invasive kudzu leaves and they can 
telepathically communicate with animals. Ultimately, this novel provides a similar warning to 
that offered in Frankenstein, that science under patriarchal-capitalism results in destruction and 
can be used by dominant power groups to exploit disempowered human and nonhuman 
creatures. More sinisterly, Oryx and Crake reveals how essentialist sociobiological beliefs, 
biotechnical instrumentalism, and humanist hubris, all of which originate in the patriarchal value 
system, can lead to apocalyptic-level tragedy.   
 In The Year of the Flood, a narrative that runs chronologically alongside the apocalyptic 
world of Oryx and Crake, Atwood introduces the God’s Gardeners environmental 
countercultural group who live on the Edencliff Rooftop Garden somewhere within the chaos of 
the pleeblands. Founded, by Adam One, this group of Adam and Eves practice a faith best 
described as spiritual Darwinism. Their green religion teaches the “convergence of Nature and 
Scripture, the love of all creatures, the dangers of technology, the wickedness of the Corps, the 
avoidance of violence, and the tending of vegetables and bees on pleebland slum rooftops” 
(MaddAddam xviii). The God’s Gardeners group prophesy the “Waterless Flood” and therefore 
many of them survive the pandemic Crake unleashes.  
 MaddAddam, the final book of the trilogy, focuses on the way these surviving Gardeners 
recover from their trauma and negotiate the post-apocalyptic birth of a chimeric 
indigenous/genetically spliced Nature. The Year of the Flood and MaddAddam suggest that the 
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transgenic animals, humanoid Crakers, and bizarre cult-like humans are a source of hope. In 
particular, the God’s Gardeners’ belief system advocates practicing a curious “attentiveness” to 
nature, a sensual receptiveness to the external world, in which an energetic, agential wilderness 
of nonhuman intentionality might be perceived and thereby enable a more interconnected across-
species co-existence. The Craker-Animal-Human intercommunications that take place in 
MaddAddam implicitly suggest that our human-nature relation must henceforth be more 
carefully considerate of more-than-human interests than it has been, more biocentric in its scope 
as opposed to narrowly homocentric. The newfound sense of human-animal-GMO continuity 
helps one “‘begin to conceive a potential for mutual and sustaining interchange with nature,’” 
which will then propel one to engage in dialogic ethical responses to and interactions with nature 
over the more unfortunate and historically popular dialectic “‘of prejudged superiority, of 
deafness, of closure’” (Plumwood qtd. in Warkentin 114). 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
	  
	   7 
CHAPTER ONE: Scientific Manifestations of Gender Development Under Western 
Patriarchal Culture 
and dream of masculine 
filiation, dream of God the father 
emerging from himself 
in his son,—and 
no mother then. 
 
Hélène Cixous, “Sorties” (1981) 
  
 Informed by Evelyn Fox Keller’s psychoanalytic theoretical framework, this chapter will 
examine the complicated origins of the hierarchical subject/object, self/other split, an 
understanding of the world human beings are socialized into adopting within patriarchal society 
according to feminist retellings of classical psychoanalysis. This section then investigates the 
link between this false differentiation in boys and their adoption of the Western rational 
worldview that promotes a scientific or “objective” approach to nature(s). This chapter argues 
that the combination of an unnatural and aggravated assertion of male identity at the cost of the 
repression and devaluation of female identity culminates in a logic of domination that results in 
the destruction of the self, the other, and nature. 
Part I: Object Relations Theory: Individualistic vs. Mutual Selves 
 Feminist critics of Freudian psychoanalysis argue from an object relations theoretical 
framework that the failure of boys to differentiate (both to acquire a sense of autonomous 
selfhood and a confident and tolerant notion of one’s kinship with others) often leads to the 
control and domination of women and nature via violence by men in an effort to deny one’s 
affinity with and dependency on recognition (being affected) by the other (Benjamin 150). In 
other words, the procedure for forming “male” identity under the patriarchal socialization 
process is reduced to the hyperseparation of self from the other, to establishing complete 
independence and dissimilarity from the mother and nature-background associated with her 
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presence in early childhood. In order to deny the self’s dependency on the other and assert one’s 
hyper-independent individuality, one objectifies and dominates the other as a superior-subject 
over an inferior-object, which results in masculine subject’s failure to recognize her (or nature) 
as an independent person or subject. The others (nature and the feminine-other in general) 
become object-instruments and vessels to signify the masculine-subject’s needs, desires, lacks, 
and fears. This distortion in emotional and sexual development provides the substratum from 
which the capacity for a certain breed of scientific, “rational” thought (which shrouds the 
underlying posture of “masculinity”, objectivity, and the desire for domination) develops (Keller, 
Gender 80). This rational posture has hitherto monopolized the epistemological field of Western 
philosophy from Cartesian philosophy’s mechanization of, or “stripping out…of mindlike 
qualities such as agency and goal-directedness” from the feminized entities and the natural world 
(Plumwood, Feminism 115) to its culmination, at last, into its postmodern technocratic phase—
what Donna Haraway terms the “informatics of domination.”  
 According to Jessica Benjamin, early ego psychoanalytical theory emphasizes the 
infant’s break from unity, the alienation from the other, and is blind to the fact that the awareness 
and discovery of the self and the awareness and discovery of the other are interdependent 
processes (147). The socialization of males within Western patriarchal society imagines the 
proper human development as one of a chronological “progress” where the self breaks from the 
matrix of the first bond and separates from the mother. In other words, this process places “the 
mutual functions of recognizing the other and establishing one’s own autonomous identity in 
opposition” (147). Furthermore, it aggravates the natural individuation process or the original 
necessary psychological separation from the mother. Under “‘good enough’ social relations,” or 
within a non-patriarchal cultural environment, the child will explore separateness and return to 
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the mother in cycles whereupon both “members of the dyad . . . learn to let go of the early bond 
without rejecting the other” (Flax 252). This separation-individuation period is marked by 
intense ambivalence as the child “both wants to return to the symbiotic state and fears being 
engulfed by it” (252). After a precarious time the child should develop a capacity for reciprocal 
relations and a secure sense of self.  
 Evelyn Fox Keller confirms the importance and delicate nature of this individuation 
process or what she interprets as the development of the child’s sense of objectivity or the 
“capacity…for delineating subject from object . . . by which the child’s sense of self is formed” 
(80). She defines objectivity as the ability to distinguish “self from not-self, ‘me’ from ‘not me.’” 
In other words, establishing selfhood by a sense of difference from the other followed by a 
separation manifested in the newfound consciousness of self-boundaries is not inherently 
pathological. Keller argues that it is not the comprehension of difference that causally brings 
forth dominating attitudes toward women and the environment, similar to how ecofeminist Val 
Plumwood claims that “a relation of dichotomy, difference, or . . . a simple hierarchical 
relationship” does not necessarily result in a sinister or colonizing outcome for nature (Feminism 
47). Keller affirms a cautious use of difference when she says “the extent to which one can 
maintain clarity about the difference between self and other” is key to one’s autonomy but on the 
other hand “the maintenance of continuity between self and other provides a check against 
the…desire to hurt or destroy” (100).  
 Ultimately, in a healthier cultural context other than that offered by the patriarchal 
landscape, the child establishes what Keller calls “dynamic autonomy” or a sense of self that is 
“both differentiated from and related to others, and a sense of others as subjects with whom one 
shares enough to allow for a recognition of their independent interests and feelings—in short for 
	  
	   10 
a recognition of them as other subjects” (99). This allows for a more reciprocal relation with the 
mother and gives rise to a perception of the world as full “of interacting and interpersonal agents 
with whom and with which one feels an essential kinship, while still recognizing, and accepting, 
their independent integrity” (Keller 99-100). Similarly, Plumwood advocates creating the 
conditions in which a “mutual” or “relational self” might form. These conditions consist of 
encouraging “intersubjective interactions” in which the self recognizes the other as its own 
center of needs and limitations but also recognizes he is changeable by the other and capable of 
transforming the other (Feminism 156). One must grasp a sense of self and of other that is secure 
enough to allow for ambiguity between the boundaries of both without “threatening the loss of 
either” in order to participate in a fully creative, perceptive, and affectionate life (Keller 82). 
Overall, the writings of various object relations theorists propose that the individual maintain a 
finely balanced tension between self and other, one’s desire for intimacy and independence for 
“the attempt to delineate absolutely between self and other represents a miscarriage in 
development…that inhibits growth and perception as well as genuine self esteem and the 
capacity to love another” (101).  
 However, under patriarchy it is impossible to achieve this synthesis of mutuality and 
similarity on the one hand, and a sense of separateness and difference on the other (Flax 252). 
For the majority within the Western patriarchal society it is our fathers who we identify with as 
masculine-subjects and “our mothers who provide the emotional context out of which we forge 
the discrimination between self and other” and this “inevitably leads to a skewing of our 
perceptions of gender” in the sense that male qualities are praised over feminine ones (85). To 
add to this problem, the masculine identity is pressured to fashion itself in “opposition to what is 
both experienced and defined as feminine” (88). Masculine selfhood is acquired by rejecting and 
	  
	   11 
creating dissimilarity and difference from the mother-natural background, which leads to the 
scripted failure of the individual to recognize the mother “as an independent person, another 
subject” but rather she is viewed as “Other: as nature, as an instrument or object, as less-than-
human” (Benjamin 148). This tendency to see the mother as an object extends to the entire 
natural world because early in life the world of objects blurs and overlaps with the mother’s 
image. Because of one’s early experiences he associates the mother with original unity and 
separation as negation of the mother as the first object.  
 Indeed, this precarious separation-individuation process or the formulation of the boy 
child’s sense of objectivity (the ability to distinguish between subject/object, self/other) becomes 
problematically gendered (and manifests itself in scientific attitudes, discourses, personalities, 
and language) when masculine-biased cultural forces interfere during the Oedipal stage of the 
child’s development within patriarchal societies (Keller 87). During the individual’s first sense 
of his hard won, nascent, and fragile selfhood, the father figure comes to stand for a beacon of 
protection against the individual’s fears of “reengulfment” or ego disintegration, psychic death. 
He is taught implicitly to identify with the qualities of the “objective” external father of rigid 
autonomy and separateness while denying all of the characteristics within himself associated 
with the maternal feminine. Individuation and differentiation, objective reality itself, is 
personified by the father and so our “earliest experiences incline us to associate the affective and 
cognitive posture of objectification with the masculine, while all processes that involve a 
blurring of the boundary between subject and object tend to be associated with the feminine” 
(87). Clearly, a certain strain of Western science that “has been premised on a radical dichotomy 
between subject and object…simultaneously reflects and perpetuates” the gendered associations, 
between women and nature as threatening boundary blurring objects and men as objective 
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subjects, one makes during his early emotional and sexual development under the subtle 
influence of sociocultural duress.  
 On the other hand, female children are encouraged to identify with the mother and 
therefore tend to merge with her identity and sacrifice their independent subjectivity: “The small 
girl’s experience is often that she develops continuity and sameness at the expense of difference 
and independence” (Benjamin 148). Society discourages females from differentiating from the 
mother and instead encourages the blurring of their boundaries thus leading to their 
internalization of the status of an object. The girl child “becomes in her own mind object, 
instrument, earth mother” recognizer but unrecognized as “she serves men as their other, their 
counterpart, the side of themselves they repress.” In this way each gender represents one 
malformed part of a hyperpolarized whole. Neither falsely differentiated gender develops true 
autonomy nor learns the necessary art of maintaining a tension between the cultivation and 
knowledge of the self and recognition and appreciation of the similarities and differences of and 
dependence on the other.  
 According to Plumwood, a child who grows under this distorting pressure in which he is 
unable to recognize the mother as a subject he both shares a symbiotic kinship with and is 
distinct from results in a politics of incorporation or a “‘breakdown of differentiation’” in which 
“‘other is assimilated to self’” and in the case of the girl child, who sees herself as object-other, 
“self is assimilated to other’” (Jessica Benjamin qtd. in Plumwood, Feminism 157). The boy is 
only able to see the other as an extension of the self’s mental omnipotence where the other is 
simply a part of the self, which “leads to domination and instrumentalization, the erasure of the 
other as an external limit on the self and its reappearance as a projection of the self.” He will fail 
to “encounter the other as independent other” and instead see her “only in the image of [his] own 
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desires or needs, which [he] imposes on [her]” (Plumwood, Feminism 158). Alternatively, the 
subject will unconsciously engage in a project of hyperseparation in which the other is imagined 
as a hostile, alien-other (threatening to one’s ego-boundaries) who is “utterly different by nature 
and a[-] part of a separate, lower, or exceptional sphere (Freud’s ‘dark continent’), thus denying 
continuity” and the common claims of intrinsic value (161). The masculine subject, or “master 
identity” is only able to recognize the other as a “colonized” of radical alterity under the psychic 
organizing principle of hyperseparation or as assimilated to the self’s “empire of the same” under 
the impulse to incorporate a world that threatens to separate from the self and challenge its 
absolute atomistic sovereignty by making it feel vulnerable. Overall, his pathway to 
hyperseparated subject formation ultimately stems from a conceptualization of both feminized-
others and nature as “neutral, indifferent and meaningless, with no interests or significance of 
[their] own […]; any significance or value [they] might have for humans is an arbitrary product 
of human consciousness” (110). And, once this boundary between self and other is secured 
“every-thing other than the Self is seen as…a thing to have and possess,” utterly mute, inert, and 
non-creative “standing reserve” entirely void of provoking an ethical response from “humanity” 
(Hiltner 23). 
Part II: The Materialization of Domination in Sexual Sadism and Scientific Discourse 
 How is the hyper-objectivity (the problematic patriarchal formulation of the 
subject/object, self/other split) of the rigidly autonomous masculine subject linked to the 
domination of others and how are both of these related to the objectifying, instrumentalizing, and 
exploitative domination of human and more-than-human natures by science? Keller has noted the 
potential links between the development of the estranged identity in boys, their conditioned 
capacity or socialized attraction to a scientific or objective approach to the world, and the 
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conceptualization of power as the domination over the other (Benjamin 148). The rational 
posture that results from this false differentiation, ultimately leads to what Benjamin calls 
“rational violence” and domination. The patriarchy demands that the individual deny his 
dependence on the “inferior” and threatening other but this delusion is psychically isolating and 
impossible. According to Benjamin, in order for the self to split from the other and also not be 
alone, the self “resolve[s] the problem of dependency by possessing or controlling the other” 
(150). In the self’s attempts to deny its “sameness, dependency, and closeness with another 
person” and fight off the consequent feelings of loneliness, it becomes “different and individual 
by making the other person an object, [and]…seeks autonomy by dominating the other person” 
(Benjamin 150). She claims that any act of domination contains within it the potential for 
violence. Violence is a way of expressing control over another: “aggression is mobilized to 
distance oneself from the object and then to overpower it” (Flax 253). Similarly, Susan Griffin 
sees the act of objectification itself as a violent act for the “soul was not made to dwell in a thing; 
and when forced to it, there is no part of the soul but suffers violence” (49). The subject’s 
fantasized and real acts of violent domination function as a desperate method of ensuring both 
possession of and separation in type from an object-other. 
 Similar to Benjamin’s explanation of domination above, Keller also associates the 
hyperseparation of self from other with a defensive and desperate need to dominate and control 
the other in order to alleviate fears of dependency and isolation. However, she emphasizes that 
domination is not just the result of the struggle for hyper-autonomy. While domination is a 
response to a fear of dependency and affinity, “it arises most critically out of the psychological 
assimilation of autonomy with external authority” or the desire to be the omnipotent father in 
contradistinction to being the impotent, dependent child of the mother (Keller 97). Benjamin’s 
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summary of Hegel’s explanation of the master/slave dynamic posits that the reason that 
domination is chosen by the master-identity over the act of mutual recognition is because the 
“nascent self wants to be omnipotent, or rather, has the fantasy that its mental process is identical 
with the world,” with external authority, arguably also a desire of science (152). The patriarchal 
self wants to be alone and independent in the world, to exist objectively, control everything and 
to allow the “other to exist only as an object inside itself” (152). In other words, in order for the 
self to repress its fears of psychic death (ego boundary blurs) and dependent vulnerability, it 
pursues a sense of omnipotence through acts of domination which work in an aesthetic 
dimension to “symbolize man’s combat with nature—a nature that is constantly threatening to 
engulf him from without and from within’” (Alain Renaut qtd. in Ferry 51). Domination as the 
“submission of brute nature to man’s…will” works as a kind of ritual reenactment of the 
masculine subject’s “‘breaking away’ from [the] natural state of which the animal [and all 
feminized-others] remain prisoner” as well as his subsequent arrival at the realm of masculine 
omnipotence or the “authentically human” (Ferry 51).  
 Violent domination is also associated with eroticism in Western culture. According to 
Freud, the self is uncomfortably forced to realize its dependency on the other when it experiences 
“animal desire” which is associated with psychic death because the sex act causes a lack of 
boundaries; merging threatens continuity or a reunion with the undifferentiated sea of the mother 
one worked so hard to break away from (Benjamin 153). In the patriarchal world that emphasizes 
hyper-individuality and the maintenance of the “law of discontinuity,” the boundary loss inherent 
to the erotic act is feared and must be avoided at all costs. If the individual had undergone an 
alternative process of differentiation from that condoned by patriarchy the self might accept and 
even actively seek periods of oneness without feeling threatened. One would be able to 
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temporarily transcend the isolated self through love and experience the “delight [in] such an 
intense interruption of accustomed being” (Sandilands 186). In the world of patriarchy, the 
individual perceives love and similarity as threatening to selfhood and trades it for the power and 
safety of domination or sadistic sexual expression just as certain representations of the scientist 
show “him” as unaffected and at a distantly removed location from the writhing object of his 
study. Sadistic sexual expression is described as “not mutuality but mastery, …not loss of 
boundaries of the self but affirmation of the self. […] The sexual subjugation of the other 
becomes erotic by demarcating the self from other in such a way as to channel contempt and 
fears of impotence (as well as ego loss) away from the self to the other” (Keller 105). Through 
sadistic fantasy, the other is constructed as helpless and the self as all-powerful, which is similar 
to nature’s construction as passive or malleable in the discourse of modern science. Acts of 
domination reflect the individual’s anxiety of losing their alienated selfhood and sense of power. 
Ultimately, the domination of others occurs when one is reminded of one’s dependency on the 
other or feels threatened by the “specter of difference dissolving” (Keller 106). Domination is a 
way of both creating and maintaining the object and its identity as different, which is required for 
the construction and maintenance of the delusion of the self-governing autonomous personae.  
 The desire to dominate human others is linked to the “ambition to dominate nature, and 
hence to a particular set of commitments in science” because of patriarchy’s conflation of power 
and control with knowledge and fear of the unifying feminine, love, and nature (Keller 114). The 
early childhood investment in radically differentiating from feminized-others and the sexual 
adult’s ritualistic performance of this differentiation via domination gets projected onto the 
scientist’s engagement with feminized-others and nature. The aggression within scientific 
discourse reflects the enforced lack of connection with the mother and the natural objects 
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originally connected to her, a malicious effect of the patriarchal splitting process where 
domination arises out of an anxiety of dependence, affinity, and ego loss (Keller 124).  
 One can also see a related link between the aggressive discourse of science and male 
psychic development in that the “the dream of dominion over nature, shared by so many 
scientists, echoes the dream that the stereotypic son hopes to realize by identifying with the 
authority of the father” (Keller 124). The son’s identification with the father reflects the son’s 
wish to achieve an omnipotent Godliness and, correspondingly, the ability to completely deny 
his connection with the mother-born body of nature. At first the “polymorphously perverse” boy 
simultaneously identifies with the mother and father. As discussed above, the boy later identifies 
with the father as an attempt to negate impotent dependency and the original fusion with the 
mother in accordance with external social pressure. This identification with the father occurs 
during the Oedipal stage where the boy first experiences the primal scene, which is an event in 
which the child, who is still “mourning a damaged oneness with his mother,” stumbles onto the 
stage of his parents’ act of coitus (Kerrigan 164). This scene stimulates so-called “proper” ego 
differentiation in the child, a shift from the anxiety of separation to the anxiety of castration and 
finally resolution. In other words, in a patriarchal society the child slips from unity with the less 
powerful, boundary blurring mother, to a rivalrous, voyeuristic position towards the father, and 
finally to an identification with the father in his competitive stance to possess and rule over the 
mother. In the child’s identification or projection of himself “into the role of the father, the father 
occupies the slot he has vacated – watcher, discoverer, and in this position, punisher” (164). In 
other words, the ego submits to the surveillance of the superego or the internalized father. Not all 
egos submit to this expelled, surveying superego-father and instead become “father of 
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themselves” in occupying their father’s old position with the mother and simultaneously the new, 
third position as omniscient, omnipresent, and omnipotent.  
 The boy secures an illusion of complete self-sufficiency through this fantasy of being 
father to himself and therefore sees himself, in the mode of Descartes, as completely 
transcendental to the body of maternally associated infancy (Bordo 107). Being one’s own parent 
allows one to deny having been born from that helpless, original state of union with the mother. 
Instead, he fantasizes he possesses her as a subdued sexual object of conquest that is fully under 
his control and therefore need not worry over the pain of separateness or dependency (107). In 
this way, the subject can satisfy his desires for re-unification by objectifying and internalizing 
the mother-object while simultaneously denying his association with the mother (the feminine 
nature) of his original bond. Even so, the “polluted” trace of the original identification with the 
mother remains a part of the boy’s fragile psychic landscape. Rather than only “positively” 
identifying with the father, the child exposed to the primal scene also at times experiments by 
“negatively” projecting himself into the submissive position of the mother. In this case, the 
developing ego marries rather than internalizes the fatherly superego. Within a patriarchal 
culture that demands the child gravitate to one or the other of the parental figures, these early 
childhood traumas manifest in a variety of contradictory impulses and self-expressions.  
 Keller illuminates how this early childhood hermaphroditic identification appears in 
Francis Bacon’s scientific discourse in which he attempts to secure omnipotence by “an 
identification with the father, which allows simultaneously for the appropriation and denial of the 
feminine” (41). Bacon thinks through his scientific praxis through the metaphoric images of 
sexual hermaphroditism, rape, and childbirth. Indeed, Keller points out how there is a kind of 
acquisition of or assistance from the feminine in Bacon’s desire for the impregnation of his mind 
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by divine illumination. He imagines that he must purge himself of the atavistic errors of the old 
science, taught by the impotent and “feminine” ancients, in order to be “filled” with the virile 
new scientific principles. First, the scientist must purify his mind to a virginal state by purging 
the “old science” from its depths and transforming the mind into a receptive, submissive womb. 
God then is able to penetrate and transform the mind from female to male. Once the scientist’s 
mind is clean of its feminine miasma, God floods the worthy vessel with His phallic-light, which 
gives the scientist the creative inspiration or seminal thrust to forcefully inspect and fuse with 
nature in order to produce his own knowledge-child (Keller 38). In other words, after becoming 
“potent,” the scientist is to pursue nature by hounding, conquering, and subduing her in forced 
sexual union in order to reveal her secrets and “‘secure an increase beyond all the hopes and 
prayers of ordinary marriages, to wit, a blessed race of Heroes and Supermen’” (Bacon qtd. in 
Keller 36). One most rape nature in order to access her instrumental riches. Bacon denies the 
female as subject and his affinity with her while coopting the female reproductive mode (Keller 
41). Keller reads this appropriation of the feminine, in the face of the patriarchal call to hyper-
separate, as necessarily garnering an especially aggressive repudiation of the female subject and 
things associated with the feminine as reflected in his horrifying scientific discourse of female 
violation. Interestingly, Keller also notes that this necessary impregnation of the scientific mind 
by God as conceived by Bacon has been replaced in modern secular times by a thoroughly 
independent mind in that the “scientist himself has assumed the procreative function that Bacon 
reserved for God: his mind is now a single entity, both phallus and womb. However, his kinship 
with Bacon survives in his simultaneous appropriation and denial of the feminine” (42).  
 To sum up, scientific ideologies that promote a “cool and objective remove from the 
object of study” or that “promise[-] power and the exercise of domination over nature” reflect the 
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emotional and sexual needs and desires of the masculine subject (Keller 124). Indeed, as we will 
see, the scientists and masculine-subjects from Margaret Atwood’s MaddAddam trilogy embody 
the ambition to father the self, the hermaphroditic mode of domination over nature. As discussed 
in the next chapter, Mary Shelley’s Frankenstein also critiques how the distortions of our 
infantile and early childhood desires, fears, and anxieties by patriarchy “continue to reverberate 
throughout adult life” as reflected in the discourse and projects of the scientific subject at the 
expense of all his feminine objects (Flax 254).  
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CHAPTER TWO: Destructive Science and Subversive Creatures in Mary Shelley’s 
Frankenstein 
 
 Ecofeminists1 argue that the causes of ecological problems originate in the conceptual 
conflation and domination of women, animals, and the environment by patriarchal cultures 
(Plumwood 18; Warren 260). As discussed, feminist psychoanalytical accounts of masculine 
socialization within patriarchal culture locate the origins of this destructive domination in the 
denial and repression of early experience, the masculine repudiation of its affinity with and 
dependence on the feminine object world. They argue that because the mother/female is 
associated with the external world of things in early human development, this initial rejection of 
the feminine extends into the destruction of “nature” and general abuse of the other as an 
instrumental object – a conspicuous posture materialized in masculine scientific attitudes and 
projects. The Romantic period is noted as a time of social upheaval in which the hierarchical 
categories of identification, including gender, class, race, and species, began to come under 
scrutiny and discussion. These fiery debates manifested themselves in the scientific research of 
the period, the French Revolution, abolitionism, and the push for the enfranchisement of women 
and animals. Promising rescue from the period’s existential feelings of instability and 
vulnerability, eighteenth and early nineteenth-century science, loyal to its masculine gender 
performativity, sought the patriarchal ideals of independence, progress, truth, and control in its 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
 
1 Ecofeminism theorizes that within Western intellectual and cultural traditions there are important historical interconnections 
among the unjustified patriarchal and colonial dominations of women, human others, and nonhuman others (Warren 260). 
Oppressive ideological frameworks within Western language reinforce and perpetuate the domination of women, nature, and 
people of color. For example, hierarchical value dualisms such as man/woman, mind/body, rationality/animality, self/other, etc. 
provide the conceptual basis for the superior half of each dyad to dominate the constructed inferior dyad (Plumwood 45). 
Ecofeminists note that cultural representations of the other in Western androcentric literature and language silence and associate 
women and people of color with the “inferior” half of these binaries claiming that they are more natural, while men, the “master 
identity,” or the colonial “Self” is analogous with “culture, reason, and the realm of the mental” and is thought of as superior to 
and separated from nature and the physical realm (Warren 258). This perceived moral superiority of the masculine-self is defined 
as endowed with certain qualities (i.e. rationality, “freedom,” whiteness, objectivity) while the moral inferiority of the feminine-
other is defined by its supposed “lack” of these very qualities. The superiority of the Self justifies the subordination and 
objectification of the other (Gaard 116). Ecofeminists explore how the constructed devalued qualities of the other are policed and 
inscribed upon the bodies of women, people of color, animals, and nature thus mutually reinforcing these groups’ inferior status, 
subordination, and colonial exploitation.	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ambition to forcibly “unlock the elementary forms of [a] nature” that was figured female 
(Saunders 500). Critics have noted Romantic women writers’ apprehension of the dangers of an 
“eighteenth-century science made by men for (gentle)- men” supported by a culture whose 
knowledge production was based on misogynistic gender metaphors and the perpetuation of the 
hyper-estranged self (Mellor, “Feminist” 89; Saunders 501).  
 Mary Shelley’s 1831 version of Frankenstein anticipates feminist psychoanalytical 
critiques of the patriarchal socialization process. Overall, the novel works as a critical 
commentary on patriarchal society’s making of human beings, which is a kind of masculine 
parthenogenesis in its repressing of the feminine and praising of the ambitiously hyperseparated 
and delusively independent master-male individual. Shelley explores the dangers of this 
estrangement to both the self and the natural world of object others through her representation of 
a masculine science based on scientists’ desire to control, manipulate, and ultimately subdue and 
destroy the feminine and nature. Shelley critiques the cultural values associated with the 
penetrating and destructive treatment of nature by Father-Science. Additionally, Shelley 
constructs the creature to challenge the patriarchal establishment of self and the appropriation 
and domination of the feminine other for self-elevating purposes that manifest in the metaphors 
and descriptions of Victor’s science. She uses the creature to subvert and block the experiences 
of the “phallic authoritarian sublime” to draw attention to how it, like the metaphors of science, 
masters and appropriates the feminine and nature in order to “transform awe or fear 
into…imaginative empowerment” (Pipkin 600).     
 Part I, The Violent Metaphors of Masculine-Gendered Science, of this chapter argues that 
Frankenstein explores the malign results of patriarchal socialization on individual identity and 
romantic and familial relations. This section also looks at how human development within this 
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toxic context manifests itself in particular scientific attitudes (embodied by Victor’s probing 
masculine gendered science that conspicuously expresses a disconnected superiority and a fear of 
and desire to appropriate the feminine). Part II, Mary Shelley’s “Feminine” Appropriation of the 
“Masculine” Sublime, argues that the creature anticipates Donna Haraway’s cyborg-
revolutionary subject. The creature appears to threaten patriarchal structures of the self much in 
the same way the masculine sublime threatens the annihilation of the masculine-self in that this 
self is confronted with as aspect of “nature’s” unruly, inassimilable difference, that highlights his 
vulnerable smallness and unholy hybridity (blurred identity) as well as his overwhelming, 
repressed desire for oceanic merger with this representative of the m(other). However, the 
sublime response the creature invokes in the characters significantly offers no chance of 
transcendence or empowerment, the second moment of the sublime directly proceeding the 
masculine-subject’s disheveled confrontation with radical alterity where he “succeeds” in the 
maintenance of “borders by subordinating difference and by appropriating rather than identifying 
with that which presents itself as other” (Freeman 4). Instead, the creature firmly embeds the 
masculine-subject in his material conditions and undermines his discrete categories of being. 
Part I: The Metaphors and Violence of Masculine-Gendered Science 
 The narrative behind the development of Victor Frankenstein’s scientific personae begins 
with an exaggeratedly delineated description of the self’s “natural” gravitation toward “hard” 
penetrating science versus the feminine-other’s predictable and stronger affiliation with the 
identifying, interconnected soft womb of ecological thinking. Victor describes feeling “deeply 
smitten” with the desire “to learn the hidden laws of nature” and feels “gladness akin to rapture” 
as nature is “unfolded” to him (Shelley 22). These lines imply the scientist self as actively and 
aggressively revealing a coyly covered nature. In contradistinction, Victor describes Elizabeth as 
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preoccupied by the “majestic and wondrous scenes” which surround their “Swiss home—the 
sublime shapes of the mountains, the changes of the seasons, tempest and calm, the silence of 
winter, and the life and turbulence of…Alpine summers.” These lines juxtapose Victor’s 
intervening, masculine gaze against Elizabeth’s more gentle and gratuitous feminine inspection 
of nature. 
 Victor’s above account of his interests resembles Bacon’s sexual imagery in which he 
conquers, subdues, and shakes nature to her foundations for “the nature of things betrays itself 
more readily under the vexations of art than in its natural freedom” (qtd. in Keller 36). Victor’s 
budding identification with the scientific impulses of the masculine-self, which is rooted in the 
detached alienation and desire to dominate the other, becomes clear when he hints at his vicious 
childhood disposition: “My temper was sometimes violent, and my passions vehement; but by 
some law in my temperature they were turned not toward childish pursuits but to an eager desire 
to learn, and not to learn all things indiscriminately” (23). Child-Victor’s violent impulses 
originate in his unnatural splitting and repudiation of the maternal-other, which then fosters an 
interaction with the world reminiscent of the rational scientific sensibilities.  
 The masculine socialized individual who is attracted to a science that “advertises itself as 
revealing a reality in which subject and object are unmistakably distinct may perhaps offer 
special comfort” to someone whose identity depends on the rigid policing and maintenance of 
barriers against the return of the repressed feminine (Keller 90). And indeed, Victor’s mother 
teaches him from a very young age to objectify women and therefore the nature he associates 
with her identity. His mother’s careless language causes Victor to consider Elizabeth as his 
object and gift: “And when…she presented Elizabeth to me as her promised gift, I, with childish 
seriousness interpreted her words literally and looked upon Elizabeth as mine” (21). 
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Furthermore, she is so much his object she is a reflection or extension of Victor himself: “All 
praises bestowed on her I received as made to a possession of my own.” This is an additional 
indication of Victor’s growing potential to identify with the scientist-self who aggravates the 
distance between himself and the other-object of his study. He will soon learn from his natural 
history professors: “[The] self is the One who is not dominated […]. To be One is to be 
autonomous, to be powerful, to be God; but to be One is to be an illusion, and so to be involved 
in a dialectic of apocalypse with the other” (Haraway, Simians 177). Once this self is established 
“he” must aggressively police the chasm between the one who prods at the known and the one 
who receives the prodding. 
 After Victor’s discovery and appropriation of Cornelius Agrippa’s works he more fully 
internalizes the “dedication of techno-science to militarized and systematically unjust relations of 
knowledge and power” as indicated by his increasingly dominating language (Haraway, 
“Otherworldly” 79). In language that conspicuously mirrors Bacon’s, he describes himself to 
Walton as having been “imbued with a fervent longing to penetrate the secrets of nature” and in 
a mixture of admiration and impatient contempt describes Agrippa as having only “partially 
unveiled the face of Nature, but her immortal lineaments were still a wonder and a mystery” (25; 
my emphasis). With each consecutive day of study, Victor becomes more familiar and fluent 
with the language and logic of domination over nature.  
 At the age of seventeen it is decided that Victor will separate from his family and pursue 
his scientific studies at Ingolstadt and further develop into the masculine ideal of the 
autonomous, estranged individual. Here the separation he acquired as a child is aggravated as he 
is “taught to see nature ‘objectively,’ as something separate from [himself], as passive and even 
dead matter—that can and should be penetrated, analyzed, and controlled” (Mellor, “Feminist” 
	  
	   26 
110). Further, the scientists conflate this passive dead matter with the female sex in order to use 
nature for their own ambition for glory as indicated by Victor’s excited proclamation that he 
“will pioneer a new way, explore unknown powers, and unfold to the world the deepest 
mysteries of creation” (33). In this way, Victor the scientist, “who analyzes, manipulates, and 
attempts to control nature unconsciously engages in a form of oppressive sexual politics” 
(Mellor, “Feminist” 112). The male child’s socialization under patriarchy ultimately produces a 
certain kind of knowledge production based on dominating and exploiting nature and the 
feminine.  
 Prior to Victor’s departure to school his mother dies, emblematic of the psychoanalytical 
account of the son’s repudiation of the mother in order to establish the self. Interestingly, 
Elizabeth is described as acquiring all of Caroline Beaufort’s maternal attributes as the newly 
minted object-instrument without interests of her own: “She indeed veiled her grief and strove to 
act the comforter to us all. She looked steadily on life and assumed its duties with courage and 
zeal. She devoted herself to…her uncle and cousins” (29). Elizabeth’s conflation with the mother 
is later maliciously resolved in her murder by the creature who critics such as Anne Mellor argue 
embodies Victor’s own desire. Victor’s desire for her murder is played out in his dream, which 
significantly occurs right after he gives life to the creature who functions as a kind of surrogate 
or avatar for the deepest drives of his id: “I embraced her, but as I imprinted the first kiss on her 
lips, they became livid with the hue of death…and I thought that I held the corpse of my dead 
mother in my arms” (43). Elizabeth, as second mother, represents the return of Victor’s own 
repressed feminine side that took the form of repudiating the original mother. Elizabeth’s 
eroticism also serves as a threat to Victor’s individuality by linking him to the maternal 
undifferentiated sea by the boundary merging sex act that is a kind of psychic death. Both female 
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figures threaten his false differentiation or masculine selfhood and therefore his comfortable 
estrangement from nature. Only when the threatening feminine is transformed into mechanistic 
and inert matter can its presence be tolerated and enjoyed.  
 Victor begins his studies at Ingolstadt having internalized the desire of the masters of 
science “[who seek] immortality and power” by lawfully wedding and then violently 
“penetrat[ing] into the recesses of nature [to] show how she works in her hiding-places” (32). 
Victor’s mentor M. Waldman deploys such rhetoric to inspire his students, words that resemble 
Keller’s description of the Baconian metaphor of the scientific practice as sexual domination 
over female nature. Victor’s desperate desire to emulate M. Waldman’s grandiose description of 
science’s command and penetration into the workings of nature manifests in his drive to create 
the creature (33). Victor’s schoolboy reverence for the paternal professor resembles Bacon’s 
promise of sexual dominion over nature to his apprentice as documented in Benjamin 
Farrington’s Temporis Partus Masculus: An Untranslated Writing of Francis Bacon: “My dear, 
dear boy, what I plan for you is to unite you with things themselves in a chaste, holy, and legal 
wedlock. And from this association you will secure an increase beyond all the hopes and prayers 
of ordinary marriages, to wit, a blessed race of Heroes and Supermen” (qtd. in Keller 36). The 
goals of the scientists are to exploit and dominate nature’s resources so as to create a kind of 
independent self-serving mirror self for it is they who want to sire and be Supermen (Mellor, 
“Feminist” 112).  
 Keller notes an overlooked complementary part to the master metaphor of penetrating a 
female nature. She finds a kind of feminine receptivity and responsiveness in Bacon’s language: 
“For man is but the servant and interpreter of nature […]. [N]ature [can only] be 
commanded…by being obeyed” (qtd. in Keller 36). This passage reveals the paradoxical 
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assertion that the scientist must be both domineering and submissive. The scientist must be 
receptive and permeable to the piercingly seminal knowledge of God to become endowed with 
the ability to penetrate into nature and sire a Hero. Bacon claims that the “older science 
represented only a female off-spring, passive, weak, expectant, but now a son was born, active, 
virile, generative” (qtd. in Keller 38). This statement reveals the rejection of the feminine from 
the self and aspiration toward the father. M. Krempe confirms this sentiment when he exclaims 
that Victor “[has] burdened [his] memory with exploded systems and useless names […]. My 
dear sir, you must begin your studies entirely anew” (31). According to Bacon and M. Krempe, 
Victor must begin his studies anew in order to birth the masculine virile science by 
“cleansing…the human mind of ‘false preconceptions,’ so as to facilitate receptivity” (Keller 
38). After the mind is cleansed, “the mind can be impregnated by God and, in that act, virilized: 
made potent and capable of generating virile offspring in its union with Nature” (Keller 38). 
Henceforth, the scientific Mind is male and can sire male progeny with female Nature by force 
via the penetration of her secrets in a mode that resembles rape.  
 Accordingly, Victor is made to repudiate the ancient “feminine” science in the same way 
he repudiated identification with the mother and instead studies modern natural philosophy under 
the guidance of M. Waldman. Indeed, Victor’s mind is restored back to its feminine virgin 
pureness and God’s rays of light hungrily penetrate his mind and leave him heavy with the virile 
knowledge needed to couple with female nature and yield “Heroes and Supermen”: “The moon 
gazed on my midnight labours, while, with unrelaxed and breathless eagerness, I pursued nature 
to her hiding-places” (39). After the aggressive interaction with nature, Victor’s mind 
“conceives” the product of this forced union, namely, he “discover[s] the cause of generation and 
life” and becomes “capable of bestowing animation upon lifeless matter” (37). Keller perceives 
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that behind the hermaphroditic nature of the scientific mind is a mark of Freud’s description of 
the male child’s sexual fantasy. The child originally identifies with both the mother and father 
but then is socially pressured to identify with the “race of fathers who can give birth” and deny 
the mother, which gives him the power to assert the self in a delusion of “omnipotent self-
sufficiency” (Keller 41). The child achieves omnipotence by “giving birth to himself” while both 
appropriating and denying the mother. Victor does repress the maternal in his fantasies of 
Elizabeth’s murder and appropriates it in his womb-like laboratory, his “workshop of filthy 
creation,” a “female space” (Youngquist 347) where the embryo-creature’s “intricacies of fibres, 
muscles, and veins” develop to maturity like “toil in the mines” or in a “solitary chamber, or 
rather a cell” until the “moon gaze[s] on” the “midnight labours” of Victor’s “breathless” 
birthing event that causes his “eyeballs…[to] start[-] from their sockets” (39, 41). Overall, the 
masculine self who aspires to independence and alienated omnipotence first denies and then 
assimilates the feminine into the male self, represented by female genocide within Frankenstein 
and Victor’s new reproductive capacities.  
 The patriarchal colonization of the feminine and science’s denial of the other’s 
subjecthood leads to nature’s attempted instrumentalization and women’s dehumanization, all 
participants ultimately culminating in destruction. Conceptualizing the other as an object to be 
entirely consumed and transformed into an extension of the self leads to oppressive gender 
politics and the ruination of nature. Mary Wollstonecraft argues from a similar perspective in her 
essay “A Vindication of the Rights of Women” that the treatment of women as subordinate 
disgraces masculine characters, leading to moral decay. What she says of women is applicable to 
any disenfranchised group including non-human others: “They may be convenient slaves, but 
slavery will have its constant effect, degrading the master and the abject dependent” 
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(Wollstonecraft 212). Resembling the previously discussed theories of psychosocial 
development, Wollstonecraft believes that “English men have been forced to assume the social 
role of the master and thus taught to be demanding, self-indulgent, arrogant, tyrannical. Treating 
their women as inferior dependents has undermined men’s ability to understand the needs of 
others, to act justly or compassionately” (Mellor, “Revolution” 37). As discussed, the feminine is 
indeed both degraded and destroyed in the novel represented by the metaphors of science and 
symbolic deaths of Elizabeth and his mother, all an effect of patriarchal socialization.  
 The feminine within Victor is also deadened due to his patriarchal socialization. Victor is 
poisoned in his inability to identify with the mother and perform as the recognizing subject or 
“parent” for he only hears the creature mutter “some inarticulate sounds” and declares that the 
creature “might have spoken, but I did not hear” before abandoning him (43). Victor is also 
afflicted by patriarchy as the “charms of nature” become imperceptible to him during his 
experiment as do the affections of his family, decaying under the “attack by the fatal passion” 
that leaves him isolated with a “slow fever,…and nervous to a most painful degree” (47). If the 
creature is indeed an attempt to sire oneself, Victor’s flight also implicitly suggests his continued 
unhealthy suppression of the knowledge that he too requires recognition by and is dependent on 
the other. Overall, the agitated subject-object split harms both nature and its inhabitants as they 
purge themselves of an affiliation with the feminine and thereby the natural world.  
 Shelley’s implicit critique of the damaging project of repudiating, dominating, and 
appropriating nature and the feminine by nineteenth-century scientists of a polarized 
hermaphroditic mind parallels the use of females and nature in Romantic literature in general. 
For example, in “The Eolian Harp” Samuel Taylor Coleridge uses a feminine figure that displays 
flirtatious prudery toward her lover to represent his idea that the “intellectual breeze” of 
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Nature/God must ravish the human consciousness in order to inspire the imagination to flighty 
poetic visions. Perhaps Shelley took notice of and desired to critique the “role that gender plays 
in masculine Romanticism…[where] the poet [is seen] appropriating whatever of the feminine he 
deems valuable and then consigning the rest either to silence or to the category of evil” (Mellor, 
“Gender” 27). Upon a surface glance, Victor and Elizabeth’s early relationship is described as a 
balance of complementary gendered opposites, an image consistent in Romantic poetry: 
“Harmony was the soul of our companionship, and the diversity and contrast that subsisted in our 
characters drew us nearer together” (23). Eventually, this harmony fails and the feminine is 
murdered in alignment with the self’s need to repudiate the feminine. In fact, each character that 
is read as Victor’s feminine half or acts in a feminine manner is initially described as in balance 
and harmony with Victor’s own masculine identity but each feminine figure or character that 
dabbles in femininity is ultimately destroyed. For example, Elizabeth having internalized her 
status as object, earth mother teaches Clerval, who “might not have been so perfectly humane, so 
thoughtful in his generosity, so full of kindness and tenderness amidst his passion for 
adventurous exploit,” the feminine art of beneficence and good service in substitute for the 
masculine ambition he clearly had been socialized into internalizing (24). Due to Elizabeth’s 
feminine socialization of Clerval, he later serves as Victor’s nurse and also seems to house a 
stronger feminine connection with nature. Ultimately, Clerval is destroyed by the creature in a 
continuation of the symbolic rampage of killing all that is feminine within the self.  
 According to Mellor, feminine qualities are colonized and then appropriated in much of 
masculine Romantic love poetry as in the poet’s search for the ideal woman in “Alastor” when 
the speaker says, “Her voice was like the voice of his own soul” (P. Shelley 153). No doubt 
Shelley noticed the incorporation and instrumentalization underlying the praise of harmonizing 
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the sexes in much Romantic poetry. In other words, she noticed how the male poet “rather than 
embracing the female as a valued other,…[often] effaces her into a narcissistic projection of his 
own self” (Mellor, “Gender” 25). Mellor believes that the female beloved the male Romantic 
poet extols is but “self-love: he ignores her human otherness in order to impose his own 
metaphors, his own identity, upon her, to render her but a clone (or soul mate) of himself” much 
like Baconian hermaphroditic science appropriates the feminine to sire the self (“Gender” 27). 
Ideas of harmony are founded on the same problematic and oppressive masculine/feminine 
binaries that dissolve and unify back into a single masculine form.  
Part II: Mary Shelley’s “Feminine” Appropriation of the “Masculine” Sublime 
 In having Victor form the boundary blurring, feminine, and sublime creature who 
ultimately refuses incorporation or complementary subjecthood, Mary Shelley seems aware of 
the “[g]reat riches for feminists in explicitly embracing the possibilities inherent in the 
breakdown of clean distinctions…structuring the Western self ,” how categorical collapse 
“cracks the matrices of domination and opens geometric possibilities” (Haraway, Simians 174). 
While Shelley is clearly sustaining a powerful critique against the hubris and dominating aspects 
of some branches of the patriarchy’s nineteenth-century scientific enterprise, arguably, she also 
is keenly aware of the liberating potential of the biological sciences especially in the Romantic-
era’s newly formed natural histories. Specifically, one could read Erasmus Darwin’s proto-
evolutionary theory that the “whole is one family of one parent” whose members share “mutual 
bonds and…affections” as an egalitarian reconceptualization of the proper place of women as a 
node within an intricate and hypervolume, circular rhizome rather than above the animals and 
below God and man on the Great Chain of Being (qtd. in Fosso 2). As Mellor notes, Shelley 
implicitly condones observational scientific research that attempts to “describe accurately the 
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functionings of the physical universe” and opposes that “which attempts to control or change the 
universe through human intervention” (“Feminist” 90). However, upon further reflection the text 
does not offer such a clear delineation between the sciences she either accepts or rejects. It seems 
Shelley entertains the possibility of biotechnology’s liberating potentials and uses her knowledge 
of the science of her time to construct a powerful and sublimely, subversive creature who is 
tragically socialized and ostracized by the patriarchy and thereby destroyed.  
 Victor’s creature is more than a surface warning against interfering and transgressing 
against nature in the form of irresponsibly power-motivated experiments doomed to failure. The 
creature is also (ironically) a short-lived feminist celebratory hope for escape from the roles 
forced onto female embodiment in patriarchal culture, according to Paul Youngquist’s reading, 
as well as an alternative to the so-called harmonized sexes which is, to put it crudely, a male 
figure with a swallowed female inside. Shelley purposely constructs Victor as passionately 
devoted to and obsessed with the success of his scientific project. He is wrapped up in the 
pleasure of his narcissistic anticipation of glory and a species that would “bless [him] as its 
creator and source” so that his failure is felt as that much more devastating to the patriarchal 
program that wishes to subordinate and objectify nature and the feminine into self-interested use 
value. Rather than altruism or a sense of service to his community, Victor whole-heartedly 
pursues his work for the “glory [that] would attend the discovery” (26). Rather than searching for 
the connections and understandings between humans and nature, in a mode of selfish ambition 
Victor and his brother-scientists attempt to “ascend into the heavens” and “acquire[-] new and 
almost unlimited powers” to “command the thunders of heaven, mimic the earthquake, and even 
mock the invisible world with its own shadows” (33). The complex hubristic mixture of too 
serious tragic heroism, delusions of omnipotence, mastery, derision, and a glut for power are 
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what thrive in this description of the scientific agenda, which Shelley pleasurably thwarts 
through the creature.  
 The goal of science in the text is to dominate and control nature as commodities and 
services but Victor fails and falls unspeakably far from this idealization in setting loose the 
uncontrollable embodiment of sublime nature without the hope for masculine transcendence or 
inspiration. In contradistinction, from the perspective of feminism the creature is not a failure at 
all but in actuality the ironic formation of the liminal other, the “cyborg monster” that challenges 
the “political possibilities and limits from those proposed by the mundane fiction of Man and 
Woman” and Nature (Haraway, Simians 180). Victor fails to truly comprehend M. Walden’s 
naïve yet prophetic consolation that “[t]he labours of men of genius, however erroneously 
directed, scarcely ever fail in ultimately turning to the solid advantage of mankind” in that he has 
created a revolutionary figure that will not submit to its incorporation by the patriarch as nature 
and the feminine have been made to do (34).  
 The monster is a liberating image in the sense of Haraway’s cyborg in that he helps 
“redefine the…politics of embodiment” (179). First, it is important to note that the post-gendered 
world of the cyborg differs from Mary Wollstonecraft’s androgynous ideals. The cyborg is 
embodied as a kind of polymorphously perverse binary collapse while Wollstonecraft’s 
androgyne is a disembodied, floating brain in the public space but loyal to his or her appropriate 
gender role in the private sphere as assigned to female and male anatomies by the colonizing 
hegemonic master narrative. Furthermore, the monster-cyborg is different from the way 
Romantic writers have idealized the gender poles by calling for their harmonization in a pursuit 
of mythic wholeness. This dualistic vision of harmony often maintains an oppressive distinction 
between culture/nature and man/woman whereas the revolutionary creature’s monstrosity de-
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natures/mutates sure binaries. The creature is a proto-cyborg revolutionary figure because he 
dwells on the boundaries distinguishing sacred and profane, natural and unnatural, and forces 
one to acknowledge one’s proximity to inanimate matter and animality. He queerly reveals that 
all life forms, including the stable, rational subject, are actually a “mesh, a nontotalizable, open-
ended concatenation of interrelations that blur and confound boundaries at practically any level: 
between species, between living and nonliving” (Morton, “Queer Ecology” 276). He denies the 
self’s delusion of firm boundaries and homocentric superiority as he is fashioned from human 
and animal materials taken from charnel houses and slaughterhouses. The creature mixes gender 
roles and interests in that he femininely delights in the “sight of flowers, the birds, and all the gay 
apparel of summer” (112). He is also cultured in the Western literary canon, thus becoming the 
most rationally male character in the novel in the Romantic sense. Yet he is also “like a wild 
beast…ranging through the wood with a staglike swiftness” as well as being eloquent, reasoning, 
and sincere (116).  
 Because the creature is made rather than born, he undermines the patriarchal myth of 
original unity “represented by the phallic mother from whom all humans must separate…with its 
inescapable apocalypse of final return to a deathly oneness that Man has imaged to be the 
innocent and all-powerful Mother, freed at the End from another spiral of appropriation by her 
son” (Haraway, Simians 176). This is the myth that interpellates scientists and poets into 
repudiating and assimilating the feminine and nature in their work and it is also the medical 
narrative used to account for and justify male estrangement, domination, and objectification of 
nature and the feminine. Instead the creature is human created, defying rigid definitions of 
human authenticity and “naturalness,” and so potentially immune to such poisonous self-
fulfilling prophesy. Finally, as the cyborg realm is a “monstrous world without gender,” meaning 
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an escape from gender performativity and prescription, Shelley too fantasizes “female 
independence from the biological fate of motherhood” (Youngquist 353). She imagines freedom 
from compulsory reproduction and oppressive gender roles as represented by the creature’s total 
disregard to the norm of maintaining the integrity of identity categories as well as the hope 
embodied by the new medical technologies that artificially generate the creature that suggest 
unprecedented bodily autonomy. Shelley both critiques Victor’s destructive parthenogenesis 
while also taking advantage of its liberating potential. The creature represents the fantasy of an 
escape from patriarchal hierarchical identities and their stagnant corresponding fates.   
 The creature stimulates feelings in the characters of an overwhelming sublime nature in 
his challenge of patriarchal definitions of self while also blocking the usual accompanying 
inspiration and transcendence, thus presenting a subtle critique of the masculine sublime. Victor 
wanted to create a tame species of slaves to nurse his ego and instead forms the sublime proto-
cyborg, the revolutionary subject, the epitome of transgression against the master narratives of 
colonizing science and patriarchal family politics for which Victor stands. No wonder Victor 
feels “the beauty of the dream vanish[-], and breathless horror and disgust fill[-] [his] heart” as 
he gazes upon the “being [he] had created” and decides to flee the scene of his blasphemy (42). 
Upon the opening of the “dull yellow eye of the creature” Victor stands vis-à-vis with the 
sublime and subversive figure, shocked to learn that nature is “[n]either mother, nurse, lover, nor 
slave, nature is not matrix, resource, mirror, [muse], nor tool for the reproduction of that odd 
ethnocentric, phallogocentric, putatively universal being called Man” (Haraway, “Otherworldly” 
70). Perhaps sensing the “boundary-maintaining images of base and superstructure, public and 
private, or material and ideal never seem[ing] more feeble” (Haraway, Simians 165), Victor 
ambiguously exclaims, “Beautiful! Great God!” before describing the creature’s mixture of 
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beautiful and horrific features much like the sublimity one would feel on the edge of a craggy 
precipice (42). Victor’s mission was to dominate and control nature and thereby ascend to 
heaven much like the creative process one undergoes as a part of the male transcendental 
sublime. The male poet’s experience of the sublime is described as beginning in a desire to 
control the alienating and threatening natural world with the hope that “through transcendence” 
he might “escape the confines of the physical world in order to rejoin, on a ‘higher’ 
spiritual/intellectual level, an idealized nature that he has subdued” (Pipkin 599). The aesthetics 
of the transcendental or “masculine” sublime begins with a debilitating and humbling sense of 
fear and awe in the insignificance and smallness of “man” in the face of an intimidating aspect of 
nature. However, the subject quickly recovers from this humiliating experience in his desire to 
control the nature world through transcendence where the “subject’s mind and/or imagination is 
exalted above nature, transcending anything it encounters in the material world”  (Economides, 
“Sublimity” 89). Instead, Victor sets nature free gaining an unwanted glimpse of the true image 
of and humanity’s affinity to the nonhuman and the so-called feminine as multiform, blurred, and 
uncontrollable. The creature represents the experience of the sublime as the disruption of 
traditional culture – he is the image of the revolutionary who decides that his fate “shall not be 
the submission of abject slavery” (124).  
 Shelley seems to subtly invert Romanticism’s “identification of the sublime 
with…masculine empowerment” and instead constructs the sublime as the horrifying experience 
of the destabilization of the patriarchal sense of self and its appropriating tendencies through the 
image of the creature (Mellor, “Domesticating” 91). She refuses to satisfy the “masculinist 
sublime that seeks to master, appropriate, or colonize the other” by first “femininely” and 
passively submitting to the overwhelming forces of nature before being impregnated with an 
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epiphany in order to actively transform fear into poetic empowerment (Pipkin 599). A method 
aesthetically similar to this is used in the previously discussed account of scientific 
hermaphroditism in order to repudiate the female while fathering the self and virile sons. Instead, 
Shelley seems to appropriate and parody the masculine sublime by forming the creature who 
sabotages patriarchal projects of transcendence, glory, and stable selfhood. For example, Victor’s 
journey to the village of Chamounix to climb to the peak of Montanvert is at first in complete 
conformity to the masculine construction of the sublime. He tells Walton that the “view of the 
tremendous and ever-moving glacier” filled him with a “sublime ecstasy that gave wings to the 
soul and allowed it to soar from the obscure world to light and joy” (79). However, the creature 
serves as a kind of blockage to this experience of transcending one’s physical limitations for the 
“presence of another would destroy the solitary grandeur of the scene.” Indeed, the moment 
Victor experiences the overwhelming sublimity of nature the creature approaches him provoking 
more horrific and monstrous images of the sublime: “He bounded over the ice…sight 
tremendous and abhorred!” (80).   
 Earlier in the novel the first glimpse that Victor gets of the creature since its animation in 
his feminine-appropriating laboratory is at the site of William’s murder amongst a torrent of 
sublime lightning. The moment he realizes that the creature is the harbinger of death to 
patriarchal selfhood the lighting illuminates the creature “hanging among the rocks of the nearly 
perpendicular ascent of Mont Salêve” (60). This image aligns the creature with a subversive 
sublime. The image of the creature amongst the sublime weather and landscape momentarily 
shocks Victor into recognizing his mortality, his identity as a “being of nature” whose existence 
is entirely wrapped up in others and forces greater than he, all of which runs counter to his 
patriarchal conception of alienated selfhood and delusion of omnipotence (Hitt 607). For 
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example, the creature provokes Victor to ponder the interconnectedness of life signified by the 
vulnerability of his family: “I considered the being whom I had cast among mankind and 
endowed with the will and power to effect purposes of horror…nearly in the light of my own 
vampire, my own spirit let loose from the grave” (60). Moreover, these lines suggest both 
Victor’s identification with the creature as his sired self and a reading of the creature’s 
subversive potential as horrifying to the integrity of patriarchal structures. It is atop the sublime 
mountain that Victor again momentarily sympathizes with the creature after the creature’s 
narrative: “I compassioned him and sometimes felt a wish to console him” (126). The creature 
provokes Victor to cross his constructed anatomical boundaries and to acknowledge the 
similarities between the self and other that is not an extension of the self. Victor comes close 
here to learning that to truly love the natural, “not as a mirror of our mind but as sheer otherness, 
would be to love what is least subjective about it,” what is strange, “ugly,” and disconcerting 
(Morton, “Dark Ecology” 266). The creature invites him to step out of his solitary and sterile 
existence but he “cannot bear so much reality” and responds to such a sublime prospect in 
unrelieved and unproductive horror (Randel 528).   
 All of the characters that come into contact with the creature respond to him with the 
same exclamation of “Great God!” This horror signifies a Burkian sublimity, which is 
experienced as the threat of annihilation of the self on a psychic-level, but only here also, Shelley 
offers no opportunity for patriarchal empowerment. The sociocultural context that the characters 
inhabit is not a “cyborg world…in which people are not afraid of their joint kinship with animals 
and machines, not afraid of permanently partial identities and contradictory standpoints” 
(Haraway, Simians 154). These blurred identities threaten patriarchal selfhood. Even the liberal 
egalitarian De Lacey family of harmonized masculine and feminine opposites cannot tolerate the 
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monstrous “breach of nature and culture,” the transgression of the boundary between human and 
animal, life and death, artificial and natural (152). The old man De Lacey requests that the 
creature confess his story: “I am blind and cannot judge of your countenance, but there is 
something in your words which persuades me that you are sincere. I am poor and an exile, but it 
will afford me true pleasure to be in any way serviceable to a human creature” (Shelley 114). 
These sentences reveal the body as a map of social relations. They reveal De Lacey’s allegiance 
to gender conformity and definitions of man as of culture, not of nature or animal disposition. 
According to Jonathan Bate, the De Lacey’s treatment of the creature can also be considered 
“speciesist” (53) where speciesism, like racism and sexism, is defined as the discrimination 
“against an other based only on a generic description and not on what we actually know about its 
needs, interests, and capabilities” (Wolfe, Animal Rites 34). Indeed, it is Felix’s shallow response 
to the creature’s outward, alien appearance that leads to his condemnation not his internal merits 
or concerns. And so, upon the family’s entrance the creature begs for protection whereupon the 
old man exclaims, “Great God!...Who are you?” and the family falls apart in sublime horror 
(115).  
 The horrified inquiry into the identity of the creature is significant, suggesting an 
awareness of the creature’s unlawful hybridity. Felix responds with violence forcing the creature 
to the ground and striking him “violently with a stick” (115). They cannot tolerate the 
heterogeneous multiplicity of themselves they see reflected back at them in the form of the 
creature and respond by dominating, an attempt to repress the creature back into conformity as 
the proper image of the object other to secure their senses of self. Furthermore, the text 
emphasizes again the creature’s alignment with the sublime when the creature remarks that he 
“could have torn [Felix] limb from limb, as the lion rends the antelope.” The characters’ fear of 
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annihilation corresponds to the sublime representation of the socially destabilizing and 
overwhelming presentation of a more accurate and “meshed” version of the human: post-gender, 
post-reproduction, animalistic and cultured, uncontrollably passionate, reasonable, and godless.  
 Likewise, Victor later creates a female creature who embodies the “meshed” notions of 
unlawful hybridity above so thoroughly that she is prematurely and violently destroyed prior to 
animation. Victor responds to the sublime potential of his female creature with horror and 
aggression similar to the way the De Lacey family responded to his first male creature. His 
aggression and horror is a deep-seated fear of the transgressive, uncontrollable subject, the proto-
cyborg that collapses his logic of domination and source of power by undermining gender roles, 
species boundaries, and the nature/culture divide. Furthermore, the female creature threateningly 
embodies more sublime connotations rather than the beautiful as prescribed by Burke who 
believes the category of the beautiful “demarcates the limits of the sublime, maintains the social 
order by transforming lust into love, distinguishes feminine from male characteristics” (Pipkin 
605). The cyborg-female-monster “defies that sexist aesthetic that insists that women be small 
delicate, modest, passive, and sexually pleasing” (Mellor, “Possessing” 360). Victor reasons that, 
much like Mary Wollstonecraft, the female creature, “who in probability was to become a 
thinking and reasoning animal, might refuse to comply with a compact made before her creation” 
(144). He senses that his creatures stand for a restructuring of family, race, sex, and class in that 
they challenge the defined limits of the patriarchal self and other. The female creature wakes him 
to the notion that there is “nothing about being ‘female’ that naturally binds women. There is not 
even such a state as ‘being’ female, itself a highly complex category constructed in contested 
sexual scientific discourses and other social practices” (Haraway, Simians 155). Victor conceives 
of the female creature as a being who “threatens the very foundation of patriarchal power” and 
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his own definitions of the self, so he violently destroys a creature who “might assert her own 
integrity and the revolutionary right to determine her own existence” apart from the 
consciousness forced upon her by colonizing patriarchy (Mellor, “Possessing” 360).  
 Like the female monster, the illegitimate proto-cyborg creature has no fertile ground to 
cultivate his wisdom of liminal multiform existence. This picture of the creature was perhaps 
informed by Wollstonecraft’s solitary fight, a woman who was slandered as a hybrid, monstrous 
“hyena in petticoats” and doomed as a female body with an “unnatural” genius. The creature is 
seduced and falls prey to fulfilling the patriarchal apocalypse as Wollstonecraft was destroyed by 
the toxic fate of compulsory femininity and reproduction. Early in the text Victor frames a 
foreshowing of the tragedies to come when he begs Walton, “[l]earn from me, if not by my 
precepts, at least by my example, how dangerous is the acquirement of knowledge and how 
much happier that man is who believes his native town to be the world, than he who aspires to 
become greater than his nature will allow” (38). These lines simultaneously warn against human 
hubris as well as possibly expressing Shelley’s desire for the ignorance of feminine conformity 
and acceptance of her biological fate that her mother made impossible. Shelley seems to warn 
that the way is barren and long for the isolated revolutionary subject often ending in failure.  
 Haraway interestingly points out how Victor’s creature falls short of her cyborg ideal in 
that he still exhibits a neurosis of false consciousness and aspires toward patriarchal self-
assertion and social acceptance: “[T]he cyborg does not expect its father to save it through a 
restoration of the garden; that is, through the fabrication of a heterosexual mate, through its 
completion in a finished whole, a city and cosmos” (Haraway, Simians 151). The creature fails in 
his revolutionary potential because of the lack of guiding cyborg feminist authority and his self-
education that consists of patriarchal origin myths. Felix unknowingly instructs the creature in 
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“the strange system of human society…the division of property, of immense wealth and squalid 
poverty, of rank, descent, and noble blood” (Shelley 100). The creature reports that the “words 
induced me to turn toward myself” stimulating him to narcissistically reflect on his own identity 
and void status (Shelley 100). These lines suggest the creature is stirred to the aspiration of a 
patriarchal identity that he knows he will never be able to acquire. Moreover, he comes to 
idealize patriarchal society’s desire for father-identification, the self-sacrifice of mothers, 
autonomy, and gender difference: “Other lessons were impressed upon me even more deeply. I 
heard of the difference of sexes,…how all the life and cares of the mother were wrapped up in 
the precious charge” (101). Learning the supposed “proper” formulation of the nuclear 
heterosexual family, the creature goes on to lament his lack. He acknowledges his own social 
conditioning by remarking that the “patriarchal lives of my protectors caused these impressions 
to take firm hold on my mind” and comments that if he had been exposed to more revolutionary 
perspectives he might “have been imbued with different sensations.” Human nature is not 
determined but instead it is learned. His secret education persuades him to live out the patriarchal 
apocalypse of Oedipal warfare whose conclusion ultimately is self-annihilation in a symbolic 
return to the mother as represented by his preconceived fiery death engulfed by the frozen 
maternal sea. While the creature’s tale ends in a predictable patriarchal tragedy, Shelley has still 
planted a cryptic yet subversive seed.  
 Mary Shelley’s account of Victor’s patriarchal maturation process and corresponding 
socialization into a scientist anticipates feminist psychoanalytical critiques of human 
development. This development entails the establishment of selfhood at the cost of objectifying, 
rejecting, dominating, and instrumentalizing the other of the first bond and nature. Additionally, 
the text reveals the appropriation of the feminine by the masculine mind as outlined in Victor’s 
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apprenticeship, figuratively, a scientific-sexual maturation process. The dangerous consequences 
of these gender politics, which encompass the domination and repression of a multiform nature, 
are reproduced by the patriarchal family and manifested in science. They are implicit in the 
gruesome murders of the female characters and Victor’s own physical and mental deterioration. 
Furthermore, while the text offers a critique of both the patriarchal socialization process and its 
mirror within the scientific enterprise, Shelley also figures biotechnological endeavors as 
potentially liberating. She revises the masculine notion of the sublime as overwhelming yet 
ultimately empowering by creating the sublime creature, that in many ways mirrors feminine 
nature, to subversively disrupt and even transform reified identity categories and defy 
subordination and incorporation by the masculine-poetic-scientific mind.  
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CHAPTER THREE: The Domination of Women and Nature by Biotechnological 
Patriarchal-Capitalist Culture in Margaret Atwood’s Oryx and Crake  
 
Humanity had to inflict terrible injuries on itself 
before the self—the identical, purpose-directed, masculine 
character of human beings—was created, and something 
of this process is repeated in every childhood. 
 
Max Horkeimer & Theodor Adorno, Dialectic of Enlightenment (1944) 
 
 Margaret Atwood’s Oryx and Crake updates for our own time Mary Shelley’s 
interrogation of her nineteenth-century society. Atwood explores how the “masculine” pathology 
that is nurtured within twenty-first century Western middle-class capitalist families is implicated 
in the destruction of human and nonhuman “nature” as exemplified in the objectification of 
animals and women by the scientific communities and within the consuming milieu of the 
pleeblands. Specifically, Atwood looks at how the technoscientific-capitalist patriarchal 
environment shapes the scientist Crake’s masculine subjectivity and problematic life aspirations 
to ultimately critique the masculinization of science and its dangerous consequences for women, 
animals, and the health of the planet in general. The laboratory animals and Oryx epitomize the 
for-profit products of late-biocapitalism, what Haraway terms the “informatics of domination,” 
while Jimmy and Crake represent its horrifying orchestrators. 
 Part I, Interpersonal Distortions and Technocratic Hegemony as Products of Human 
Development within Western Patriarchal Culture, argues that Oryx and Crake explores the 
process and malign results of patriarchal socialization on individual identity as well as romantic, 
fraternal, and familial interpersonal relations through the experiences of Jimmy, Crake, and their 
families. The novel also looks at how human development within this context manifests itself in 
particular scientific attitudes (embodied by Crake’s probing masculine gendered science that 
reeks of a disconnected superiority and a fear of and desire to appropriate the feminine). Part II, 
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Life as “Other” within the Technocratic Hegemony, briefly looks at how these technocratic 
cultural values and projects culminate in tragic consequences for humanity and nature as well as 
for women in Oryx and Crake.  
Part I: Interpersonal Distortions and Technocratic Hegemony as Products of Human 
Development within Western Patriarchal Culture 
 As discussed in the previous chapters of this thesis, boys develop hyper-independent 
detached individualities and girls selfless, object-instrument personas in patriarchal households 
in which women mother. Moreover, the estranged masculine subject is associated with 
controlling and dominating relational capacities while the undifferentiated, continuous feminine 
object lacks individuality, self-boundaries and performs the interpersonal role of “abject 
dependency, the inability to tolerate separation and aloneness” (Benjamin 160). Nancy 
Chodorow has illustrated in her essay “The Sexual Sociology of Adult Life” these “[d]iffering 
relational capacities and forms of identification prepare women and men to assume the adult 
gender roles which situate women primarily within the sphere of reproduction in a sexually 
unequal society” and men in the general labor force or scientific and technical workforce (265). 
Indeed, a similar occurrence is explored in the postmodern dystopian society of the novel Oryx 
and Crake where sexually polarized psychodynamics conditions men and women for their 
appropriate place within a “strongly bimodal social structure, with the masses of women and 
men of all ethnic groups, but especially people of colour, confined to a homework economy, 
illiteracy of several varieties, and general redundancy and impotence, controlled by high-tech 
repressive apparatuses ranging from entertainment to surveillance and disappearance” (Haraway, 
Simians 169). In the novels, women socialized under patriarchy in both classes “lead[-] an 
existence that always borders on being obscene, out of place, and reducible to sex” (166). The 
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men either assume submissive lower level jobs that require obedience and conformity (a posture 
that reveals the boy’s dream of total union/merger with or envelopment by the m(other) as the 
faulty response to the original separation) or they assert themselves in controlling or domineering 
positions of power such as those advertised by science (a father-identifying, mother-repudiating 
posture). Thus, though Oryx is conditioned for and confined to the homework economy while  
Sharon, Jimmy’s mother, is primed for the technocratic private home2 they operate in the same 
fashion as exploitable and selfless object-instruments of subservience in accordance with their 
socialization under patriarchy. Jimmy takes a less “masculine” position as an advertisement 
producer, and Crake pursues the stereotypic male dream of dominion over nature, as they aspire 
to their contradictory projects of reunion with and denial of the maternal respectively.  
 Benjamin describes the dominating male and submissive female roles as defensive 
responses linked to false differentiation originating in the precarious separation-individuation 
period. Under patriarchy, when the child begins to feel himself separate from the mother (and 
understand neither he nor his mother to be omnipotent in their original unity with nature) he 
often defensively responds by denying his anxiety and loss and instead turning it into confidence 
and mastery: “the child seeks mastery over the frustrations of separation and lack of gratification 
through assertion of self against the mother and all that she represents and a rejection of all 
dependency on her” (Bordo 107). In an attempt to carve out a self from the mother matrix or 
“place the other outside the sphere of mental control of omnipotence,” the infant inflicts 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
2 Jimmy’s mother eventually decides to rebel against the expectation that she will perform according to the tradition of the self-
sacrificing female by abandoning her family to join an underground resistance movement. However, it is important to note that 
the toxic patriarchal environment leaves her with two desperate and ultimately unfulfilling, life-stealing options, namely, to 
quietly conform to her role as object that she was conditioned to assume or perpetually mourn the unavoidable separation from 
her children and meet an untimely death as a “treasonous” revolutionary. Regardless, she has to fall into the despair of the 
isolation of the domestic sphere, the female space she was created to manage where she socializes Jimmy under the patriarchal 
definitions of masculinity and femininity, before she realizes that the dismantling of her totalitarian corporation-run state would 
beneficially impact more people potentially than if she were to remain with her children or in a situation where she could keep 
her life. While Sharon is transparent about her contempt for the unethical treatment of scientific test subjects and uncritical, 
profit-driven biotechnological manipulations of nature, it is not clear whether her motives for resistance center around a desire to 
undermine gender prescriptions and relations, a project essential to the success of social and environmental justice movements.   
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aggressive acts upon the mother in the hopes of colliding with the “other’s resistance . . . to 
establish her or his solid, independent presence,” to place her outside his field of omnipotence 
(Benjamin 164). It is important that the mother recognize these acts so as to give “her or him the 
feeling of meaningful selfhood and relations with others.” If the mother does not set a limit, 
respond in a way that asserts her own independent subjectivity, the child will fail to place the 
other outside the self and fail to understand boundaries. In the case of failure “the act of placing 
the other outside is converted to assertion of control or possession over her…, in a denial of 
one’s own dependence” (166). The result is a male child for “which the outside world is seen 
purely as a creation of and an object for the self” (Flax 260). The other is felt purely as an object 
and instrument and the subject is eternally frustrated by the need for recognition and separation. 
Therefore, the child, depending on its gender socialization, spends life either denying its 
dependency and need for recognition by controlling, objectifying, and instrumentalizing the 
other to establish an acute distance and dissimilarity or relinquishing selfhood in the “female 
posture [which] disposes [one] to accept objectification and control in order to flee separation, 
both as aloneness and as self-assertion” (Benjamin 167). Interestingly, the male personality 
remains hazardously balanced between falling back into its longing for symbiosis with and 
maintaining its suffocating separation from the other. As a result, “one’s own wishes, body, 
women, and anything like them (nature) must be partially objectified, depersonalized and rigidly 
separated from the core self in order to be controlled” (Flax 261). Thus Jimmy’s developmental 
trajectory moves from symbiosis to the violence of maternal separation by the pressure to 
identify with the father and ends in an anxious desire for reabsorption as well as a subtle wish for 
omnipotence. In contradistinction, Crake’s professional and sexual personality wishes to 
“possess the mother as a fantasy of ‘becoming the father of oneself’ where his sexual and 
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professional activities “become[-] a means of denying the actual passivity of having been born 
from that original state of union into ‘a body of limited powers, at a time and place [one] never 
chose’…at the mercy of the now-alien will of the mother” (Bordo 107). He chooses separateness 
and the pleasure of control and mastery over those whom he denies being dependent upon: 
feminized-others, women, and nature.   
 Safely tucked within the OrganInc technoscientific Compound, Jimmy’s socialization 
into masculine objectivity and detachment is first evidenced in the discussion of animal feelings 
at a bonfire functioning to dispose of “bioterrorist” infected cow and sheep carcasses. Young 
Jimmy, outfitted in rubber boots with duck prints on the toes, is told to walk through a pan of 
disinfectant. When he expresses worry for the animals pictured on his boots he is told that the 
cartoon ducks “weren’t real and had no feelings, but he didn’t quite believe it” (Oryx and Crake 
15). There is no congratulatory sigh at his misplaced compassion to quietly guide him into the 
realm of reciprocity (as would have potentially occurred if he had been female). Instead, in his 
mind, he is stranded in a strange deceptive world of parental authority indifferent to the suffering 
of certain objects. Indeed, the masculinization process “begins with beating the tenderness and 
empathy out of small boys and directing their natural human curiosity and joy in affecting the 
world around them into arrogant attitudes and destructive paths” (King 409).  
 Later his mother and bioengineer father get into a fight whereupon the mother, Sharon, 
retreats to the bedroom and his unnamed father (coolly anonymous as the “invisible” scientist 
reflecting on the known as distant and separate knower) fills Jimmy in on women and the 
“[h]otness and coldness, coming and going in the strange musky flowery variable weather 
country inside their clothes – mysterious important, uncontrollable. […] But men’s body 
temperatures were never dealt with; they were never even mentioned. […] Why nothing about 
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the hot collars of men?” (Oryx and Crake 17). These lines allude to the misogynistic stereotype 
that women are unpredictable, passionate, uncontrollable bodies much like volatile weather 
systems. On the other hand, men enjoy existence within the presumed homeostasis of 
“controlled” masculinity or their identities are more radically disassociated from their 
embodiment. Additionally, falsely differentiated, these lines demonstrate that Jimmy’s father 
sees the world “divided into two parts—the knower (mind [– self]) and the knowable (nature [– 
other]). […] The scientific mind is set apart from what is to be known, that is, from nature, and 
[his] autonomy…is guaranteed” (Keller, Gender 79). Likewise, Jimmy’s father’s silence on the 
“male” condition is consistent with a psychology and sensibility that strives for pure detachment, 
objectivity, and complete independence from the feminine world of passionate affect. Similarly, 
Jimmy’s adult brain, having been molded within a highly scientific environment, believes that 
Oryx is a “casketful of secrets. Any moment now she would open herself up, reveal to him the 
essential thing, the hidden thing at the core of life, or of her life, or of his life – the thing he was 
longing to know” (314). All of the above lines reveal the masculine anxiety of the threatening 
other as interiorly indecipherable, a view that has been known to culminate into aggressive 
attempts by scientists to penetrate into “female” secretive caverns. Keller argues that this desire 
to “expose female interiority, to bring it into the light, and thus to dissolve its threat entirely,” is 
a distinguishing mark of modern science and especially molecular biology’s reductionist 
obsession with discovering the “secret of life” (“Making Gender” 457).  
 Jimmy’s relationship with his mother and nature is initially one of union. For example, 
Jimmy becomes upset over the prospect of consuming the transgenic pigoons used to grow 
human organs: “[H]e was confused about who should be allowed to eat what. He didn’t want to 
eat a pigoon, because he thought of the pigoons as creatures much like himself. Neither he nor 
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they had a lot of say in what was going on” (Oryx and Crake 24). Jimmy’s concern for the 
pigoons demonstrates his initial identification with disempowered “objects” (both animals and 
women in his society). Jimmy’s natural progression from mother-child unity to a healthy sense 
of autonomy becomes distorted by the toxic domestic context within the patriarchal-capitalist 
culture. His scientist mother decides to quit her job and reasserts her position as stay-at-home-
mom, a thing that “was held out to him like a treat” (30). She is presented as an object of 
pleasure for his utilitarian desires. Later the reader finds out her return home is not merely based 
on a selfless mother stereotype to perpetually serve her son but rather due to her ethical qualms 
with the scientific experimentation going on at OrganInc Farms. She is lethargic, apathetic, and 
despondent at home, hardly the “recognizer” Jimmy needs to develop into a wholly differentiated 
person endowed with a dynamic autonomy. In fact, neither of Jimmy’s parents are described as 
fulfilling the essential role of recognizer: “About the different, secret person living inside 
[Jimmy] they knew nothing at all” (58). Sharon’s helpless object-attitude quickly causes Jimmy 
to pursue sadistic projects in his relations with his mother: “As he grew older and more devious, 
he found that on the days when he couldn’t grab some approval, he could at least get a reaction. 
Anything was better than the flat voice, the blank eyes, the tired staring out of the window” (32). 
After upsetting Sharon to the point of chokes and cries, Jimmy reports that he feels sorry “but 
there was more to it: he was also gloating, congratulating himself, because he’d managed to 
create such an effect” (33). Jimmy inflicts pain upon his mother so that he can feel some sort of 
bounded self to stave off the threatening void. Her helpless and emotionally dead behavior is the 
product of an oppressive social structure that confines one either to the dominating projects of 
technoscience (a location she is psychically not conditioned for) or the submission of home. 
Jimmy’s father uses this knowledge to his empowered argumentative advantage when she tries to 
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critique his research: “‘Anyway it’s been paying for your room and board, it’s been putting food 
on your table. You’re hardly in a position to take the high ground’” (57). To which she tragically 
responds, “Believe me, that is one thing I really do know. Why can’t you get a job doing 
something honest? Something basic.” These lines reveal that Sharon is aware of her impotent 
entrapment within the cannibalistic system. Jimmy learns while his mother knows, one either 
assumes the position of eaten object or eating subject within the informatics of domination. 
 Jimmy’s pressure into identifying with the masculine posture of the father continues 
throughout his childhood. He reflects that his “father was always giving him tools, trying to 
make him more practical. In his father’s opinion Jimmy couldn’t screw in a lightbulb” (Oryx and 
Crake 37). Moreover, Jimmy’s father explains to him, after transferring to a better job at 
NooSkins where they develop youth rejuvenating “skin-related biotechnologies,” that “[t]he 
rewards in case of success would be enormous…doing the straight-talking man-to-man act he 
had recently adopted with Jimmy” (55). There is no mention of the “ravaged hopefuls who had 
volunteered themselves as subjects, paying no fees but signing away their rights to sue, [that] had 
come out looking like the Mould Creature from Outer Space – uneven in tone, greenish, and 
peeling in ragged strips.” The message to Jimmy from his father is clear: masculinity within the 
informatics of domination involves capitalizing on the less fortunate by adopting instrumentalist 
and unfeeling attitudes of estranged distance from the object world, which disturbingly includes 
“feminized” human beings.  
 Jimmy effectively satirizes and thereby dismisses the truth of this unfortunate situation 
when he creates the caricatures Evil Dad and Righteous Mom:  
Evil Dad blustered and theorized and dished out pompous bullshit, Righteous 
Mom complained and accused. In Righteous Mom’s cosmology, Evil Dad was the 
sole source of hemorrhoids, kleptomania, global conflict, bad breath, tectonic-
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plate fault lines, and clogged drains, as well as every migraine headache and 
menstrual cramp Righteous Mom had ever suffered. (60) 
 
These distorted parental lessons result in Jimmy’s false differentiation, which manifests itself in 
contradictory yet unsurprising ways. The hyper-autonomous (dependency denying) objectifying 
side of himself is made evident in his puberty when he starts “having sexy dreams…about girls a 
lot in the abstract, as it were – without heads” (59). Simultaneously, his closest companion 
Killer, who is a spliced raccoon/skunk hybrid called a rakunk, (“the only person he could really 
talk to”) reflects his anxious and secret longing to submerge back into unity with the maternal 
realm (59). Rather than dissecting or mutilating living creatures in the mode of an emotionally 
detached stereotypical boy, Jimmy relishes the absolute symbiotic and affectionate dependency 
between himself and his pet. Furthermore, his relationship with the rakunk illustrates that he is 
not persuaded of the object-status of disempowered others, bioengineered or not.  
 One can also read the little rakunk as a “transitional object” that Jimmy employs in his 
attempt to become a parent to himself in order to assuage his feelings of helpless dependency on 
his mother. According to Bordo, the transitional object functions as the child himself wherein 
“cuddling…the object, the child is actually playing at self-parenting, at being his own baby. Such 
self-parenting allows the child to feel less precariously at the mercy of the mother, more in 
control of his or her own destiny” (107). Indeed, when Sharon performs the ultimate separation 
from Jimmy by abandoning him she also “liberates” Killer3 who represents Jimmy’s own 
psychic state as evidenced when he exclaims: “Killer was his! And Killer was a tame animal, 
she’d be helpless on her own, she wouldn’t know how to fend for herself, everything hungry 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
3 “Killer” is an ironic name for Jimmy to give his rakunk, given he is projecting his own sense of vulnerability and helplessness 
onto the animal. Jimmy intends to call the animal “Bandit” but is dissuaded by the ridicule of his mother. He settles on the name 
“Killer” perhaps to compensate for his discomfort with dependence and to overcome the humiliation of his mother with some 
kind of display of power. Giving the rakunk the name “Killer” represents his attempt to psychically construct himself as a strong, 
masculine-subject instead of a weak child whose feelings are vulnerable to the mother’s cruel whims. Moreover, there is a subtle 
suggestion that choosing the name Bandit is not red-blooded or manly enough. Jimmy subconsciously knows the desire to call his 
pet “Bandit” does not conform to masculine gender performativity while “Killer” is clearly the “all boy” name choice.    
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would tear her into furry black and white pieces” (Oryx and Crake 61). It seems Jimmy projects 
his own dependency and helplessness onto his little rakunk as many such exotic animals succeed 
just fine in a feral state. This apprehensiveness at reliance resurfaces in his adult aspiration to 
become untouchable, in his effort to be “himself, alone, unique, self-created, and self-sufficient” 
(176), the omnipotent father of himself and one who “never dreams about his mother, only her 
absence” (277). Additionally, one can see his complementary childhood desire for symbiosis in 
his adult fantasy of Oryx as “legion,” a descriptor that associates her with the ubiquitous 
character of nature or the maternal realm. In this fantasy he imagines she might “glide into his 
body and be present with him in his flesh, and his hand on himself will become her hand” (110). 
Jimmy unconsciously reflects on his strange dual impulses as he licks Oryx’s food soiled fingers: 
“This was the closest she could get to him without becoming food: she was in him, or part of her 
was in part of him. Sex was the other way around: while that was going on, he was in her. I’ll 
make you mine, lovers said in old books. They never said, I’ll make you me” (315). He eternally 
battles himself in his dual endeavors to engulf the world as his own omnipotent mind and submit 
to reengulfment by the other. Clearly, socialization under patriarchy results in the perverted 
polarization of the individual and collective consciousness.  
 Crake’s developmental processes are not explicitly delineated in the novel. However, 
because he grows up in a patriarchal household within the biotech Compound environment it is 
safe to assume his unfolding follows a similar trajectory to Jimmy’s. Rather than choosing 
Jimmy’s more ambivalent set of defensive responses to the separation-individuation processes of 
childhood, Crake seems to wholly identify with the objectifying father persona. As evidence of 
his choice to deny and distance himself from the original relation by objectifying and dominating 
the other, the reader is given a chilling glimpse of Crake’s affectless response to his mother’s 
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horrific death by a transgenic staph infection, which the text later suggests may have been 
transmitted to her by Crake himself. There is much in the text to suggest that this murder may 
have been motivated by the affair Crake’s mother had with his “uncle” suggesting a violent 
desire to control women’s sexuality in patriarchy that foreshadows Crake’s later jealous murder 
of Oryx as she glides into Jimmy’s arms after her nightly visitations to Crake. As a scientist 
looking through a microscope at his specimen, he is able to coolly view his mother through the 
isolation room window where she is “frothing” as the bioform eats through her:  
His mother was supposed to be able to speak her last words to him via the 
mike system…but there was a digital failure; so though he could see her lips 
moving, he couldn’t hear what she was saying. ‘Otherwise put, just like daily 
life,’ said Crake. He said anyway he hadn’t missed much, because by that stage 
she’d been incoherent.  
 Jimmy didn’t understand how he could be so nil about it – it was horrible, 
the thought of Crake watching his own mother dissolve like that. (177) 
 
Keller cites many studies of scientists that have found those who entertain a “distant relation to 
the mother” couple this stance with “open or covert attitudes of derogation” toward their 
mothers, which is certainly true of famous scientists such as Newton (Gender 91). In addition to 
Crake’s mother-objectifying nature, he identifies with his dead scientist father who he 
romanticizes as the benevolent colonizing master with his “head in the clouds [who] believed in 
contributing to the improvement of the human lot” (183). Furthermore, Chodorow has noted how 
“boys in father-absent and normally father-remote families develop a sense of what it is to be 
masculine through identification with cultural images of masculinity and men chosen as 
masculine models” (266). If we accept this as possible, given Jimmy and Crake’s consumption of 
child pornography and excessively violent media, in addition to the influence of their parental 
figures, then the boys hardly have a chance at developing into anything other than subjects 
prepared to participate in an objectifying, dominating, sadistic, and ethically indifferent 
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nonrelational world: “The same repressions, denials of affect and attachment, rejection of the 
world of women and things feminine, appropriation of the world of men and identification with 
the father that a create a psychology of masculine superiority also condition men for participation 
in the capitalist work world” and in Crake’s case in particular, the biotechnological work world 
(Chodorow 268). 
 Given his upbringing and analytical skills, Crake enters Watson-Crick, one of the most 
prestigious technocratic universities within the novel. Crake’s attraction to this institution may 
stem from its valorization of “[a] science that advertises itself as revealing a reality in which 
subject and object are unmistakably distinct,” which “offer[s] special comfort to those who, as 
individuals (be they male or female), retain particular anxiety about the loss of autonomy” 
(Keller, Gender 90). Indeed, Crake describes the students populating Watson-Crick as fully 
endowed with a strident capacity for objectivity but lacking the skills for reciprocal relations 
when he says they have “single-track tunnel-vision minds…[and] a marked degree of social 
ineptitude” (Oryx and Crake 193). Keller has also cited studies that report that scientists “tend 
overwhelmingly to have been loners as children, to be low in social interests and skills, indeed to 
avoid interpersonal contact” (91). On the romantic side of things “young scientists are typically 
not very interested in girls” which reflects a personality interested in keeping the feminine object 
at a comfortable remove (91). Crake professes his fear of the boundary loss inherent to eroticism 
when he reduces it to a simplified and unthreatening biological impulse and activity of revulsion 
in one stroke: “Falling in love, although it resulted in altered body chemistry and was therefore 
real, was a hormonally induced delusional state […]. In addition it was humiliating, because it 
put you at a disadvantage, it gave the love object too much power” (193). Crake’s philosophy on 
	  
	   57 
love reflects the false differentiation of his childhood in which the “emphasis on separating and 
drawing boundaries excludes and defends against merging and identifying” (Benjamin 167).  
 The vestiges of the masculine desire for control and domination (as a defensive response 
to threats of dependency, looming reabsorption, or reminders of affinity) are most conspicuous in 
the sociobiological and biodeterministic theories of human nature conceived of by Crake. These 
theories ease the scientist’s apprehension of an unpredictable, chaotic, mysterious female cosmos 
while simultaneously simplifying the complex world to illuminated mechanism, whereby “the 
nightmare landscape of the infinite universe…become[s] the well-lighted laboratory” (Bordo 
99). For example, Crake explains to Jimmy, “‘As a species we’re in deep trouble, worse than 
anyone’s saying. […] Demand for resources has exceeded supply for decades in marginal 
geopolitical areas, hence the famines and droughts; but very soon, demand is going to exceed 
supply for everyone’” (Oryx and Crake 295). In response to this chaotic situation Crake suggests 
that the problem lies in the “ancient primate brain” and the solution lies in his BlyssPluss Pill 
that will sterilize the human population while his bioengineered Crakers, who lack the “hard-
wiring that had plagued humanity,” slowly replace the human species (305). The Compound 
environment, where the technocratic class lives, also reflects this need for control as indirectly 
indicated by Jimmy’s coveting of the chaotically feminine pleeblands on the bullet-train: 
“Everything in the pleeblands seemed so boundless, so porous, so penetrable, so wide-open. So 
subject to change” (196). Overall, Crake’s beliefs and the technocratic Compound architecture 
reflect the unconscious anxieties and deep psychic structures of patriarchy, even though Crake 
himself is tragically blind to his social conditioning, chalking it up to hard-wired “biology.” 
 Crake’s falsely differentiated mind, which thinks all things sprung from his being to serve 
his purposes, sees the world only in terms of dehumanized objects and instruments: “The other is 
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not seen as a unique individual bound to the self by specific ties. It is related to as a universal 
rather than a particular, as a member of a class of interchangeable items which can be used as 
resources to satisfy the master’s needs” (Plumwood, Feminism 54). As mentioned, this 
conceptualization of the outside world as merely objects created by and for the self can be traced 
to one’s “reaction and defense to the discovery of separateness” during early infantile experience 
(Flax 260). The falsely differentiated child must deny and repress any original associations with 
the mother and in order to do this he must objectify and internalize her and the world that was 
immersed in her being, a response that creates a “solipsistic isolated self with delusions of 
omnipotence” (260). Thus the scientists of the Compounds, who do a lot of “fooling around” for 
as an “after-hours hobby,” profess that the game “create-an-animal was so much fun 
[because]…it made you feel like God” (51). A further example of the engulfing ego’s self-
extending, world objectifying, and controlling impulses is exemplified by the student scientists’ 
development of an algae-based “Smart Wallpaper that would change colour on the walls of your 
room to complement your mood” (201). Crake also sees the outside world as a creation that 
exists merely for his benefit and his God-like approval or disapproval. For example, Crake 
requests that Jimmy take care of the Paradice Project (the Crakers) if anything were to happen to 
him. Jimmy wonders why Oryx is not the chosen Godmother of the humanoids to which Crake 
responds: “If I’m not around, Oryx won’t be either” (321). Jimmy scoffs and inquires whether 
she will immolate herself on his funeral pyre to which Crake responds in the affirmative with a 
grin; “Which at the time Jimmy had taken both as a joke and also as a symptom of Crake’s truly 
colossal ego” (321). But in fact, Oryx, in Crake’s mind, is merely an object created by and for 
him to do with as he pleases as indicated when he murders her during his assisted suicide.  
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 After the rogue hemorrhagic hidden within the BlyssPluss Pills is released and devastates 
humanity, Jimmy angrily realizes Crake’s narcissism and play at being God the Father when he 
ponders over the fact that Crake had been “[s]itting in judgment on the world . . . but why had 
that been his right?” (341). In fact, Crake’s Paradice Project seems to be a physical expression of 
infantile father-of-oneself fantasies where he can enjoy the delusional privilege of being the Self. 
Indeed, many feminist critics of science are of the “view that the ultimate aim of the reproductive 
and gene industry is to create ‘immortal man’ capable of reproducing himself (sic) without 
women” through the mechanism of cloning, for example (Klein 159). We can see the inheritance 
of Bacon’s hermaphroditic legacy in Crake’s simultaneous appropriation and denial of the 
feminine. Crake’s bubble-dome, which is likened to an egg in Jimmy’s mythology, is his 
prosthetic womb where he houses his bioengineered Crakers, his aggrandized, super embryos. 
Unlike Bacon, Crake does not need God to prime his mind in order to father these “Heroes and 
Supermen;” rather he is phallus and womb, an end in himself. Crake as a scientist identifies with 
“the race of fathers who can give birth” and thereby asserts his independence from and denies his 
dependency on the maternal realm. In this act of starting humanity anew he seems to be revoking 
his detestable childhood that originated in an immersion within maternal nature in order to feel 
himself irrevocably separate as God, as father of self (Bordo 108). However, in order to secure 
this ultimate separation from the realm of nature he must exert one finalizing and total act of 
objectifying sadism by destroying humanity in an apocalyptic pandemic. As Plumwood has 
wryly pointed out, the “sadodispassionate Hero,” the one who identifies with the “ideals of 
detached rationality,” will ultimately “choke[-] the life from his planetary partner in his final 
sadistic act of mastery” (Environmental 22). To be sure, it is “Crake’s resentment of his mother 
[that] causes the apocalypse, and Jimmy’s grief at his mother’s desertion [that] makes him 
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unable to prevent it” (Watkins 126). These devastating actions by Crake and the willful inaction 
chosen by Jimmy are the “abstract expression[s] of…deeply felt dilemma[s] in [their] 
psychological development under patriarchy,” the physical manifestations of the violent 
internalization of a distorted subject/object dichotomy during childhood maturation (Flax 261). 
Crake pursues total transcendence over nature while Jimmy relinquishes control in order to 
warmly disintegrate into Crake’s apocalypse and reunite with his “phallic mother” (Haraway, 
Simians 151). 
Part II: Life as a “Feminized-Other” Under the Technocratic Hegemony 
 The quality of life for feminized-others, women, and animals within this patriarchal 
society, bent on cultivating “mental traits attuned to the needs of capitalistic materialism [and 
scientific reductionism], namely utilitarian rationality and aggression,” is unsurprisingly bleak 
(Banerjee 242). The association of women with the despised nature of childhood has led to an 
increasingly violent dialectic between man-culture and woman-nature in the masculine subject’s 
aspiration to forget and overcome his link with nature in order to “achieve manhood and 
transcendence” (King 409). Every female character in Oryx and Crake is reduced to an object 
with no self boundaries or limits to what can be done to her person by the masculine subject in 
his frenzied attempt to objectify the natural world to drastically delineate self from other, with 
Oryx serving as the epitome of this situation. While the late-capitalist biotechnological culture 
may have put the “dichotomies between mind and body, animal and human, organism and 
machine, public and private, nature and culture” all into question ideologically, the original 
subject and object dualism is reified and secure (Haraway, Simians 163). In fact, the masculine 
scientist subject uses the conflation of these traditional binaries to his advantage for now the 
culture conceives that “[n]o objects, spaces, or bodies are sacred in themselves,” but rather are 
	  
	   61 
eternally reducible to code and commodity (163). Contrary to Haraway’s subversive cyborg 
politics, biotechnology’s boundary blurring genetic reductionism in the Compounds props up the 
capitalist project of homogenizing the object-world into faceless consumers and replaceable 
slaves; it’s desire is to erase all difference with the exception of the supremacy of the subject, an 
aim rooted in the distorted developmental scheme under patriarchy. In the novels, biotechnology 
is both used directly to dominate and exploit feminized-others as well as indirectly in providing 
the ontological justification for the capitalist’s corrupt utilitarianism.  
 The novel perpetuates a distinction between subject and object, discrete self and the 
faceless masses of others. For example, the students at Watson-Crick, where Crake goes to 
school, refer to “other students in their own faculties as their conspecifics, and to all other human 
beings as nonspecifics. It was a running joke” (209). Plumwood notes, “the dominated class must 
appear suitably homogenous if it is to be able to conform to and confirm its [inferior] ‘nature’” 
(53). This dangerous inferiorization through difference and homogenization of the masses by the 
hegemonic class has a far reaching internalization power as evidenced in Jimmy’s aloof and 
uncritical surprise that the “pleebland inhabitants didn’t look like the mental deficients the 
Compounders were fond of depicting, or most of them didn’t” (288). One glimpses a particular 
sinister effect of homogenization of the pleeblanders by the dominating class, stemming from the 
falsely differentiated subject/object split, in the exploitative and conscienceless way Crake 
discusses the test subjects for his BlyssPluss Pills. He tells Jimmy that he got them “[f]rom the 
poorer countries. Pay them a few dollars, they don’t even know what they’re taking. Sex clinics, 
of course – they’re happy to help. Whorehouses. Prisons. And from the ranks of the desperate, as 
usual” (296). In Crake’s mind, “the colonized are all alike, and are not considered in personal 
terms or as individuals” (Plumwood 55). Crake’s treatment of his test specimens reveals how the 
	  
	   62 
patriarchal conceptualization of the world through a subject/object split capitalizes off of the 
homogenization of objects and their constructed inferiorized difference from subjects.  
 The scientist’s work within the Compound environment is solely about controlling and 
dominating nature as an instrument or object, transforming it first into manipulable code and 
then desirable commodity. They genetically modify pigs into balloon-like pigoons, sus 
multiorganifer, who grow extra organs and human neocortex tissue under the farce that the 
motivation for such a project is to help stroke victims. Sharon immediately spots the deception of 
her husband’s work when she says, “You hype up your wares and take all [your medical 
patients’] money and then they run out of cash, and it’s no more treatments for them. They can 
rot as far as you and your pals are concerned” (Oryx and Crake 56-57). Later, when Jimmy and 
Crake are slumming through the pleeblands, Crake explicitly aligns the capitalist and scientific 
projects. For instance, while Jimmy window-shops through the homogenized pleeblands Crake 
tells him, “‘So this is where our stuff turns to gold. […] You have no idea how much money 
changes hands on this one street alone” (288-89). The Watson-Crick students do not even bother 
disguising their materialistic motives for their bioengineering projects. For example, they 
specifically culture meat that they market as “ChickieNobs,” a product for which Crake notes 
“[i]nvestors are lining up around the block” (203). Additionally, they create rocks called 
Rockulators that absorb and release water depending on drought conditions, Wolvogs, an 
aggressive dog splice to protect the Technocratic Compound-Castle, and most profitable of all, 
new illness varieties. Indeed, Crake confirms this sinister revelation when he says to Jimmy the 
“best diseases, from a business point of view…would be those that cause lingering illness. 
Ideally – that is, for maximum profit – the patient should…die just before all his or her money 
runs out. It’s a fine calculation” (211). 
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 Likewise, Women are also reduced to the status of insecure consumers and 
simultaneously, fetishized objects within Oryx and Crake’s patriarchal technocracy. Scientists 
cannot refrain from this mode of thinking because a “constant stream of eager or anxious women 
consumers – and [their] body parts – is a far too profitable industry” (Klein 160). For instance, 
while ruminating over his stepmother Ramona’s aging features, Jimmy prophesizes that “[p]retty 
soon it would be the NooSkins BeauToxique Treatment for her – Wrinkles Paralyzed Forever, 
Employees Half-Price – plus in say five years, the Fountain of Yooth Total Plunge, which rasped 
off your entire epidermis” (Oryx and Crake 175). Indeed the overarching function of the 
patriarchal subject/object split seems to be the former’s exploitative advantage over the latter. 
The homogenized and objectified status of nature, women, and nonhuman others (the original 
blur of mother with the external objects she is connected to) allows for their instrumentalization. 
 Women are also directly rendered as controllable, consumable objects. Oryx knowingly 
performs her role as the object-instrument of men almost flawlessly: apart that is, from the few 
hints of defiant agency she throws at Jimmy. Oryx and many other Southeast Asian village girls 
are sold into the sex trade and passed from hand to hand like unwanted pets. They are treated like 
animal object-resources as indicated by the description of them being “lifted up into the back of 
the truck and locked in, and it was dark and hot and they got thirsty, and when they had to pee 
they had to do it in the truck because there was no stopping. There was a little window though, 
up high, so some air got in” (Oryx and Crake 137). The masculine subject thinks of the girls as 
consumable meat-objects, “delicious midgets” and “soulless pixies” (90). Jimmy dreams of girls 
whose sole purpose is to recognize and serve him, as he hoped his mother would: “They’d look 
at him, they’d look into him, they would recognize and accept him…Oh honey, I know you. I see 
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you. I know what you want” (261). These female objects are the servants, recognizers, and the 
mirrors of the repressed masculine self.  
 Ultimately, however, as we’ve seen, the masculine-subject must participate in “escalating 
dominations of abstract individuation, an ultimate self untied at last from all dependency, a man 
in space” (Haraway, Simians 151). He must dominate and objectify woman and nature out of 
existence in order to achieve pure transcendence over the “dank prison space of chthonian 
nature” (Paglia 104). Indeed, in Oryx and Crake the masculine-subject seems to succeed in his 
death drive as indicated by Crake’s paramount genocide, murder of Oryx, and the ecological 
destruction within the novel: “[A]s time went on…the coastal aquifers turned salty and the 
northern permafrost melted and the vast tundra bubbled with methane, and the drought in the 
midcontinental plains regions went on and on, and the Asian steppes turned to sand dunes” (Oryx 
and Crake 24). Despite the rigid and powerful control the masculine subject’s biotechnology 
attempts to exert over the planet, nature’s ultimately aleatory and unpredictable character resists 
this control in the last two novels of Atwood’s trilogy. There are hints within Oryx and Crake of 
the subversive natures hidden in presumably domesticated ecologies and feminized-others. For 
example, Jimmy’s mother’s rebellious desertion gives him a dark feeling: “the same sense of the 
forbidden, of a door swinging open that ought to be kept locked, of a stream of secret lives, 
running underground, in the darkness just beneath his feet” (216). Perhaps this hidden subversive 
potential is symbolized most explicitly by Oryx’s laugh of amused contempt like “a cold breeze 
on a moonlit lake” (119). This laugh speaks a “ruthless wisdom” that makes Jimmy “feel light-
headed, precariously balanced, as if he were standing on a cliff-edge above a rock-filled gorge, 
and it would be dangerous for him to look down” (255). As we will see in the final chapter of 
this thesis, Crake’s belief that if one were to “[b]reak the link in time between one generation and 
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the next,” it would be “game over forever” may ironically refer to the extinction of the 
masculine-subject socialized under late capitalist-patriarchy rather than humanity, feminized-
others, and the more-than-human world (223). 
 Overall this chapter has explored how Margaret Atwood’s Oryx and Crake critiques late-
capitalist patriarchal biotechnological projects and their grisly consequences through Jimmy and 
Crake’s patriarchal maturation processes and Crake’s corresponding socialization into a scientist. 
This development entails the establishment of selfhood at the cost of objectifying, rejecting, 
dominating, and instrumentalizing the other of the first bond and nature. Additionally, the text 
reveals the appropriation and denial of the feminine by the masculine mind desiring to father the 
self as outlined in Jimmy’s use of the transitional object and Crake’s Paradice Project. 
Ultimately, these gender politics that encompass the domination and repression of nature are 
reproduced by the patriarchal family and manifested in science. The consequences of this 
particular individual and collective psychic structuring are implicit in the gruesome murders of 
humanity, the dehumanized treatment of scientific test subjects, laboratory animals, and female 
consumers as well as the objectification of Oryx and Sharon and the destruction of the natural 
environment.  
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CHAPTER FOUR: The Intersecting Discourses of the Biological Sciences and 
Enlightenment Humanism  
 
 This chapter will give a brief overview of the historical development of contemporary 
scientific thought paradigms and examine epistemological overlaps between Enlightenment 
humanist, transhumanist, and biological discourse. This section will then give an overview of the 
philosophies of Ruth Hubbard, Jane Bennett, Deleuze, and Guattari at play in Atwood’s texts 
that challenge and defamiliarize the reader’s understanding of the world and its potentialities 
developed by the aforementioned traditional schools of thought. 
Part I: The Problems of Mechanism, Biological Reductionism, and Essentialism 
 As discussed in the previous three chapters on psychological development under 
patriarchy, the causes of ecological crises can be argued as originating from a failure of the 
imagination caused by the way social forces obscure humans’ ability to recognize their 
interdependency, affinity, and pleasurable attraction to feminized-others, animals, and the 
environment. Significantly, this toxic posture toward matter and animated life consequently leads 
to a blindness of the material world’s vitally active nature and obstructs, with dire consequences, 
sensual and communicative contact between human animals and the natural world in itself. 
Indeed, the way modern culture and science has come to perceive and make sense of nature as 
withdrawn from “both our speaking and our senses” (Abram 92), as a feminized-body estranged 
from the mind (as the material realm separated from the thinking subject), is a product of its 
history as it has unfolded under these congealed patriarchal structures that are psychically 
reproduced in the domestic space.  
 Various thinkers have marked the course of Western culture’s historical representations 
of human/nature relations that originate in its citizens’ childhood traumas. Some focus on how 
this false differentiation manifests in a human/nature split, especially in “Plato’s philosophical 
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derogation of the sensible and changing forms of the world – his claim that these are mere 
simulacra of eternal and pure ideas existing in a nonsensorial realm beyond the apparent world” 
(Abram 94). Others see the human/nature dyad mapped onto the mind/body pair in the Christian 
rejection of the soul-imprisoning body in favor of the supernal realm (Hiltner 77; White 10). 
According to Carolyn Merchant, up until the sixteenth century, Western culture’s ideological 
frameworks were informed by the “idea of nature as a living organism” or a living maternal 
figure, a philosophical perspective which encouraged a more ethical, sensual, and interactive 
relationship with the environment and its creatures (1). This view and treatment of the earth was 
gradually displaced by the Scientific Revolution with its mechanized and rationalized picture of 
the earth, which helped to justify Western society’s exploitative employment of new 
technologies toward its goals of commercialism and industrialization (2). Merchant traces the 
historical development of this shift in thinking of the earth as organic mother, to the Baconian 
treatment of nature as a justifiably sexually interrogated witch, to its final culmination in 
Cartesian thinking that describes all of physicality as made of inert and entirely predictable 
mechanical objects. She argues all of these portrayals of nature reflect the evolving 
socioeconomic interests of the periods. The development of mechanism as a worldview saw the 
“death of the world soul and the removal of nature’s spirits” as necessary to prevent “any 
scruples that might be associated with the view that nature was a living organism” so that society 
could continue “progressively” profiteering from the planet (227).  
 Moving into the contemporary period, late-capitalist culture’s uncritical adoption of the 
theories of sociobiology, a form of biological reductionism that sees human and animal behavior 
as absolutely genetically determined by tried and true evolutionary pathways (“resistance is 
futile”), is the historical product of the above mentioned seventeenth-century mechanical 
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framework that imagined nature as “more…predictable…and thereby manipulable” (Merchant 
227). As Haraway confirms, the mechanistic, clockwork models of nature gave way to the 
“translation of the world into a problem in coding” at the end of the twentieth century (Simians 
164). Haraway says this new biotechnological science is born of the current patriarchal-
capitalist-informational matrix or the “informatics of domination.” This biotechnological science 
functions under the assumption that human nature and the “corpuscular world” are infinitely 
reducible to decipherable, malleable, and commodifiable code. This militant-corporate form of 
scientific mythology ostracizes and denies the sensual knowledge, intrinsic value, and vitality of 
both the human body and the sentient environment eclipsing any hope of reciprocal and joyous 
communion with the earthly realm in itself. Rather, this reductionist view imagines the planet as 
a vacuous space full of inert and silent objects ripe for manipulation (genetic “improvement”) 
prior to an exploitative and immensely profitable harvest.  
 Aspects of Enlightenment humanist ideology and several seemingly antithetical sciences 
(i.e. mechanism, sociobiology, and biotechnology) combine in the scientist Crake’s philosophy 
in Atwood’s Oryx and Crake. To demonstrate this, first, it is important to examine the ways in 
which these philosophies overlap and build off of one another. Sociobiology, with its investment 
in the notion of biological hardwiring that supposedly cannot be altered by cultural forces (a 
perspective social ecologist Murray Bookchin describes as “crude as Descartes’s machine-like 
view of the body” [Re-Enchanting Humanity 39]), and the new biotechnological science of the 
“informatics of domination” (that sees organisms as “code” that can be altered artificially), 
collaborate together in strange and unfortunate ways. First, according to Haraway, the 
informatics of domination adopts the sociobiological theories that purport to describe the various 
genetic essences of human nature but recasts them into the “curable” medical terms of pathology. 
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Coloring aspects of human nature as pernicious justifies biotechnology’s project of researching 
into the “nature of things” and propels its program of “optimization” for society by redesigning 
the individual by changing those supposed negative or flawed and fixed characteristics of human 
nature (Simians 67). For example, sociobiologists “explain the existence of crime on the basis of 
a ‘criminal personality’ and believe that criminals behave the way they do because they have 
diseased brains, too much or too little of certain hormones or other critical substances, or 
defective genes” (Hubbard 28). The ironic name of Crake’s research facility (the 
“RejoovenEsense” Compound) is emblematic of this medical drive to rejuvenate or artificially 
improve/enhance the essences of human nature. This is the quintessence of the logic behind 
Crake’s “ideal of human progress through human engineering” (Haraway, Simians 13) that he 
sells to the public in the form of the “BlyssPluss Pill…designed to take a set of givens, namely 
the nature of human nature, and steer those givens in a more beneficial direction than the ones 
hitherto taken” (Oryx and Crake 293).  
 Moreover, both Enlightenment humanism’s emphasis on rationality, agency, and the 
freedom to progress and perfect the self as essential parts of human subjectivity as well as this 
humanism’s underlying essentialism (expressed in the belief in an unbridgeable gap in kind 
between animal nature and human culture)4 surprisingly unite in the biotechnological logic 
within the cultural climate of the informatics of domination. On the one hand, humanism’s well-
intentioned emphasis on freedom, perfectibility, and the “progressive” transformation of the self, 
(which then extends into an improvement of society at large) becomes a mutated goal when a 
part of the informatics of domination. The “freedom” to guide nature(s) to perfection becomes a 
tyrannical form of unchecked genetic redesign and environmental manipulation in its “call” to 
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“‘create more fecund gardens than Eden itself’” (Bookchin qtd. in Eckersley 111) in the hopes of 
accumulating “power and profit” (Eckersley 111). According to Cary Wolfe, in his book What is 
Posthumanism?, ideological vestiges of Enlightenment humanism appear as this very kind of 
biotechnological drive to “guide” nature(s) and can intensify into a form of “transhumanism.” 
Transhumanism is a form of posthumanism that sees the method of becoming “human” as 
“achieved by escaping or repressing not just [humanity’s] animal origins in nature…but more 
generally by transcending the bonds of materiality and embodiment altogether” (Posthumanism 
xv). Wolfe provides an excellent example of how Enlightenment humanism, transhumanist 
biotechnology, and sociobiology in the form of social Darwinism (Herbert Spencer’s misreading 
of evolutionary theory) combine into a lethal project of variegated reasoning. In this hodgepodge 
philosophy (an outlook Crake on the surface seems complicit in) one finds “‘the paradoxical 
figure of an evolution which has to extract humanity properly so-called (that is, culture, the 
technological mastery of nature – including the mastery of human nature: eugenics) from 
animality” but by an approach characteristic of “‘animality (the ‘survival of the fittest’) or, in 
other words, by an ‘animal’ competition between the different degrees of humanity’” (Étienne 
Balibar qtd. in Wolfe Posthumanism xiv). In perfect harmony with “his” Enlightenment 
predecessors, the transhumanist biotechnologist desires total control over the body, engineered 
“perfection,” a bioengineering project successfully executed only under the social conditions of 
“might makes right.” Indeed, Jimmy describes Crake’s “might” metaphorically as “alpha wolf, 
the silverback gorilla, the lead lion” (Oryx and Crake 300).  
 Additionally, Enlightenment humanism’s underlying essentialism (the state of being 
“free” as an essential quality of the “authentically” human that animals are by definition 
excluded from) can be deployed by biotechnologists at will “to justify oppression” because they, 
	  
	   71 
alongside their capitalist investors, “control the discourses and institutions that reduce [feminized 
and animalized] human beings to the status of objects” (Wolfe, Animal Rites 38). As Wolfe 
smartly points out in his critique of Luc Ferry’s humanism of “freedom,” the definition of the 
human that serves as the basis for humanist philosophy is relationally defined against the 
“animal” that is “‘programed by code which goes by the name of instinct’” (Ferry qtd. in Wolfe, 
Animal Rites 32). In contrast, the human is entirely free of natural essences, the body; s/he is not 
dictated by “natural codes” (Ferry 11). Ferry’s humanism is grounded on the notion of humans as 
essentially free and animals as essentially determined by nature. Ferry’s humanism is 
characterized by his attempt to make “a single and defining characteristic (“freedom”)” as both 
the “categorical distinction between the human and nonhuman animal” as well as the only 
worthy “criterion for ethical consideration” (Wolfe, Animal Rites 35). Historically, worldviews, 
philosophies, or ethics that have “propose[d] a single capacity…for being owed moral 
consideration” or admittance into the category of the “human” have been criticized for being 
“essentialist,” racist, and sexist (Slicer, “Your Daughter” 108). The chilling problem with this 
humanist essentialism is that a culture can conceptually withhold whatever “single capacity” 
(“freedom”) from any entity that it decides supposedly shares the animal’s “state of nature” and 
thus systematically animalize this being for exploitative purposes. Using the criterion of 
“freedom” to buy one membership into the realm of cultured humanity is the same conceptual 
move employed by Western cultures that have historically used the benchmark of “rationality” to 
build the privileged “human” realm of the masculine public, which has also worked 
simultaneously to construct women and other feminized-others as morally inferior because of 
their supposed lack of rationality (Warren 258). And indeed, as Val Plumwood argues in her 
book Feminism and the Mastery of Nature, those that belong to the sphere of the rational define 
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what is authentically human while those that belong to the sphere of the merely irrational, natural 
animal (women) play an instrumental role in the service of the sphere of the rational, as things 
rather than ends in themselves. Certain biotechnological scientists who are born into the 
privileged class, sex, and race intersectional category, might see themselves as “free,” godlike 
humans, and the rest of “nature” (the feminized and animalized poor, women, people of color, 
animals, etc.), at best, as limited and faulty abortions of nature in need of radical, genetic 
“cleansing” or, at worst, as entirely valueless apart from the entertainment and profit one makes 
from transforming them and the world they inhabit into the chimeric shadows of one’s mind, like 
Jimmy’s world becomes “piece[s] of a bad dream that Crake is dreaming” (Oryx and Crake 352).   
Part II: Crake’s Lethal Philosophy 
 The scientist Crake from Atwood’s Oryx and Crake clearly subscribes to sociobiology’s 
essentialist descriptions of genetically predisposed human and animal subjects and supports the 
capitalist agenda in its efforts to homogenize these groups through these reductive descriptions 
for the purposes of “behavioral intervention,” control, and exploitation. According to Ruth 
Hubbard, sociobiologists “claim that it is possible to identify the fundamental elements of human 
nature…whatever their cultural or historical differences, and selected animals as well” (29). 
Many feminist critics of science argue that because scientists are cultural products they “peer 
through the prism of everyday culture, using the colors so separated to highlight their questions, 
design their experiments, and interpret their results” (Fausto-Sterling 9). In other words, born 
within a capitalist milieu, this means scientists often “portray as natural the competitive and 
hierarchical capitalist societies in which men dominate women and a small, privileged group of 
men dominates everyone else” (Hubbard 36). Predictably, Crake sees hierarchy or the “king-of-
the-castle hard-wiring that plague[s] humanity” as a part of the natural structure of “neural 
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complexes” within the human brain (Oryx and Crake 305). Haraway has also warned of the 
implications for gender and social politics that arise from this new informational paradigm 
influenced by sociobiological theory: “The close ties of sexuality and instrumentality, of views 
of the body as a…utility-maximizing machine, are described nicely in sociobiological origin 
stories that stress a genetic calculus and explain the inevitable dialectic of domination of male 
and female gender roles” (Simians 169). Indeed, Crake believes that humans are “hormone 
robots” with “monkey brains” but “faulty ones” who foully indulge in rape and the “sexual abuse 
of children” (Oryx and Crake 165-66).  
 As a further example of this problematic “genes as essence” reasoning that has been 
historically employed in eugenics practices condoned by the militant American nation-state 
(Mottier 85), sociobiologists claim that “Man’s natural sexuality sends him in search of many 
sex partners, making him an unstable mate at best, while woman’s biological origins destine her 
to keep the home fires burning, impelling her to employ trickery and deceit to keep hubby from 
straying” (Fausto-Sterling 4). Crake molds the gender roles for his humanoid species in a similar 
way to his own toxic patriarchal culture, mistakenly believing that the impulses to rape, murder, 
property grab, wage war, etc. originate in the same “removable” genes that allow for the human 
practices of art, idol worship, and funeral rituals. While the Craker men serve the purpose of 
imposing a protective urine circle around their community, the women “tend[-] the central fire; 
others squat around it, warming themselves” and breastfeeding (Oryx and Crake 158). The 
difference between Crake and sociobiologists is that Crake employs a more transhumanist and 
transpeciesist praxis in his desire to change the human nature described by reductionist biology 
supposedly for the better, while sociobiologists tend to simply justify the status quo. Overall, 
while both essentialist sociobiology and “life-improving” biotechnology are motivated by the 
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“quest to comprehend phenomena according to what they are in some absolute ontological 
sense,” the latter is also invested in exploring “what they have the capacity to become” 
(Economides 1). And what one is or could become matters insomuch as it remains consistently 
exploitable.  
 As demonstrated, Crake claims not to believe in the need to maintain the integrity of any 
“Nature” and seems to have no ethical qualms (in principle) with using technology to dominate 
both animals and feminized, “othered” groups of human beings. However, a closer examination 
of Crake’s complex psychology reveals a latent ecological consciousness monstrously tainted by 
his patriarchal conditioning. The scientist Crake’s strange “green” sensibility begins when he is 
still the boy “Glenn” who plays violent computer games, watches live executions, and varieties 
of fetish pornography with Jimmy. It is during one of these afternoons, while exploring 
“HottTotts, a global sex-trotting site,” that the two boys are arrested by the penetrating and 
contemptuous gaze of the little girl Oryx sadly situated “in front of the standard gargantuan 
Gulliver-in-Lilliput male torso” (90). Crake immediately freezes the frame of her face and prints 
out a hard copy. Jimmy’s emotional discomfort, perhaps his debilitating sense of empathy for 
Oryx, is quite obvious: “Jimmy felt burned by this look – eaten into, as if by acid” (91). He 
quickly considers using substances to numb the “pain of the raw torn places, the damaged 
membranes where he’d whanged up against the Great Indifference of the Universe” but 
concludes that his guilt is irreparable because he feels “culpable” and “wrong” for enjoying this 
“entertainment” that he justified as permissible because it was “far beyond his control” (91).  
 Adolescent Jimmy and Crake, for the first time since their early childhoods, are forced to 
acknowledge the reality of the feminized-other as human, as a subject forced into the status of a 
thing. Jimmy’s feelings of disorder in response to Oryx’s gaze point toward the boy’s refusal to 
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“recognize” the mother during early childhood. According to his social conditioning, the 
m(other) is the object who averts her eyes and “recognizes” the power of his subjecthood by 
writhing under his desirous gaze. But here, Jimmy and Crake are uncomfortably “fixated in the 
gaze” of Oryx’s “threatening otherness” because it “indicates [a] threatening reciprocity…that is 
too revealing…to view directly” (Young 26). Her gaze crumbles the scaffolding supporting the 
patriarchal distinctions between self/other, man/woman, human/nature (animal). Her eyes speak 
to Jimmy and Crake’s repressed desires for the beauty of a vulnerable dependency that comes 
along with true intimacy with another being of equal status rather than the sadistic and 
narcissistic reduction of the beloved to the status of an object to glut one’s need for power.    
 The impact of this little girl’s gaze on Glenn, who transforms into the mad scientist 
Crake, becomes clear as the novel progresses. During the boys’ next rendezvous, Glenn 
interrupts business-as-usual, “surfing the Net,” to introduce Jimmy to a new gaming interest of 
his called “Extinctathon” (80). To play this game Jimmy and Glenn have to pick codenames of 
extinct animals in order to enter a chat room devoted either to the “Kingdom Animal” or 
“Kingdom Vegetable.” Jimmy picks “Thickney” and Glenn picks “Crake,” both named after 
Australian birds. Crake’s nickname sticks with him from this point forward. Once in the chat 
room players proceed to narrow down the extinct creature vaguely proposed (“Begins with, 
number of legs, what is it?”) by looking at “Phylum Class Order Family Genus Species, then the 
habitat and when last seen, and what had snuffed it (Pollution, habitat destruction, credulous 
morons who thought that eating its horn would give them a boner)” (81). Jimmy is unamused by 
the tedium of this activity, while Crake takes quite a liking to it. Later, as a developing scientist 
at Watson-Crick Institute, Jimmy discovers Crake has mastered the game and, in fact, the game 
is a kind of countercultural meeting platform for a bioterrorist group (reminiscent of the radical 
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environmental group Earth First!) called MaddAddam5: “Adam named the living animals, 
MaddAddam names the dead ones. Do you want to play?” (214). Jimmy is horrified to see 
Oryx’s face as one of the “lily-pad” folders for entering the MaddAddam bioterrorism site: “It 
was the picture of Oryx, seven or eight years old, naked except for her ribbons, her flowers” 
(215). Crake’s use of this picture after all of the years since they had originally witnessed Oryx’s 
“contemptuous, knowing look” suggests that her existence also made an irreversible impact on 
his psychic landscape and emotional health. Indeed, as an adult Crake tells Jimmy their traumatic 
adolescence was a “definitive time[-]” (300)6.  
 Crake’s ecological consciousness seems to be subconsciously linked with Oryx. Perhaps, 
in the mode of ecofeminism, his mind unconsciously associates the destructive consumption of 
various animal species with the oppression and consumption of women. Oryx’s cool stare (which 
speaks to his repressed desire to honor the m(other) through reciprocal, loving interactions) 
experienced in such close proximity to a game that floors one with its extensive documentation 
of the havoc that humans have wrought upon natural systems and life forms propels the 
development of Crake’s ecological consciousness but also taints it insomuch as it becomes 
symptomatic of a kind of (quasi) deep-ecological misanthropy. To demonstrate this, it is 
important to give a brief overview of the main ideas behind deep ecological philosophy.  
 As described by Bill Devall and George Sessions, the notion of self-realization and 
biocentric equality are the main concepts or “ultimate norms” behind deep ecology’s ideological 
force. Self-realization refers to the individual’s recognition of his or her place as merely one 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
5 The MaddAddamites are originally part of the God’s Gardeners pacifist group. However, because their leader Adam One 
disapproves of ecoterrorist methods in the subversion of their Corporation-run system, his brother Zeb and his followers leave the 
group and use the Extinctathon chatroom as a secret communication platform.  
6 Later, the novel seems to imply that Crake’s apparent collusions with the MaddAddamite bioterrorists is to eventually blackmail 
them into working on his BlyssPluss and Paradice Projects. Like the property-sabotage operations of Earth First!, the 
MaddAddamites are not interested in doing “any people numbers,” but Crake in contrast becomes very much interested in human 
obliteration (217).  
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corporeal member of an active assemblage of many others, a “‘self-in-Self’ where ‘Self’ stands 
for [the] organic interrelated wholeness” of an interspecies “nurturing nondominating society” 
(Devall and Sessions 67). They call for an “unfolding of the self” which is in opposition to the 
“isolated ego striving primary for hedonistic gratification” (i.e. capitalist consumer subjectivity) 
but rather “includes not only me, an individual human, but all humans, whales, grizzly bears, 
whole rain forest ecosystems, mountains and rivers, the tiniest microbes in the soil, and so on” 
(67). On the other hand, their concept of biocentric equality involves the notion that “all things in 
the biosphere have an equal right to live and blossom and to reach their own individual forms of 
unfolding and self-realization within the larger Self-realization. This basic intuition is that all 
organisms and entities in the ecosphere, as parts of the interrelated whole, are equal in intrinsic 
worth” (67). Humans would indeed step much lighter on their paths, perhaps even increase the 
sum of happiness on the earth, if they adopted such norms.   
 However, many critics of deep ecology have duly noted the potentially troubling 
authoritarian politics that might come to fruition from such beliefs, especially in the face of their 
implicitly militant “principles” (Ferry 68) that “the flourishing of human life and cultures is 
compatible with a substantial decrease of the human population” and that true believers are 
obligated to “implement the necessary changes” (Devall and Sessions 70). In his book Re-
Enchanting Humanity Murray Bookchin argues that deep ecology’s holistic notions of self-in-
Self functions as a kind of self-effacement and promotes a society of mass disempowerment 
composed of individuals who have lost their identity in their merge into the “larger cosmic 
whole” (99). However, some thinkers are sympathetic to deep ecology’s vision of the resistance 
of the ego to the aggressive differentiation of the self from all others in its description of the 
ego’s boundaries expanding outward to encompass all earthly things. But as Plumwood has 
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deftly illustrated, deep ecology’s unifying impulse is usually a mask for the incorporating or 
assimilating impulse from early childhood development, which is unable to “affirm difference” 
and therefore “denies the other through the attempt to incorporate it into the empire of the self” 
(Feminism 179). She also points out that deep ecology’s desire to transcend the personal and 
particular with an eye to the greater whole “‘reflect[s] the familiar masculine urge to transcend 
the concrete world…in preference for something more enduring and abstract’” (Marti Kheel qtd. 
in Plumwood, Feminism 181). 
 Crake’s troubling scientific ideologies discussed above combine with his ecological 
consciousness, which encompasses all of these concerns about deep ecological belief and praxis, 
to exert truly monstrous effects in the world. One of the first instances in which the reader 
witnesses Crake’s skewed “biocentric” values is when he expresses outrage at the Happicuppa 
Corporation (the equivalent of the modern day Starbucks Coffee Company) for ruining 
rainforests in order to plant genetically modified coffee. Crake is indifferent to the fate of the 
“small growers” and “their labourers” who have been thrown “out of business” and are 
“reduced…to starvation-level poverty” (Oryx and Crake 179). He reasons that the “guys killing” 
the peasants should be “whacked,” but not because “of the dead peasants, there’s always been 
dead peasants. But [because] they’re nuking the cloud forests to plant this stuff,” the latter being 
obviously more valuable to his mind. Jimmy comments that the peasants would cause the same 
amount of rainforest destruction if endowed with the technological power and Crake responds 
that “they don’t have half a chance” of acquiring that kind of power. Jimmy asks if he is taking 
sides and Crake says, “‘[t]here aren’t any sides, as such,’” a comment that suggests Crake 
doesn’t see this as a political issue involving a clash of different interests. Instead, it is a matter 
of essential (biological) flaws in homo sapiens. Crake’s opinion that he can defend neither the 
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Happicuppa Corporation nor the peasants ultimately reveals his disturbing belief that “natural” 
humans, without the aid of his bioengineering vision, are irreparably damaged and destructive to 
the world’s life forms and systems as a whole. 
 A further affiliation of Crake’s mindset with mutated forms of deep ecological thinking is 
in his flattening of human/animal ontological divisions expressed through his constant conflation 
of human and animal behavior. For example, Crake reduces the human impulse to create art to a 
“stab at getting laid,” a behavior analogous to the mating behaviors of “sneaker male” frogs who 
use drain pipes to amplify their calls and attract mates who might not be naturally attracted to 
their small stature much like what evolutionary psychologists say about art (168). Crake also 
expresses a complete disregard for the individual or part and instead praises the value of the 
whole or system. For instance, Crake wonders whether “a single ant [can] be said to be alive, in 
any meaningful sense of the word, or does it only have relevance in terms of its anthill?” (371). 
Crake’s philosophical “conundrums” bring to mind Bookchin’s worry that various posthuman 
schools of thought (i.e. sociobiology, deep ecology, etc.) that “[v]iew[-] human beings as merely 
another animal species – such as fruit flies – create[-] an ideal setting for thinking about how 
their numbers can be reduced by foul means as well as fair” (Re-Enchanting 59). As an example 
of misanthropic versions of deep ecological thinking taken to its logical conclusion Bookchin 
cites a disturbing statement by the leader of Earth First!:  
‘When I tell people how the worst thing we could do in Ethiopia is to give aid – 
the best thing would be to just let nature seek its own balance, to let people there 
just starve there, they think that is monstrous. But the alternative is that you go in 
and save these half dead children who will never live a whole life. Their 
development will be stunted. And what’s going to happen in ten years time is that 
twice as many people will suffer and die.’ (David Foreman qtd. in Bookchin 107) 
 
This statement reveals a number of things, namely, Foreman’s (and Crake’s) egomaniacal belief 
that he has the right to decide what constitutes and who is permitted to lead a full life, what 
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nature’s “balance” descriptively looks like, and the utilitarian tendency to privilege the whole 
over the individual. Crake demonstrates a similar line of reasoning in his failure to comfort 
Jimmy’s disgust with the market for child slaves and prostitutes in the Southeastern Asian village 
of Oryx’s childhood: “Jimmy, look at it realistically. You can’t couple a minimum access to food 
with an expanding population indefinitely. Homo sapiens doesn’t seem able to cut himself off at 
the supply end. He’s one of the few species that doesn’t limit reproduction in the face of 
dwindling resources” (120). In response, Jimmy sadly remarks that humanity is doomed, to 
which Crake says “cheerfully,” “‘[o]nly as individuals’” (120). Crake’s miscalculated deep 
ecological idea, as summed up by Oryx, that “[t]here are too many people and that 
makes…people bad,” that humans are inherently damaged, in combination with his 
Enlightenment humanist/transhumanist belief that he “has found the problems” and can “make 
the world a better place” leads to the intentional eradication of the modern human species (322). 
The unusual combination of philosophies that compose Crake’s mindset make it impossible for 
him to adopt the more healthy aspects of the humanist ideal, namely, a faith in humanity’s 
aptitude to transcend and actively revise the social conditions which threaten to reduce him or 
her to a thing. Crake reduces the social justice and ecological crises suffered in his world to a 
“genetic deep structural” problem rather than focusing on the “social roots of our ecological 
dislocations” (Bookchin, Re-Enchanting 109).  
Part III: Toward an Ecology of Sensuality and Becoming 
 In sum, most reductionist scientists see genes as the “keys to the ‘secret of life’ or 
blueprints of the organism” (Hubbard 27). Ultimately, as discussed above, these scientists see 
genes as the direct cause of particular behavioral and physical phenotypes. Feminist critics of 
science’s absolute devotion to the “genetic deep structure” as predictive of one’s essential core, 
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resist reductionist characterizations of human and animal nature by appealing to more ecological 
descriptions of the loosely embedded subject and emphasizing the potential for bodily and 
psychic transformation. They point out that “in a complex system of reactions…which requires 
many components and conditions that must work together…and that are often interdependent, it 
is wrong to single out any one substance or event as the cause” (Hubbard 43). Hubbard usefully 
develops this more ecologically framed argument more fully to point out how the organism is in 
constant conversation with its environment, which challenges the biotechnological scientist’s 
beliefs that they have complete control over their project-organisms and the consequences of 
their manipulation:  
[The] genes [that] participate in the functioning of multicellular 
organisms…involve large numbers of interacting metabolites and pathways as 
well as interactions between cells and tissues and between the organism and 
environment. Genes are only part of this story, and their roles are not sufficiently 
well understood to predict what will happen if one or another of them is changed, 
replaced, or even just moved from one position to another on the chromosome. 
(48) 
 
Analogously, various anti-reductionist scientists and social theorists, such as Anne Fausto-
Sterling, argue that an “individual’s capacities emerge from a web of interactions between the 
biological being and the social environment. Within this web, connecting threads move in both 
directions” (7). In direct opposition to the reductionist view of nature, Hubbard points out that 
one cannot “predict the structures and functions of proteins [and the traits they express mediated 
by a multitude of somatic and external forces] from the properties of the amino acids of which 
they are composed” (33). Instead she sees the world from a kind of interactive or 
“transformationism” model where “biological and environmental factors can change an organism 
so that it responds differently to other, concurrent or subsequent, biological or environmental 
changes than it would have done otherwise. Simultaneously, the organism transforms the 
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environment, which of course, includes other organisms” (33). Overall, these feminist thinkers 
emphasize the unpredictability of “multidirectional acts of association” between various life 
forms and their environments (Haraway, Companion 31). 
 These ecofeminist theories of interconnected transformation are conspicuously similar to 
Gilles Deleuze and Félix Guattari’s notions of becoming. According to Louise Economides in 
her study “Romantic Individualism, Animal Rights, and the Challenge of Multiplicity,” these 
thinkers’ “phenomenology of becoming entails an understanding of how entities are, of 
necessity, always already interconnected with other entities in novel configurations that cannot 
be reduced to the dualistic paradigms” valorized by essentialist sociobiological discourse (1). 
Deleuze and Guattari argue that every entity (conceived of by reductionist models as a stable, 
autonomous subject or object) is in fact a boundless multiplicity, a pack, or rhizomatic structure 
(a mini ecological system haphazardly connecting, disconnecting, and reconnecting to an infinite 
number of other propagating, evolving ecosystems, universes within universes) that is “already 
composed of heterogeneous terms in symbiosis, and…is continually transforming itself into a 
string of other multiplicities” (249). The pack is also the “reality of becoming-animal of the 
human being” or what is irreducibly withdrawn, unpredictable, and mutable, distinctly counter to 
modernity’s essentialist dualisms and its “institutions of the family and the State apparatus” 
(242). Similar to Fausto-Sterling’s above account of the individual and its environment’s 
seesawing impacts on one another, these thinkers describe a “Universe fiber” that “stretches from 
a human to an animal…from molecules to particles…across borderlines [that] constitute a line of 
flight or of deterritorialization…[and therefore] carries the transformations of becoming or 
crossings of multiplicities” (249).  
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 Additionally, these thinkers conceive of some kind of “contagious affect” or a sensual 
apprehension of the “power of the pack that throws the self into upheaval and makes it reel” 
(240). This sensation of radical nonhuman becoming, a decentering of one’s bounded 
individuality, transforms or turns one’s awareness over to the fact that s/he is part and parcel of a 
swarming agential ontologically heterogeneous multiplicity of “unnatural7 participations,” 
symbiotic alliances. The new assemblages that form from these “lines of flight” from the norms 
dictated by hegemony “are interkingdoms,” becomings that are “in the domain of symbioses that 
bring into play beings of totally different scales and kingdoms, with no possible filiation” (238). 
Moreover, in contradistinction to a certain kind of scientist’s faith in the predictive powers of 
essentialist and biologically determined thought paradigms, ecological bodies, assemblages and 
rhizomatic networks are inherently unpredictable, ungovernable, and recalcitrant:  
[N]o one, not even God, can say in advance whether two borderlines will string 
together or form a fiber, whether a given multiplicity will or will not cross over 
into another given multiplicity, or even if given heterogeneous elements will enter 
symbiosis, will form a consistent, or cofunctioning, multiplicity susceptible to 
transformation. No one can say where the line of flight will pass. (Deleuze and 
Guattari 250) 
 
Ultimately, these thinkers suggest a compelling plasticity and fluidity inherent to the world of 
things, a “becoming-animal [that] takes the form of a…rupture with the central institutions” that 
seek to stabilize the Western myths of fixed wholeness, unity, and Oedipal Man (Deleuze and 
Guattari 247). It is Deleuze and Guattari’s colorful model of an unforeseen political cross-species 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
7 Calling such interspecies “pack” formations “unnatural” is an interesting label given the prevalence of such assemblages in the 
biosphere. An obvious example of this type of non-filial “partnership” includes plant and fungal intertwinements, organisms that 
come from entirely different taxonomic categories. Perhaps a more striking example consists of stories about a bird called the 
“honeyguide” who moves oddly and makes noise to get an “assistant” nonhuman or human mammals’ attention in order to lead 
them to a bee hive whereupon the mammal who is interested in possessing the honey breaks open the hive leaving the beeswax 
and larvae exposed for the hungry bird: “In view of this mutual benefit, it is not surprising that humans and the honeyguide have 
developed an elaborate interspecific communication system” in many African countries (Isack and Reyer 1344). To my mind, 
Deleuze and Guattari’s “unnatural participations” refer to the above bio-assemblages and a similar type of unpredictable cross-
species, gender, class, and race mutualistic dance that is spontaneously produced by the random alliance of entities with similar 
interests always in perpetual metamorphosis and exchange. These non-hereditary unions are counter to ideals of the “natural” 
within Oedipal-capitalist culture insofar as the entities involved have no loyalty to or investment in the maintenance of a stable, 
heteronormative State made of essentialized, absolute identities closed off from alien symbioses, the ephemerality of identity and 
the rainbow of ontologies.  
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aggregate (“the becoming-animal of men, packs of animals, elephants and rats, winds and 
tempests, bacteria sowing contagion” (243)) that Atwood’s army of Toby, the pigoons, and the 
Crakers formulate in a symbolic representation of the “true” structure of an interdependent 
coalitional ecosystem. Such an aggregate suggests the possibility of formulating a new ethical 
interspecies relation based on cooperation and an invested effort in communicating and 
understanding radically alien cultures. 
 Jane Bennett also recognizes the essentialist and reductionist tendencies of the 
shortsighted Western philosophical project that wields the formidable weapons of 
demystification and life/matter, subject/object dualism that “tend[-] to screen from view the 
vitality of matter” (xv) or mute the energetic “call” of the thing (Vibrant Matter 4); they numb 
the ability for one to sense the “incredible feeling of an unknown Nature—affect,” the power and 
contagion of the pack (Deleuze and Guattari 240). Like Deleuze and Guattari, Bennett works to 
show the unpredictable and “irreducibly strange dimension of matter,…[its] ‘intangible and 
imponderable’ recalcitrance” (Vibrant Matter 3). She wishes to “people her desert” with animate 
and vital things because she believes that the “image of dead or thoroughly instrumentalized 
matter feeds human hubris and our earth-destroying fantasies of conquest and consumption” (ix). 
She argues that Western philosophy has deadened the world and thereby humanity’s ability to 
sense and perceive the “nonhuman powers circulating around and within human bodies,” which 
has resulted in humanity’s spiritually and corporally alienated and unsustainable relation with the 
world of things (ix). She highlights the “curious ability of inanimate things to animate, to act, to 
produce effects dramatic and subtle” in order to distribute agentic capacity, vitality, and value 
across a wider diversity of types with the goal of invoking a greater sense of kinship between 
things and humans and therefore a heightened ecological sensibility (6).  
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 Inspired by Deleuze and Guattari’s description of the viral assemblage, Bennett describes 
her notion of the assemblage in similar terms as “living, throbbing confederations…[with] 
uneven topographies” (24); animal, vegetable, human, machine, viral, pharmaceutical, cultural, 
geological, and atmospheric particulates circulating, aligning, or extinguishing devoid of a 
unifying center, non-harmonious. She argues that it is important to acknowledge these 
assemblages as public collectives or polities, political ecologies composed of human and 
nonhuman elements with significant impacts on human and nonhuman lives. In order to argue 
for the existence of “ontologically heterogeneous” eco-publics, Bennett points out that “conjoint 
action is the agency behind the emergence of a public” and that often “some acts of conjoint 
action originate in nonhuman (natural and technological) bodies” (95). Bennett proposes that a 
public is an association of bodies joined together in conjoint action “not so much by choice” 
(100). Rather they are “provoked to do so by a problem,” often one that revolves around a 
“shared experience of harm” (100). Similarly, Deleuze and Guattari assert that “[b]ands, human 
or animal proliferate by contagion, epidemics, battlefields, and catastrophes” and that in these 
heterogeneous publics/packs, “unnatural participations or nuptials are the true Nature spanning 
the kingdoms of nature” (241). Ultimately, Bennett argues that the importance of expanding the 
definition of who/what participates in a public lies in the possibility of understanding more 
comprehensively a problem affecting humans and therefore achieving the ability to generate a 
web of solutions. Additionally, she argues that that if we accept “nonhuman bodies as members 
of a public” we might be better able to detect “instances of harm to the (affective) bodies of 
animals, vegetables, minerals, and their ecocultures” (Vibrant Matter 103). She is trying to open 
the reader’s mind to the idea of including nonhuman actants within a political body and therefore 
the necessity of devising “new procedures, technologies, and regimes of perception that enable 
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us to consult with nonhumans more closely, or to listen and respond more carefully to their 
outbreaks, objections, testimonies, and propositions” (108). She believes that democratization 
should be broadened for the sake of the “health of the political ecologies [the packs, 
assemblages, or rhizomes] to which we belong” (108). In The Year of the Flood and MaddAddam 
Atwood reveals how capitalist culture has relegated the nonhuman to speechless, apolitical, 
disenfranchised objects and how if one learns to listen (or if civilization comes crashing down 
and one can finally hear through the noise) one might be congenially propelled (or pressured by 
angry Pigoons) to add nonhuman voices to a reimagined democratic body.   
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CHAPTER FIVE: Perceptive Practices, Recalcitrant Natures, and Interspecies Political 
Ecologies: The Unforeseen Posthuman Future in Margaret Atwood’s The Year of the Flood 
and MaddAddam 
I came to explore the wreck. 
The words are purposes. 
The words are maps. 
I came to see the damage that was done 
and the treasures that prevail. 
 
Adrienne Rich, “Diving into the Wreck” (1973) 
 
 Critics have suggested Margaret Atwood’s MaddAddam trilogy can be read as a fatalistic 
dystopia that bleakly warns of unavoidable apocalypse due to malevolent, fixed flaws in human 
nature (Glover 59). Moreover, much Atwood criticism has been unquestioningly informed by 
anthropocentric theoretical paradigms in which concern with “human” survival in the novels is 
central (Rozelle 2). These readings assume the existence of a fixed, essential human subject and 
express great apprehension at its potential “loss” due to culture/nature boundary blurs instigated 
by the new “posthuman” sciences and technologies in the texts. However, a less reactionary and 
homocentric analysis might read the posthuman realities of the rogue humans (Toby and the 
God’s Gardeners/MaddAddamites) and cyborgs (the bioengineered Crakers and the pigoons) as 
exhibiting hope, liberation, and revolutionary potential through responsive practices that enable 
the discernment of the enchanted vitality underlying the more-than-human world as well as the 
unpredictable genomic capabilities of these posthuman characters that spin webs of community 
between unlikely forms.  
 This chapter specifically looks at how the exploitative late-capitalist regime within the 
novels provokes a countercultural opposition whose ideology and praxis are informed by 
philosophies that resemble Jane Bennett’s vital materialism and Gilles Deleuze and Félix 
Guattari’s notion of “becoming-animal.” Moreover, the collapse of a humanist, stable system 
opens up a space in which the nonhuman and human “products” of biotechnology are free to 
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behave in unexpected ways to further “confuse” modernist boundaries between human/animal 
and subject/object which help to develop new ethical, perceptive responses toward the 
feminized-other and a new world of interspecies relational possibility. In the post-apocalyptic 
setting of the novels, the God’s Gardeners’ reality of ecological systems composed of vibrant 
material actants becomes joyfully evident and thereby works to propel the transformation of the 
human subject into a more pack-minded collective in Deleuze and Guattari’s sense. The 
irreducibly aleatory, emancipatory and oddly collaborative quality of the agential forces and 
recalcitrant natures housed in the rogue humans, bioengineered creatures, and native species also 
becomes compellingly apparent as they synergistically react to shape a flexible cross-species 
body politic as represented by the Craker-pigoon-human alliance. Overall, the novels highlight 
the “natural” recalcitrance of things and their insurgent potentialities (latent interspecies political 
ecologies), the “becomings-animal” that lay dormant within the various “potent and taboo 
fusions” of so-called once discrete binaries poised to erupt in violent reaction under the right 
conditions. For Atwood’s readers, these figures represent the necessary deconstructions and 
transformations of the ideas of the human subject and the so-called object world if the human 
species wants to try and form a more ethical and ontologically inclusive ecological future 
“grounded in concern for others” (Rozelle 1).  
 In “A Cyborg Manifesto” Donna Haraway points out that in late-capitalism’s new era of 
communications sciences and biotechnologies, the reduction of the world into a simple problem 
of code has caused the boundaries between humans and animals, and machines and organisms, as 
well as the physical and non-physical to become exceedingly fluid and blurry. The effects of this 
have been problematic in the extreme as evidenced in instrumentalist attitudes toward all living 
things (the reduction of all subjects to discrete “objects” and finally to the level of manipulatable 
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information) and the totalitarian use of surveillance technologies, militant eugenics discourse, 
unethical bioengineering experiments, and oppressive sociobiological interpretations of gender, 
among many other dominating uses of the new technologies. Be that as it may, perhaps, 
according to vital materialist Jane Bennett, if the “difference between subjects and objects [is] 
minimized . . . the status of the shared materiality of all things [will be] elevated. All bodies 
become more than mere objects, as the thing-powers of resistance and protean agency are 
brought into sharper relief” (Vibrant Matter 13). Complementarily, Haraway perceives how 
“biotechnologically mediated gene transfers redo kin and kind at rates and in patterns 
unprecedented on earth” with the potential for creating new and powerful species alliances 
(When Species Meet 18). For example, she sees the “protean transformations” (emergent “kinds 
of unity across race, gender, and class” and the “fusions with animals and machines”) instigated 
by the new sciences and technologies as hopeful sites for revolutionary metamorphoses and 
motely polity coalitions that are in stark opposition to Western Man and “His” static and 
essentialist agendas (“Cyborg” 173). Moreover, Haraway (like Deleuze and Guattari in their 
book A Thousand Plateaus) recognizes that the boundaries between organic discrete categories 
have always been unstable and fluid in a continuous becoming (Companion 16). Similarly, eco-
phenomenologist David Abram describes the “boundaries of [the] living body [as] open and 
indeterminate; more like membranes than barriers, they define a surface of metamorphosis and 
exchange” (46). Finally, Bennett, in combination with Deleuze and Guattari (in a mode 
analogous to Haraway’s affinity politics), emphasize the recalcitrant thing-power of non-human 
entities, the powerful affect of multiform packs (neither of which mind the bounds of modernist 
divisions or predicted trajectories) that have the interpellating potential to penetrate the 
permeable bodies of the world and propel them to form ecologically-oriented, ontologically 
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heterogeneous polities that include a wider range of actants and potentially ethical subjects. 
These thinkers also offer several techniques for perceiving the enchanted and participatory nature 
of things, for recognizing and responding to others, which they claim will provoke restorative 
political action and more loving, livable relations with the world. Margaret Atwood, in The Year 
of the Flood and MaddAddam envisions such a “Nature” in which none of its inhabitants can 
maintain self-contained integrity but rather constantly participate in a self-other “dance of 
interaction” in which the “self” (human or nonhuman) comes into contact with “someone else’s 
needs and reality, creating an interactive process in which each transforms and limits the other” 
(Plumwood 156). 
 Part I of this chapter, Pre-Apocalyptic Countercultures and Perceptive Practices, explains 
how the God’s Gardeners’ eco-societal aesthetic and spiritual practices resemble Bennett’s 
suggested techniques for apprehending enchanted materialism to formulate a more sensual and 
collaborative interaction with the world and Deleuze and Guattari’s notions of drug use as a 
deterritorializing practice exercised to create new modes of being counter to state 
institutionalized norms. This section also looks at how the God’s Gardeners’ beliefs productively 
undermine modernist divisions between humans and animals. Part II, The Enchanted 
Materialisms and Recalcitrant Natures of the Post-Apocalyptic World, of this chapter looks at 
how the “waterless flood” clears the way for a more effortless and accessible apprehension of the 
vibrant, uncontrollable, and agentic qualities that issue both from “natural” and bioengineered 
entities. This newfound comprehension and susceptibility to thing-power and the “contagion” of 
the pack, in a sense, primes many of the characters to enter the world of becoming. Part III, 
Emergent Publics/Packs, will argue that these recalcitrant natures provide unexpected sources of 
hope and liberation as they collapse speaker/silent, human/animal, and subject/object binaries. 
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They propel the various characters to join in a new kind of coalitional unity in experiential 
affinity as exemplified by the Pigoon-Craker-Human war against the Painballers whose 
aftermath results in a Pigoon-Human political alliance/pack. This section will argue that despite 
this event’s satirical nature, it challenges one to question/widen one’s definitions of subjecthood 
and how and whose “voices” should be included in an ecological democracy. Part IV, Ethology 
(or Degrees of Affect) Versus Biocentrism as a Foundation for a Cross-Ontological Ethics, will 
conclude the discussion by briefly looking into the anxiety of blurring boundaries, some of the 
pitfalls in reading and celebrating the cross-species alliances depicted in the novels as advocating 
biocentrism, and the necessity of a more ecological assessment of “who” and “what” matters in 
an ontologically heterogeneous ethics.  
Part I: Pre-Apocalyptic Countercultures and Perceptive Practices 
  It is important to replace the images of human, animal, and environmental natures 
portrayed in humanist epistemologies and sociobiological, biodeterminist discourses because 
they are not scientifically accurate nor do they promote sustainable or ethically livable 
worldviews. Bennett believes this replacement may be possible if one develops “the ability to 
discern nonhuman vitality, to become perceptually open to it” (Vibrant Matter 14). She explains 
that practicing vital materialist aesthetic exercises and techniques (“self-criticism of 
conceptualization, a sensory attentiveness to the qualitative singularities of the object, the 
exercise of an unrealistic imagination – an exercise of utopian thinking that embraces the 
possibility that the energetic presence of things occluded by our concepts and secular disposition 
might still be felt – and the courage of a [naïve and foolish] clown”) will open one up to the 
vitality of systems and things and encourage one to practice “ameliorative political action” (15). 
She emphasizes the importance in developing a bodily and sensual receptive attentiveness to the 
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moment of resistance, the instant of perceiving the vital power in things. This newfound 
perceptiveness could encourage wondrous moments of fearful and pleasurable discovery in 
which “human being and thinghood overlap,” thus rejuvenating the human animal’s sense that 
“we are also nonhuman and that things too are vital players in the world” (4). Restoring the 
body’s anticipatory readiness and “perceptual style open to the appearance of thing-power” could 
also help to promote the creation of a more responsible and inclusive socio-ecological polity as 
mentioned above (5). Similarly, Deleuze and Guattari see the bodily practices and aesthetic 
techniques of painting, writing, music, mind-altering drugs, and an attentive fascination for the 
“pack” or the multiplicative and contagious assemblage as conducive to deterritorialization or as 
fostering a line of flight to enter into an understanding and identification with a subversive 
nonhuman becoming in stark opposition to late-capitalist culture (239-240). Recognizing the 
necessity of developing a sense of this intimate affinity with the nonhuman world, Toby and the 
Gardeners in The Year of the Flood and MaddAddam, develop the set of bodily practices and 
aesthetic techniques delineated by Bennett, Deleuze, and Guattari that foster a sensual 
perceptiveness toward the earth’s enchanted materialism and pack affects, sensations which 
encourage the subversive state of becoming-animal and “allows to come into being entities that 
would otherwise remain concealed” (Donovan 92). 
 Bennett describes Theodor Adorno’s concept of “nonidentity” as a lack of fit between a 
concept and a thing, the way the underlying resistance of the thing exceeds one’s definitions 
(Vibrant Matter 15). She suggests that the “discriminating man…both subjects his 
conceptualizations to second-order reflection and pays close aesthetic attention to the object’s 
‘qualitative moments’, for these open a window onto nonidentity” or the vitality of things (15). 
Adam One, the founder and the leader of the God’s Gardeners eco-society, enacts this perceptual 
	  
	   93 
practice of critical reflection when he says “Science is merely one way of describing the world” 
(The Year 359). While preaching in the Sewage Lagoon, Adam One tells the crowd, “Like you, I 
thought Man was the measure of all things…In fact, dear Friends, I thought measurement was 
the measure of all things! Yes – I was a scientist…I thought that only numbers could give a true 
description of Reality” (40). Here one can see Adam One is explicitly critiquing humanist and 
rationalist (emphasis on quantitative truth) reductionism in an effort to see something closer to 
the thing in itself (or at least a more ecological construction of the world) and encourage the 
public to “cultivate the ability to discern nonhuman vitality, to become perceptually open to it” 
(Bennett, Vibrant Matter 14).  
 Toby is one such member of the public that comes to cultivate her sensual and perceptual 
skills. After Adam One rescues Toby from her abusive employer Blanco, she climbs atop the 
God’s Gardeners Edencliff Rooftop Garden and gazes “around it in wonder…Each petal and leaf 
was fully alive, shining with awareness of her” (The Year 43). She experiences her first glimpse 
of the underlying vitality of things. Both Adam One and her substitute mother and mentor, Pilar, 
encourage Toby to exercise the vital materialist techniques of an unrealistic imagination (the 
creative envisioning of the thing-power “obscured by the distortion of conceptualization” (15)) 
and the courage of naiveté (to postpone the interpretation of thing-power as social construction) 
so that she might apprehend more skillfully and consciously the inexplicable energy of things. 
After Adam one requests that Toby accept a position as Eve Six of Garden Botanics and Edible 
Weeds, Toby informs him that she cannot accept because she is unsure she believes any of the 
Gardener teachings: “She’d never managed to repeat the moment of illumination she’d felt on 
her first day with the Gardeners” (168). Adam one assures her that because she has been acting 
as if she believes she should continue to live in moments of naivety accordingly and “belief will 
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follow in time” (168). Pilar further taxes Toby’s imagination with her folk myths: “[B]ees [are] 
on good terms with the unseen world, being messengers to the dead…[while] [m]ushrooms [are] 
the roses in the garden of that unseen world, because the real mushroom plant [is] underground. 
The part you could see – what most people called a mushroom – [is] just a brief apparition. A 
cloud flower” (100). This description fits the elusive nature of the sensible world’s miracles of 
expression. The cloud flowers, bees, and underground natures can also be read as a symbolic 
description of the unseen (molecular or imperceptible) interconnected symbiotic nature of 
multiplicities, potential becomings connected by a “subterranean stem” that makes a rhizome or 
a cofunctioning ecological body composed of humans and nonhumans (Deleuze and Guattari 
251). Finally, in a further stretch of the naïve imagination, Pilar instructs Toby that she must ask 
permission from the Queen to extract honey and tell the bees the news each day. Toby is told she 
must speak out loud to bees that she believes are inertly mechanistic and thoughtlessly instinctive 
and “[s]o Toby did speak, though she felt like a fool” (100).  
 Later, Toby goes to the garden to inform the bees of Pilar’s death. She thinks they can tell 
her grief from fear and wonders, “Were they listening? Perhaps. They were nibbling gently at the 
edges of her dried tears. For the salt, a scientist would say” (181). Toby’s scientific dismissal of 
the bees behavior is problematic in that she is not practicing critical reflection and in that it 
resembles what Bennett labels as the “strong tendency among modern, secular . . . humans to 
refer such signs back to a human agency” (Vibrant Matter 17) as she does when she imagines her 
own insanity as producing the delusion of listening bees. Bennett claims that the vital materialist 
will instead 
try to linger in those moments during which they find themselves fascinated by 
objects, taking them as clues to the material vitality that they share with them. 
This sense of a strange and incomplete commonality with the out-side may induce 
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vital materialists to treat nonhumans—animals, plants, earth . . . —more carefully, 
more strategically, more ecologically. (17-18)  
 
Indeed, after a time of following the naïve and imaginative tenets of vital materialists Adam One 
and Pilar, Toby begins to see the entire world as animate and agentic, not mechanical or 
reflexive. When she has to leave the paradise of the Edencliff Rooftop Garden due to a threat of 
sabotage by Blanco, she goes to tell the bees goodbye. She notes that she will miss the bees and 
believes that the bees that alight on her face are in fact, rather than gathering salt, “exploring her 
emotions through the chemicals on her skin,” discussing her, and hopes they will forgive her for 
tipping their hives earlier to save herself from an attack by Blanco (257). Clearly, Toby has 
cultivated the special sensitivity of a thing-power materialist and is able to ascertain the agency 
and sensuality of the nonhuman world. Yet, it is not just that Toby learns to appreciate thing-
power; she also has to revise her definition of communication as information sharing that can 
take place as an exchange of chemicals8. She forgoes the assumption that language and 
intentionality are purely human prerogatives and instead begins to imagine the natural world as 
“a vast network of signifying possibilities across innumerable species” (Clark 53). Toby realizes 
that by “denying that…animals have their own styles of speech, by insisting that the river has no 
real voice and that the ground itself is mute, we stifle our direct experience” (Abram 263). By 
denying the communicative gestures and vitality of “earth others” we cut ourselves off from 
lively interactions and various experiential pleasures (both literary and “real” world) and them 
from ethical consideration. 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
8 Plants also employ chemicals to communicate. For example, certain species of plants when under attack by “insect herbivores” 
will exude “volatile compounds” that “attract both parasitic and predatory insects that are natural enemies” to the insect wreaking 
havoc on the plant (Pare´ and Tumlinson 1). This release of chemicals by the plant under attack by insect herbivores also often 
causes a defensive response in neighboring plants. Scientists call “[s]uch chemicals, which function in communication between 
and among species, as well as those that serve as messengers between members of the same species…semiochemicals.” This is 
also an example of a kind of “unnatural participation” in Deleuze and Guattari’s sense as well as nonhuman intentionality.  
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 The God’s Gardeners also seem to practice the kind of strategic anthropomorphism and 
affinity groping that Bennett advocates. Bennett defines anthropomorphism as the “interpretation 
of what is not human or personal in terms of human or personal characteristics” and believes this 
is a useful strategy for thinking about the more-than-human world because one might “at 
first…see only a world in [his or her] own image, but what appears next is a swarm of ‘talented’ 
and vibrant materialities (including the seeing self)” (Vibrant Matter 99). Indeed, Pilar projects 
the human notion and ability to love on the bees when she asserts, “They know they’re loved” 
(The Year 100). After this habitual treatment has time to sink into Toby’s skin, she does come to 
see the bees as consciously directed, “talented” entities. For example, when she goes to persuade 
a swarm of wild bees to come live at the MaddAddamite Cobb House she interprets their landing 
on her face as an intelligent investigation that will culminate into a conscious acceptance or 
rejection of her: “Several of the scout bees fly down and land on her face. They explore her skin, 
her nostril, the corners of her eyes; it’s as if a dozen tiny fingers are stroking her. If they sting, 
the answer is no. If they don’t sting, the answer is yes” (MaddAddam 303).  
 Additionally, a projected affinity onto things can help to “catalyze a sensibility that finds 
a world filled not with ontologically distinct categories of beings (subjects and objects) but with 
variously composed materialities that form confederations,” that reveal “similarities across 
categorical divides” (Bennett, Vibrant Matter 99). For example, Adam One points out that that 
“knots of DNA and RNA…tie us to our many fellow creatures” and that one should “accept in 
all humility our kinship with the Fishes, who appear to us as mute and foolish; for in Your 
[God’s] sight, we are all mute and foolish” (The Year 197). Perhaps more strikingly, Adam One 
cautions his Gardener congregation that humans are “inclined to overlook the very small that 
dwell among us; yet, without them, we ourselves could not exist; for every one of us is a Garden 
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of sub-visual life forms” (160). Each of these lines ask the human subject to recognize his or her 
interior “thing-hood,” to “reach out across the Species gap” (MaddAddam 189), and perceive that 
each “human is a heterogeneous compound of wonderfully vibrant…matter” thus minimizing 
categorical differences between subjects and objects and thereby bestowing a sense of kinship 
and value more widely (Bennett, Vibrant Matter 13). Moreover, these descriptions defy the 
humanist conception of the sovereign, atomistic subject in favor of Man as Multiplicity, as “an 
aggregate whose elements vary according to its connections, its relations of movement and rest, 
the different individuated assemblages it enters” (Deleuze and Guattari 256). 
 Similar to Deleuze and Guattari’s philosophies, not only do the God’s Gardeners 
challenge (through critical reflection) science and humanist monopolies on apprehending the 
world and understanding subjectivity, they also suggest that “psychic aids” and diverse forms of 
“art play[-] a critical ‘deterritorializing’ role in [their] particular method[s] of creating ‘lines of 
flight’ away from the…state philosophy’s meta-narratives” (Economides 2). Deleuze and 
Guattari clearly describe the politics of becoming-animal as an expression of “minoritarian 
groups, or groups that are oppressed, prohibited, in revolt, or always on the fringe of recognized 
institutions” (247). Indeed, this particular countercultural minority wishes to separate from 
“recognized institutions” that valorize and produce atomistic selves hyper-estranged from the 
more-than-human and human world and instead affirm pack alliances, heteroglossia, and 
multiplicities. During the Gardeners’ Feast of the Serpent Wisdom, Adam One tells the reader it 
“is the Serpent Wisdom we long for – this wholeness of Being,” the way “it feels the vibrations 
of Divinity that run through the Earth, and responds to them quicker than thought” (The Year 
235). In other words, the Gardeners desire the affective state of becoming-animal and a 
sensitivity to the power of things. They wish to “endow [their] own elements with the relations 
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of movement and rest, the affects, that would make [them] become [snake]” (Deleuze and 
Guattari 258): “May we greet with joy the few moments when, through Grace, and by the aid of 
our Retreats and Vigils and the assistance of God’s Botanicals, we are granted an apprehension 
of [becoming-Serpent]” (The Year 235). Moreover, such views regarding snakes reject religious 
traditions that cast them as “evil” thereby rejecting a major influence on the humanist 
devaluations of animals. 
 Through the aid of “botanicals” the Gardeners try to “explore affective states that 
strongly resemble what Deleuze and Guattari characterize as the experience of ‘multiplicity’ or 
‘becoming-animal’” (Economides 2). For example, Toby’s first Vigil is spent in an attempt to 
“mind-meld with a plantful of green peas. The vines, the flowers, the leaves, the pods. So green 
and soothing” (The Year 99) and later in a locked gaze with a liobam or what her reductionist 
thinking rationalizes is the “effect of a carefully calibrated blend of plant toxins” (171). Toby at 
this moment might not see any significance in her vision but according to Deleuze and Guattari 
these experiments nevertheless open up lines of flight, opportunities for new becomings and 
aggregate formations:  
[T]he experimentation with drugs has left its mark on everyone, even nonusers . . .  
it change[s] the perceptive coordinates of space-time and introduce[s] us to a 
universe of microperceptions…All so-called initiatory journeys include these 
thresholds and doors where becoming itself becomes, and where one changes 
becoming depending on the ‘hour’ of the world, the circles of hell, or the stages of 
a journey that sets scales, forms, and cries in variations. From the howling of 
animals to the wailing of elements and particles. (Deleuze and Guattari 249) 
 
In other words, Toby’s drug-use can be read as a kind of subversive act in that it “not only 
disrupts, it disrupts in such a way as to change radically what people can ‘see’: it repartitions the 
sensible; it overthrows the regime of the perceptible” (Bennett, Vibrant Matter 107). Toby will 
later experience the equivalent of Blake’s idea in his visionary poem The Marriage of Heaven 
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and Hell that “[i]f the doors of perception were cleansed every thing would appear to man as it 
is, infinite. / For man has closed himself up, till he sees all things tho’ narrow chinks of his 
cavern” (155). Additionally, like Blake’s Thel glimpses the underworld, Toby will be able to see 
the “world as we organically experience it in its enigmatic multiplicity and open-endedness” 
prior to its rigid conceptualization, the deeper more unitary network of relations that exists 
underneath our codified cultural lenses (Abram 40). Furthermore, these lines emphasize the 
mutable or adaptive nature of becoming, how it shifts as circumstances shift, implying the 
necessity of changing affiliations, polities, and packs depending on ever-changing environmental 
conditions. Indeed, as we will see, Toby’s above nascent Vigil creates a “line of flight” for new 
pack formations in which human collectives fuse into nonhuman collectives in a symbolic 
deconstruction of the notion of an atomistic self as well as a representation of the political 
ecology we are already a part of, have the potential to create, and must perpetually revise. 
Overall, the God’s Gardener’s vital materialist and botanically enhanced meditative techniques 
allow them to discern the underlying thing-power of the animate and inanimate world as well as 
enter into new ethical becomings in direct opposition to state conceptualizations of the privileged 
subject and his instrument-objects.  
Part II: The Enchanted Materialisms and Recalcitrant Natures of the Post-Apocalyptic 
World 
 
 As Ronald B. Hatch recognizes, “‘Atwood has something in common with recent 
ecocentrist writers in her rejection of the anthropomorphic viewpoint and their struggles to re-
position humanity as one species among many in a web of natural connections’” (qtd. in Rozelle 
2). Indeed, the basis for hope in the novels is in the transformation of human subjects from 
isolated egos to relational beings with an awareness of their multiplicity stimulated by the 
emergence of the recalcitrant natures, rogue genomes, and the thing-power of the more-than-
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human world that defies control and conformity to modernist divisions. This comprehension of 
an enchanted materialism and the cultivation of a “sense of life’s inevitable expression of itself 
through resistance” (Wolfe 37) is made possible by the doors opened by the perceptive practices 
discussed above and the new intimacy and direct proximity of humans with the natural world in 
the post-apocalyptic landscape, which unexpectedly lays the “groundwork for a new 
convergence of humans and ecosystems” (Rozelle 1).   
 Interestingly, the “apocalypse” thrusts humans back into the natural world and the reader 
glimpses the way that “‘the more one lives out of doors the more personality there seems to be in 
what we call inanimate things. The strength of the hills and the voice of the waves are no longer 
grand poetical sentences, but an expression of something real’” (Sarah Jewett qtd. in Donovan 
81). Ren, a child Gardener turned exotic dancer, affirms the impossibility of experiencing 
wonder or comprehending a vital nature inside the confines of the noisy hyper-separated 
capitalist landscape for “[w]e are a culture generally deaf to both our bodies and the rest of 
material life, deaf at an increasing cost” (Slicer 61). She tries to do a meditation but reports: “I 
could hear the thump, thump of the bass line coming from the Snakepit and the humming of the 
mini-fridge, I could see the lights of the street making blurry patterns through the glass bricks of 
the window” (The Year 279). The city environment proves not to be spiritually enlightening and 
so she ceases her efforts to turn on the news. In contrast, after the collapse of this noisy 
capitalistic world, Jimmy (Crake’s best friend left in charge of the humanoid Crakers after the 
pandemic) unexpectedly becomes more perceptive to the vitality of things by unconsciously 
exercising a version of the aesthetic and receptive attentiveness advocated by the God’s 
Gardeners. Jimmy lovingly ponders in slow, focused detail on an insect descending from a tree 
branch: 
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A caterpillar is letting itself down on a thread, twirling slowly like a rope artist, 
spiraling towards his chest. It’s a luscious, unreal green, like a gumdrop, and 
covered with tiny bright hairs. Watching it, he feels a sudden inexplicable surge 
of tenderness and joy. Unique, he thinks. There will never be another caterpillar 
just like this one. There will never be another such moment of time, another such 
conjunction. 
 These things sneak up on him for no reason, these flashes of irrational 
happiness. It’s probably a vitamin deficiency. (Oryx and Crake 41) 
 
Bennett describes feelings of openness to nonhuman ontologies, the bridging of the gap that 
separates humans and nonhumans as an experience of joy: “To the thing-power materialist, one 
powerful source of the energy required to jump the gap is joy—joy as one expression of the 
thing-power of the human body, joy as a animating energy generated in part by affection for a 
material world experienced as vital and alive” (“Steps Toward” 363). Furthermore, Josephine 
Donovan argues that this “attention to the particulars of one’s environment is morally 
progressive because it breaks down egotism and fosters compassion” (91). Unfortunately, as 
Toby initially is wont to do, Jimmy brushes off this experience of joy in the enchanted nature of 
things because of his socialization in a society saturated with reductionist beliefs in the 
predictability and mechanistic character of nature’s objects. Jimmy’s fallback response to seeing 
a moment of spiritual enlightenment is to brush it off as a meaningless chemical or physiological 
malfunction. The “Western discourses of domination cannot hear” the language he has the 
potential to “share[] with the tree, [the caterpillar], and other creatures of the wood” (Donovan 
81). Nonetheless, the new landscape has the potential to foreground the vitality of things and 
transform the hyper-estranged human subject into a more ecological sensitive multiplicity as the 
reader later sees when Jimmy begrudgingly apologizes to a banana slug: “I’m sorry I stepped on 
you, Child of Oryx, please forgive my clumsiness” (Oryx and Crake 334).  
 Hunkered down in the AnooYoo Spa after the pandemic, Toby has an experience similar 
to Jimmy’s as she surveys the tree line from the rooftop for threatening forms. She thinks that the 
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“trees look innocent as ever; yet she has the feeling that someone’s watching her – as if the most 
inert stone or stump can sense her” and justifies these feelings as the effects of isolation which 
may induce “talking crickets . . . writhing columns of vegetation . . . eyes in the leaves. Still, how 
to distinguish between such illusions and the real thing?” (The Year 15). Later when Toby goes 
to harvest maggots from the carcass of the dead boar she shot, she becomes overwhelmed with 
the swarming activity and vitality of nature, the contagion of the pack’s intensities: 
All around her is sweet scent – the tall clover’s in bloom, the Queen Anne’s lace, 
the lavender and marjoram and lemon balm, self-seeded. The field hums with 
pollinators: bumblebees, shining wasps, iridescent beetles. The sound is lulling. 
Stay here. Sink down. Go to sleep. 
Nature full strength is more than we can take, Adam One used to say. It’s a 
potent hallucinogen, a soporific, for the untrained Soul. (The Year 327) 
 
This experience with the alien vitality of things resembles what Timothy Morton calls the 
“object-oriented sublime” as that which “unnervingly reveals the ‘subject’ to be an (assemblage 
of) object(s) that can be acted on physically” and where one becomes intimate with an alien 
presence (“Here Comes Everything” 171). Indeed, according to Toby, the new proximity to 
nature in “full strength” tempts the former Gardeners and MaddAddamites to “[b]lend with the 
universe”, to stray “away during the night, into the labyrinth of leaves and branches, of birdsong 
and windsong and silence” (MaddAddam 192). These atomistic egos feel a lonely isolation from 
what is “profoundly apart. Loneliness [that] turns to yearning, a kind of love, an overpowering 
attraction to something beautiful and mysterious and other, the desire to hold forever the object 
of our wonder, to be a part of it, united with it” (Dean Moore 268). The contagious affect and 
thing-power of alien others appeals to and infects something deep within these individuals that 
seems to want to be swept up in the pack or multiplicity similar to the way “the depths of the 
ocean and the mountain heights are said to lure people, higher and higher or deeper and deeper, 
until they vanish into a state of rapture that is not human” (The Year 327).   
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 Toby senses a similarly overwhelming feeling of thing-power that verges on sublimity, in 
its “inhuman, radically different, irreducibly strange” qualities, as she traipses off with Ren to 
rescue Amanda from the Painballers (Morton, “Elegy” 265). She imagines the crows’ desire for 
her edible body while also perceiving that “each flower, each twig, each pebble, shines as though 
illuminated from within, as once before, on her first day in the Garden. It’s the stress, it’s the 
adrenalin, it’s a chemical effect: she knows this well enough” (The Year 415). Once more, she 
slips into scientific justifications as Atwood perpetually reminds us of the essentialist and 
reductionist views that limit our experiences of the world. However, Toby also seems to be 
“struck by the profound otherness and indifference, or maybe the mystery, of what [is] beyond 
[her], and by [her] own terrifying insignificance” (Dean Moore 268). This sense of physical 
vulnerability, or interior thing-hood, her edibleness, induces a “glimpse ‘from the outside’ of the 
alien, incomprehensible world in which the narrative of the self has ended” (Plumwood, “Being 
Prey” 3). What prevails is an impression of the way in which “humans are always in composition 
with nonhumanity, never outside the sticky web of connections or an ecology” (Bennett, “Steps 
Toward” 365).    
 As the thing-power of the world becomes increasingly conspicuous within these novels 
so does the irreducibly unpredictable natures of the bioengineered creatures, some of which 
function as “contagions” that propel new combinations of bodies and things into alliance. As Lee 
Rozelle argues that in the post-apocalyptic world the “[t]ransgenic animals now represent 
emergence and flux in the relationship between humans and other species; humanity’s situation 
in this brave new biosphere, one that contains ferocious pigoons…requires an extra level of 
respect and heedfulness, to say the least” (5). Jimmy reflects on how the “whole world is now 
one vast uncontrolled experiment…and the doctrine of unintended consequences is in full spate” 
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(Oryx and Crake 228). In particular, he ruminates over the fact that despite the genetic 
engineers’ belief that they could sculpt tusk-free transgenic pigs with human brain tissue, “they 
were reverting to type now [that] they’d gone feral, a fast-forward process considering their 
rapid-maturity genes” (38). While there is already ample evidence that other species (from 
elephants, sun bears, Yellowstone bison, to whales, among countless others) actively mourn the 
death of their loved ones (B. King 2), further evidence of the always already rogue and 
recalcitrant natures of the bioengineered animals is evidenced when Toby notices the pigoons 
have scattered funeral fern fronds and rose petals over a dead boar’s carcass. She recalls this as 
normal behavior for elephants but “usually [the pigoons] just eat a dead pig, the same way they’d 
eat anything else. But they haven’t been eating this one” (The Year 328). Moreover, in stark 
contrast to mechanistic descriptions of organisms as inert and wholly controllable, the pigoons 
have the capacity for pleasure and enjoyment as when Blackbeard, a Craker child, tells the reader 
they playfully and leisurely swim in the pool as well as feel “delight” in the prospects of a 
recently planted oak tree producing acorns (MaddAddam 539). Additionally, the pigoons are 
understood as being able to kill out of spite and revenge (219). These animals seem to have 
unexpectedly evolved complex cultural, phenomenological, and communicative systems that 
agitate human/animal boundaries in that characteristics that were once considered unique to 
humans are in fact exhibited by more species. They unsettle notions of what has been hitherto 
securely established as inert, controllable objects as well as who is endowed with subjectivity 
and “personhood”. While these examples challenge one to acknowledge that the expansion of 
subjecthood “might well extend in the future into forms of life that we as yet scarcely 
understand—or, to put an even finer point on it vis-à-vis the question of synthetic biology, that 
have yet to be invented” they also stir one to consider extending subjectivity to already existing 
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natures like elephants and therefore present an opportunity for a more widely inclusive 
community (Wolfe 85). Finally, the genetically engineered Children of Crake defy their 
“maker’s” wishes in overriding their genetic predetermination in being able to sing and in their 
ability to practice religion, artistic skill, literacy, and leadership. The MaddAddamites, who 
bioengineered the Crakers, confirm that “‘[t]heir brains are more malleable than Crake intended. 
They’ve been doing several things we didn’t anticipate during the construction phase’” 
(MaddAddam 391). A further surprising advantage to this genetic rebellion by the Crakers is that 
the particular ability to sing seems to allow them to communicate with a wide swath of species, 
which adds another rogue ingredient to the volatile co-species emancipatory potential in this 
post-apocalyptic world. Above all, the combination of contagious thing-power, pack affect, and 
recalcitrant natures work to deconstruct notions of singularity and fixed identities.   
Part III: Emergent Publics/Packs 
 In MaddAddam, the combination of a newfound consciousness of recalcitrant natures, 
rogue genomes, and thing-power, made possible by perceptive practices and intimate proximity 
to nature, culminates into the “unintended consequence” of an emancipatory formation of cross-
species alliance. Indeed, in this new post-apocalyptic “cyborg world…people are not afraid of 
their joint kinship with animals and machines, not afraid of permanently partial identities and 
contradictory standpoints” (Simians 154). Later, after the collapse of “civilization,” when 
confronted with the dark and unknown consequences of Amanda’s possible pregnancy by a 
Painballer or a Craker, Toby imbibes an Enhanced Meditation formula again, this time in order 
to glean advice from the dead Pilar buried under an Elderberry bush. Perhaps due to the “doors” 
and “thresholds” she unearthed on the Edencliff Rooftop garden, Toby seems to have more faith 
in the ability to stimulate “a crinkling of the window glass that separates the visible world from 
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whatever lies behind it,” to apprehend the “imperceptible,” the vitality of the more-than-human 
world (MaddAddam 318).  
 Deleuze and Guattari assert that multiplicities are becomings that braid together “animals, 
plants, microorganisms, mad particles, a whole galaxy” (250). Furthermore, each becoming is 
molecular because “becoming is not to imitate or identify with something or someone” but 
instead to “belong to the same molecule” (273). In other words, one emits particles and imbibes 
particles as one flits in and out of different becomings in accordance to whatever assemblage one 
encounters and adapts to, whatever “zone of proximity” one enters into (272-273). They claim 
that all of the molecular-becomings are “rushing toward” becoming-imperceptible as “the 
immanent end of becoming, its cosmic formula” where one “passes through the kingdoms of 
nature, slips between molecules to become an unfindable particle in infinite meditation on the 
infinite” (279). Deleuze and Guattari’s notion of becoming-imperceptible might be understood 
through Keats’s notion of himself as a “camelion” poet who engages continually with “filling” or 
“becoming” some other “Body—The Sun, the Moon, the Sea and Men and Women” (“To 
Richard Woodhouse” 973). To become-imperceptible is to “[e]liminate all…that roots each of us 
(everybody) in ourselves, in our molarity” (279) just as Keats “has no Identity” (973). In his 
letter “To Benjamin Bailey,” Keats tells his friend that the “setting sun will always set me to 
rights—or if a Sparrow come before my Window I take part in its existence and pick about the 
Gravel” (967). Deleuze and Guattari’s becoming-imperceptible resembles Keats’s filling of 
himself with the affect of his surrounding environment, the way he is “embalmed” by the 
“murmurous haunt of flies” (“Nightingale” 50) while his “heart aches, and a drowsy numbness 
pains” his “sense” as he feels “too happy” in a nightingale’s “happiness” (1-6). To move toward 
becoming-imperceptible one must escape self-enclosure and become-everybody/everything to 
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“make a world” (280). Deleuze and Guattari assert that drugs are an agent of becoming-animal, 
becoming-molecular, and becoming-imperceptible simultaneously and that they make the 
imperceptible perceivable (282). Indeed, at “zero hour,” with the expectation that Enhanced 
Meditation formulas “can mobilize gradients and thresholds of perception toward becomings-
animal, becomings-molecular” (284), Toby enters into the becoming-molecular of Pilar and, 
unexpectedly, becoming-Pigoon (a Drug-Pigoon-Pilar-Toby-Craker-assemblage) and in effect 
deterritorializes the “Old World” of instinctive and mute object-animals controlled by soulful 
human subjects endowed with free will. A new world of alternative modes of being opens up 
along this line of flight that simultaneously suggest the possibility that departed spirits can 
communicate with and through bioengineered creatures who can communicate with the Crakers.  
 Toby enters the “zone of proximity” of Pilar’s grave where Pilar is present in her “new 
body,” the Elderberry bush assemblage that is a molecular cascade of white flowers, sweet air, 
and a multitude of vibrating honeybees, bumblebees, and butterflies (MaddAddam 317). After 
self-consciously realizing she is asking an “inert” bush for a sign of what to do about Amanda’s 
pregnancy, Toby is confronted by a mother pigoon and her five farrow. As she is sensually 
ruminating on the “qualitative singularities,” the aesthetic beauty of the giant pig, her “elements” 
are suddenly saturated with “the relations of movement and rest, the affects” that would make 
her become-pigoon (Deleuze and Guattari 258). As the pigoon mother and Toby stare at one 
another the “imperceptible itself becomes necessarily perceived at the same time as perception 
becomes necessarily molecular…colors and sounds engulfing lines of flight, world lines” (282): 
“All around there are sounds, noises, almost-voices: hums and clicks, tappings, whispered 
syllables” (MaddAddam 319). Toby is “emitting particles that enter the relation of movement and 
rest, or the zone of proximity, of a [microanimality],…that produce[s] in [her] a molecular 
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animal, [that] create[s] the molecular animal” (Deleuze and Guattari 275). Toby disintegrates 
into “life, life, life, life. Full to bursting, this minute. Second. Millisecond. Millennium. Eon” 
while barely perceiving molecular-sound moving through her “like wind in the branches, like the 
sound hawks make when flying, no, like a songbird made of ice” (MaddAddam 321). Toby 
seems to become aware of the “conversation that [one] carr[ies] on with things, a continuous 
dialogue that unfolds far below [one’s] verbal awareness” (Abram 52).  
 Later she recounts the experience to a fellow Gardener, fairly certain that the pigoon 
mother was communicating with her, and to Blackbeard, a Craker child who has taken a liking to 
her. Toby seems to want to believe that “Pilar appeared in the skin of a pig,” which allowed 
Toby to discern that all entities take pleasure in life. Toby’s vision and what is communicated in 
the encounter with the sow seems also to consist of a hopeful message that this new world of 
chimeras (Craker/human and pigoon/human) is fertile and full of productive, communal 
potential. Moreover, the drug helps Toby to perceive the musical language through which the 
Crakers and animals communicate with one another, further adding to the possibility of the 
cultivation of fuller life for all species as an enlightening aperture opens in the communicatory 
world. Communication seems to be for her “no longer restricted to a verbal exchange between 
humans” but is rather “redefined as a greater range of nonverbal, embodied expressiveness” 
(Warkentin 115). Toby says that she was moved by the affect of and connected to the 
interspecies and particulate assemblage, “to the wavelengths of the Universe” with the “help of a 
brain chemistry facilitator” (MaddAddam 326). She defends against the classification of her 
experience as meaningless coincidence: “And just because a sensory impression may be said to 
be ‘caused’ by an ingested mix of psychoactive substances does not mean it is an illusion. Doors 
are opened with keys, but does that mean that the things revealed when the doors are opened 
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aren’t there?” (326). Because of her vital materialist “willingness to suspend the negatives,” 
Toby is able to experience this “mystical quasi-religious experience” (326) of “multiplicity” or 
“becoming-animal” that confuses “rigidly anthropocentric subjectivity and represent[s] a ‘line of 
flight’ from modernity’s…dualisms” (Economides 5). This deconstruction of the human as the 
sole “speaking” subject and the animal as eternally mute and dumb in the text provides a glimpse 
into the liberating potential of including animal perspectives in the struggle for life. Arguably, 
the bioengineered creature houses the very possibility for this encounter that leads to the 
transformation of egos as isolated subjects into entities aware of their part in an assemblage and 
vital things once categorized as objects into subjects: “The Pigoons were not objects. She had to 
get that right. It was only respectful” (MaddAddam 500).  
 The reader is “present at the dawn of the world” in that Toby “has made the world, 
everybody, everything, into a becoming, because [she] has made a necessarily communicating 
world, because [she] has suppressed in [herself] everything that prevents [her] from slipping 
between things and growing in the midst of things” (Deleuze and Guattari 280). Furthermore, 
Toby’s meditative experience has “sufficiently changed the general conditions of space and time 
perception so that nonusers can succeed in passing through the holes in the world and following 
the lines of flight” (286). In other words, Toby has transformed the unfamiliar imperceptible, all 
that was repressed by state-sanctioned metanarratives, into something that might slowly 
approach an ethical quotidian:   
The bees fly in and out of the hole in the Styrofoam cooler. They seem to like 
it here in the garden. Several of them come over to investigate her. […] Yes, they 
know her. They touch her lips, gather her words, fly away with the message, 
disappear into the dark. Pass through the membrane that separates this world from 
the unseen world that lies just underneath it. There is Pilar, with her calm smile, 
walking forward along a corridor that glows with hidden light.  
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Now, Toby, She tells herself. Talking pigs, communicative dead people, and 
the Underworld in a Styrofoam beer cooler. You’re not on drugs, you’re not even 
sick. You really have no excuse. (397) 
 
The interaction with the sow seems to ask if humanity might “regain the dramas of interaction 
with nature which reductive science has stolen from [them], and [become] receptive to the stories 
of other beings” (Plumwood 138). Such an animation of entities primarily thought of as 
inanimate in addition to the practice of a kind of attentive “becoming” might work to propel 
readers into exercising such an ecological relation of moral responsibility with the more-than-
human world in that becomings are intended to “strip away (or de-code)” instrumental, state 
sanctioned modes of being or “the actual determinations of the past, and restore to the present its 
virtual potential to become-otherwise in the future” (Holland 137). Toby’s “sober” 
acknowledgment of the vital materiality and interconnectivity of things demarcates the 
revolutionary transformation of human and nonhuman subjectivity in the text as well as whose 
voices and interests that might count in a public or political ecology, the pack. 
 Toby’s communicative experience, the recalcitrant natures of transgenic and native 
things, in synergistic combination with the Gardeners’ perceptive practices, leaves this post-
waterless flood MaddAddamite community deterrritorialized. Not only are they more agreeable 
to the potential of thing-power and becoming-animal, but they are open to the politics of the pack 
in which one sees the “world as a swarm of vibrant materials entering and leaving agentic 
assemblages” (Bennett, Vibrant Matter 107), where diverse bodies “enter into composition 
with…the affects of [other bodies]…to exchange actions and passions with [them] or to join with 
[them] in composing a more powerful body” (Deleuze and Guattari 257). Evolutionary 
scholarship has, until recently, privileged competitive models of natural selection and largely 
underestimated the importance of cooperation to the longevity of natural systems, a description 
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of reality that closely resembles Bennett’s notion of political ecologies and Deleuze and 
Guattari’s formulation of mechanistic assemblages and packs above (Sachs et al. 136). In a scene 
that could be easily read as a satire of “talking animals,” the pigoons (or Pig Ones) confront the 
Gardeners and MaddAddamites in order to cooperatively request their aid in eliminating the 
piglet-murdering Painballers (criminalized rapist-cannibalistic-gladiator figures who survive 
from the pre-apocalyptic world). This newly formed collective symbolically represents 
“nonhuman animals as coconstitutive with human beings in resisting the articulations of a 
biopolitical dispositif in and through the body” (Wolfe 35). In other words, this group signifies 
the revolutionary resistance against the capitalist hyper-consumptive, cannibalizing, inhumane, 
and female and animal objectifying regime signified by the Painballers. Furthermore, the 
communicative gesture by the Pig Ones resembles Bennett’s description of the political act as 
consisting of “the exclamatory interjection of affective bodies as they enter a preexisting public, 
or, rather, as they reveal that they have been there all along as an unaccounted-for part” (Vibrant 
Matter 105).  
 The interspecies group combines as a powerful assemblage that defeats the Painballers 
and succeeds in “the work of clearing away the chaos” leftover from the pandemic (MaddAddam 
415). The group also conjointly participates in a trial to decide the fate of the inhumane 
Painballers upon which they reach a bleak verdict, namely, these men’s execution. Afterwards 
the group performs a funeral for their various fallen comrades-in-arms whereupon the Pig Ones 
gather flowers and ferns to decorate the bodies and “carry Adam and Jimmy to the site…as a 
sign of friendship and interspecies co-operation” while the Crakers contribute by singing in their 
eerie “digital-keyboard theremin” tonality (538). Perhaps most significant to the future of 
fictional and real interspecies relations is the pact made between the Pig Ones and the humans, a 
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political act in its effect of provoking a “gestalt shift in perception: what was . . . an instrument 
becomes a participant, what was foodstuff becomes agent, what was adamantine becomes 
intensity” (Bennett, Vibrant Matter 107). The Pig Ones agree that they will “not hunt and eat any 
of the [humans], and they [will] also not dig up their garden anymore. Or eat the honey of the 
bees” (534). Meanwhile, the humans agree also to keep the pact communicated to the Pig Ones 
by Blackbeard’s translation of Toby: “None of you, or your children, or your children’s children, 
will ever be a smelly bone in a soup. Or a ham, she added. Or a bacon” (534). With the aid of 
various perceptive practices, and a new proximity to the contagious affect and vitality of things, 
the former Gardeners and MaddAddamites undergo a radical transformation in their 
understanding of their own subjectivity and nonhuman subjectivity. Their “prejudice against a 
(nonhuman) multitude misrecognized as context, constraint, or tool” is substituted for “a vital 
materialist theory of democracy that . . . transform[s] the divide between speaking subjects and 
mute objects into a set of differential tendencies and variable capacities” that allows for and 
represents a more egalitarian and achievably utopian consideration of nonhuman perspectives, 
needs, and ecological interests (Bennett, Vibrant Matter 108).  
Part IV: Ethology (or Degrees of Affect) Versus Biocentrism as a Foundation for a Cross-
Ontological Ethics 
 
 One might be tempted to mistake the above interspecies collective or representations of 
enchanted materialisms as a kind of advocacy for biocentrism or a “flat ontology,” worldviews 
that conceive of all things as the same with regard to value. As briefly mentioned, various 
scholars view the disintegrating boundaries and differences between humans and animals or 
objects as highly unsettling in its potential fostering of instrumentalist and objectifying attitudes 
toward humans (Glover 53). Correspondingly, in a critique of biocentric deep ecological theory, 
humanist thinker Luc Ferry views the crumbling categories as a blasphemous denigration of 
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human uniqueness and worries that “the entire Cosmos may well be assigned a positive 
coefficient higher than that of humankind” (73). On the other hand, Cary Wolfe points out in his 
book Before the Law: Humans and Other Animals in a Biopolitical Frame that “as long as the 
automatic exclusion of animals from standing remains intact simply because of their species, 
such dehumanization by means of the discursive mechanism of ‘animalization’ will be readily 
available for deployment against whatever body happens to fall outside the ethnocentric ‘we’” 
(21). In other words, as long as the category of the animal, as a domain of non-subjects denied 
ethical status, exists the potential for human animalization exists. Wolfe explains the ideological 
links between this animalization or “speciesism” and the “othering” of human groups (women, 
non-whites, etc.) He describes the “institution of speciesism” as the “ethical acceptability of the 
systematic ‘noncriminal putting to death’ of animals based solely on their species” (Animal Rites 
7). This “discourse of speciesism” can be applied to any human group that has not purchased its 
membership into the great family of Man. Therefore, despite Ferry’s fears, a posthuman de-
centering of the human (privileged simply because of its specific species status) is necessary both 
for the sake of other life forms and human society.   
 Furthermore, in a mildly surprising critique of certain strains of neovitalism and deep 
ecological thinking, Wolfe argues that by “radically de-differentiating the field of ‘the living’ 
into a molecular wash of singularities that all equally manifest ‘life,’” or declaring all forms of 
life as equal in value, one enters into a kind of political paralysis due to this position’s 
implausibility to translate into serious ecological praxis (59). Despite the intention of these 
philosophies, they also have the potential to produce a highly anthropocentric human relationship 
to nature as humans still act as the conferrer of “value” in accordance to their interests and 
benefits, but in a steward-like kind of benevolent shepherd-of-the-world figuration. Said in 
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another way, deep ecologists ignore that the only “to whom” any thing matters is still the 
exceptional Man even in their theory that purports to be a “flat ontology.” This is precisely 
Ferry’s critique captured in his sentiment that such deep ecologists act “‘anthropocentrically’ 
themselves when they claim to know what is best for the natural environment” and that all 
protection, “all valorization…of nature, is the deed of man and…consequently, all normative 
ethics is in some sense humanist and anthropocentrist” (131).  
 Wolfe acknowledges the impossibility of escaping anthropocentric human interventions 
into nature. However, at the same time, he suggests one must pursue a “pragmatic” approach to 
ethics in which one neither commits to a Kantian social contract theory of rights (a subject-
centered ethics that depends upon the possession of such-and-such attributes) or a Utilitarian 
calculation of “interests” in the name of the greatest good, which is still based on the nonhuman 
entity of concern containing some essential attribute (that humans also have) that purchases their 
ethical consideration into the privileged “empire of the same” without challenging the prejudiced 
structures that permitted the exclusion in the first place. He suggests that “‘when the question of 
what justice consists in is raised, the answer is: “It remains to be seen in each case”” (Lyotard 
qtd. in Wolfe, Animal Rites 71). We must reach “a decision that…go[es] through the ordeal of 
the undecidable,” otherwise “it would only be the programmable application of unfolding of a 
calculable process. It might be legal; it would not be just” (Derrida qtd. in Wolfe, Animal Rites 
68). Wolfe suggests we must carefully consider ethological distinctions and the symbiotic 
relations between living things and thereby acknowledge “questions of value indeed necessarily 
depend on” other “to whoms” or to a multitude of other nonhuman subjects with intentionality, 
interests, and pleasures that look nothing like human forms of experience (83-84): “If the 
capacity…to be a ‘to whom,’ is not given but rather emerges, is brought forth, out of a complex 
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and enfolded relation…to its outside (whether in the form of the environment, the other,…or the 
‘instinctive’ program of behavior), then the addressee of value…is permanently open to the 
possibility of ‘whoever it might be’” (84). This ethics can never congeal into reified law9. There 
is no permanent point of reference for determining whose community flourishing will take 
precedence from moment to moment. This perspective seems to be more accommodating to a 
wider array of vital needs, interests, and trajectories appropriate to whatever ecological issue is at 
hand. However, in Wolfe’s conceptualization, even if humanity humbles itself into 
acknowledging a more diverse multitude of beings as “whos” with idiosyncratic needs and 
values of their own (as we saw with the Gardeners’ acceptance of the Pig Ones’ desires), one 
must still select according to one’s conditional perspective and situation and therefore exclude 
(as with the Painballers10). We must exclude more ethically and carefully perhaps rather than in 
sweeping motions based on essentialist and prejudiced principles that revolve around kind, 
species, or inherent cores.   
 In any case, as Bennett discusses, the goal of a vital materialism is not to eliminate all 
differences between humans, animals, and materials as well as non-physical entities but to focus 
on the underlying non-filial affinities (vitality, energy, affect, etc.) that both constitute and 
formulate ecosystems, assemblages, and packs. The reasoning is that by (re-)cultivating an 
awareness of the vitality and agential capacity of all things as well as one’s interrelationships 
with and among them, one might be more hesitant to harm or dispose of any element carelessly. 
Furthermore, she is fully aware of the necessity of considering that “[p]ersons, worms, leaves, 
bacteria, metals, and hurricanes have different types and degrees of power…depending on the 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
9 Perhaps the legal system under this fluid ethical framework would transform into a much more open-ended process not dictated 
by uncompromising, solidified laws but more-or-less guided by laws permanently and fluidly open to contestation and revision. 
This model would entail a much more lengthy legal process to be sure, but perhaps less violently dismissing and condemning.  
10 It seems the Painballers are excluded on pragmatic ethical grounds based not on reified notions of privileged species 
membership but on the threat that they would continue to devastate multiple species’s communities, that they are forces of death 
counter to the productive flourishing of the overall ecosystem.  
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time, place, composition, and density of the formation” (Vibrant Matter 109). Similar to both 
Bennett and Wolfe, Deleuze and Guattari assert that “in defining animal worlds, look[-] for the 
active and passive affects of which the animal is capable in the individual assemblage of which it 
is a part” when formulating one’s platform for the ethical treatment of nonhuman natures (257). 
These “posthumanist” perspectives imply a kind of situational or conditional ethics in which the 
consideration of nonhumans and humans depends upon their mutable degrees of affect in 
concordance with changing circumstances. The challenge that these thinkers struggle with is how 
to transform the ethical thinking that focuses on the human/animal distinction informed by 
biology and kind to an ethical perspective that sees all forms of life as ontologically and 
phenomenologically diverse, which then requires a very nuanced, and inherently imperfect, 
reassessment of the ethical implementation of the politics of life and death.  
 A parodic (and arguably problematic on many levels) example of a pliable, situational, 
non-anthropocentric application of the above ethics occurs in the MaddAddam text when the 
Gardeners/MaddAddamites notice and decide that the “[d]eer are proliferating: they are an 
acceptable source of animal protein. They are much leaner than pork, though not as tasty” (543). 
Additionally, they almost unanimously decide that the Painballer execution is necessary to the 
survival of their group thereby refusing to privilege human life based on an essentialist notion of 
human value, a highly controversial verdict. Their ethical decision is informed by a sort of affect 
calculus11 in which they conclude the Painballers’ affects would destroy other bodily affects in 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
11 A distinction that could me made between this kind of “affect calculating” ethical decision-making and utilitarianism is that 
pragmatic affect considerations do not necessarily always meet the essentialized condition that one avoid instances of suffering 
for all living beings. As Wolfe points out while quoting from Deborah Slicer’s work, the attempt of pragmatic ethics seems to be 
to avoid the “problem…endemic to the liberal justice tradition in moral philosophy,” which is that it “holds ‘an “essentialist” 
view of the moral worth of both human beings and animals’ because it proposes ‘a single capacity—the possession of interests’ 
(or Singer’s [utilitarian] ‘suffering’) ‘for being owed moral consideration’” (Animal Rites 35). In this way, utilitarian or 
essentialist moral philosophies “exclude[-] from ethical relevance anything other than the specific criterion for the interest in 
question, whether it is the subject’s specific ontogeny, its location or ecological role, its gender, and so on.” Pragmatic ethical 
considerations seem to be based on large-scale ecological context and ethological characteristics versus the reified, universalized 
gauge for ethical judgments that marks utilitarian moral philosophy. 
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all around diabolical and grisly ways. This suggests the Gardeners are more inclusive in their 
definition of subjects according to the respective entity’s degree of affect (in the case of the Pig 
Ones) and yet there are also “‘an endless number of others to consider, and one cannot take 
responsibility without excluding some others in favor of certain others’,” as in the case of the 
Painballers who murder indiscriminately and the deer that might multiply to the point of 
destroying the surrounding vegetation and the other life forms dependent on that vegetation 
(Martin Hägglund qtd. in Wolfe 86). Wolfe addresses this paradoxical problem in his assertion 
that it is “not that we shouldn’t strive for unconditional hospitality and endeavor to be fully 
responsible; it’s simply that to do so, it is necessary to do so selectively and partially, thus 
conditionally, which in turn calls forth the need to be more fully responsible than we have 
already been” (86). Thus, as a member of a vegetarian countercultural group, Adam One’s 
situational ethics on consuming animals (“When in extreme need…begin at the bottom of the 
food chain. Those without central nervous systems must surely suffer less”) seems much less 
hypocritical (The Year 325). Above all, The Year of the Flood and MaddAddam grapple with the 
political and ethical goals of creating a more inclusive community via a careful and 
discriminatory broadening of the scope of who or what is recognized as having, what Wolfe 
calls, “immunity protection,” and voice within the expanded community; It “is not the perfect 
equality of actants, but a polity with more channels of communication between members” 
(Bennett, Vibrant Matter 104).  
 Overall, Margaret Atwood’s The Year of the Flood and MaddAddam show the dualisms 
“in which we are ourselves imprisoned, the opposition beyond which we cannot think . . . [That] 
it is only by shattering their…dominion that we might conceivably be able again to think 
politically and productively, to envisage a condition of genuine revolutionary difference, to begin 
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once again to think Utopia” (Jameson 308-309). These novels emphasize how repressive and 
blind to potential it is to assume the fixity or predictability of nature, for life will always exceed 
one’s knowledge or control in the most unexpected ways. The books reveal the “element of 
chanciness [that] resides at the heart of things” and that animals, tempests, molecules, and “so-
called inanimate things have a life…and that deep within is an inexplicable vitality or energy, a 
moment of independence from and resistance” (Bennett, Vibrant Matter 18). Furthermore, these 
novels show that entities have the ability to form congregations with powerful impacts on both 
human and nonhuman worlds. The novels suggest that acknowledging these things may lead 
humanity to a more ethical and sustainable relationship with the world of enchanted things. 
Atwood shows the enchanted materialism of the world and the recalcitrance and unpredictable 
potential for unforeseen pack formulations inherent to all things: natural, bioengineered, human, 
animal, or plant. The eco-countercultural God’s Gardeners group both practice the appropriate 
techniques in order to sensually apprehend the thing-power underlying the material world and 
remain open to joining in becomings-animal, ontologically diverse eco-public packs. These 
novels work to show how humanity is constantly adapting and mutating through its 
conversations with the natural world and that in its “passage among multiple states of becoming, 
humanity has the capacity over time to shed” the notion of human exceptionalism and 
corresponding irresponsible and indiscriminate ecocidal impulses (Rozelle 5). Perhaps if we can 
perceive of a “darkness with voices in it” rather than a “silent void” (MaddAddam 217) we will 
be more inclined to expand our definition of community and less inclined to idly “watch the 
lights blink out” (The Year 252). 
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CONCLUSION: 
In the now-leveled epistemic playing field, 
we are compelled to find other models  
of living among animal kin that will not  
perpetuate the social and ecological  
holocausts destroying the planet today. 
 
G.A. Bradshaw, “An Ape Among Many” (2010) 
 As my investigation of Mary Shelley’s Frankenstein and Margaret Atwood’s Oryx and 
Crake has shown, socialization under a patriarchal capitalist culture, which has historically 
valued the categorical hyperseparation and emotional detachment of the self from the other, leads 
to the formation of a particularly destructive kind of masculinist/scientific personality and 
culture. As my previous documentation of theories by feminist critics of the reproduction of 
patriarchy and scientific culture attests, early psychosocial development that emphasizes an 
absolute split between self/other and a relationship toward “woman/nature in terms of 
superior/inferior and subject/object” breeds the notion of androcentric human supremacy 
(Plumwood, Environmental 54). This widely adopted assumption of human (masculine) 
superiority by Western culture has justified and continues to justify the instrumental use and 
exploitation of feminized-others (i.e. disenfranchised groups of human and nonhuman others) 
within both the private realm of the patriarchal family unit and the public sphere that houses 
various scientific institutions. The particular types of childhood trauma Western masculine-
subjects are made to suffer that result in the anxious desire to dominate object-others to secure 
ego boundaries and a sense of omnipotence directly correlate to certain biotechnological 
scientists’ conceptualizations of feminized nature as disenchanted, determined, mechanistic, and 
fully predictable, controllable, and profitable.  
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 The neo-Cartesian masculine-subject/scientist’s particular “sado-dispassionate” stance, as 
Plumwood labels it, “his” “denial of embodiment and illusion of autonomy” (15), has led to the 
formation of a “technoscience and economic rationality that treat[s] nature as a nullity,” and “the 
outcome of their enormous growth and progress as a force for remaking the earth is a progressive 
nullification and decline of nature” (61). This eradication of nature is clearly indicated by the 
fisheries collapses, massive deforestation globally to feed the West’s equally massive lust for 
palm oil, California’s climate-change-driven drought, the British Petroleum (BP) oil spill in the 
Gulf of Mexico, etc. These ecological disasters “shadow” the blind optimism of technocratic 
scientists such as the geneticist Craig Venter who created a synthetic life form he sees as 
“‘herald[ing] the dawn of a new era in which new life is made to benefit humanity’” (qtd. in 
Feder 2), that can “churn out biofuels, soak up carbon dioxide from the atmosphere and even 
manufacture vaccines” (Feder 2). 
 However, many thinkers, who carefully qualify their celebration of Enlightenment 
agendas and scientific progress in consideration of the various “civilizing” atrocities committed 
in the name of the Father, reason, and light (i.e. sugar and spice), appropriately point out the vast 
accomplishments that have flourished under the dominating, colonial system of a patriarchal 
Enlightenment culture. Citing truly miraculous feats such as the Haber-Bosch process, 
anesthesia, more nuanced and sophisticated understandings of ecological systems, space travel, 
the bioengineering of more nutritious, efficient-growing plants, cosmetic and reconstructive 
surgery that allows for unprecedented creative bodily autonomy, in vitro fertilization, the internal 
combustion engine, among almost an infinite many other things that have contributed to the 
overall accumulation of life joy for a substantial proportion of humanity, these thinkers suggest 
that without such strict self-interested patriarchal (patriotic) individualism propelled forth by a 
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sturdy and steady domestic environment, we would not be where we are today. Plumwood 
cautiously acknowledges this argument in her book Environmental Culture: The Ecological 
Crisis of Reason. She conscientiously yields to the idea that perhaps androcentric politics may 
have “aided our expansion in a different era,” that the anthropocentric framework “may once 
have been functional for the dominance and expansion of Western civilization, removing 
constraints of respect for nature that might otherwise have held back its triumphs and conquests” 
(121). This may very well be the case, but these historical values and aspirations have also led us 
into the “age of ecological limits”; this “highly dysfunctional” old paradigm with its 
“insensitivity to the other…promotes a grave threat to our own as well as to other species’ 
survival” (121-122).  
 A wide swath of concerned cultural critics, environmentalists, social justice defendants, 
etc. have long made the call for the necessity of a more reciprocal and interspecies-friendly 
system of values, ethics, and epistemologies. However, perhaps because of the postmodern 
“ennui,” a helpless sense of boredom and passivity at discovering the world “barren” and dead 
(Bennett, The Enchantment of Modern Life 187), on top of the “antihumanist” sociobiological 
narratives of inevitable selfish genes that seem to be fatefully driving the nonhuman and human 
species to extinction (Bookchin, Re-enchanting 36) is what leads to a kind of normalization of 
the destructive impulse as a part of human nature, a helplessly bitter and hedonistic pursuit of a 
short yet saturated life. A smirk and a shoulder shrug accompany the chant, “Woe to the 
conquered!” Indeed, many have tried to defend and justify such imperial and patriarchal models 
as delineated in this thesis project as “universal” and “timeless,” essential to the human 
condition, in their effort to silence various queer, feminist, animal rights, and postcolonial social 
movements: “The old anthropocentric model that binds our relationships with nature within the 
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logic of the One and the Other” has made it quite difficult for us to move toward the adoption of 
“the new mutualistic and communicative models we now so urgently need to develop for both 
our own and nature’s survival” (Plumwood, Environmental 121).  
 Other thinkers, such as Max Horkheimer and Theodor Adorno in their celebrated 
Dialectic of the Enlightenment, provide us with a demystifying, critical account or description of 
the primitive origin of Western culture’s dominating behavior without, unfortunately, providing 
a reconstructive or productively idealistic picture of alternative modes of being, a critical style 
which Jane Bennett suggests has a potentially “enervating” impact on political wills in that it 
might leave one with a sense of the inevitability or invincibility of whatever hegemonic structure 
in which he or she is embedded (Enchantment 161). They sketch in painstaking detail the origins 
of Enlightenment humanity’s continued impulse to dominate or “mathematize” nature both 
within the self and outside the self as grounded in the fearful primitive effort to control 
unpredictable and chaotic natural forces. In fact, they claim that despite the Enlightenment’s 
promise of freedom from political domination it remains obsessed with the mythological 
domination of outer nature as well as the control of humans hierarchically and internally through 
the mechanism of repression. They claim that the Enlightenment subject refuses to acknowledge 
or critically reflect upon “his” agendas as driven by the primitive need to escape and control 
inner and outer nature. As a result, when the unaware subject’s repressed nature returns, “the 
volatile inward” is projected onto “the outer world, branding the intimate friend as foe. Impulses 
which are not acknowledged by the subject and yet are his [or hers], are attributed to the object: 
the prospective victim” (Horkheimer and Adorno 154). Thus the surrounding world and its 
feminized-others become a “diabolic system” that provokes the destructive and defensive 
response of self-enclosure in the subject. There is a danger to proposing such a universalizing 
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and timeless picture of human domination over nature without pointing toward a more viable 
human ontology and ethics. Such a historical anthropology could be coopted by the disillusioned 
and misanthropic far-left or right-wing groups in order to naturalize such behavior for their own 
agendas.  
 Fortunately, we are not inevitably bound to the patriarchal model of subject formation 
and its particular breed of sadomasochistic interpersonal and interspecies relations. Nor are we 
doomed to the self-interested depredations of neo-colonial technoscientific, corporate agendas 
despite their seemingly “universal” and “timeless” nature. As examined, thinkers such as Jane 
Bennett have attempted to sketch viable posthumanist ethics of attentive openness to the other as 
an intentional and communicative being that one can adopt and perform in a mode of 
“becoming” under current capitalist conditions, but which also work to actively dismantle and 
reassemble the system from within, an ethics of slow reconstruction and reformation for the 
“cultural narratives that we use help to shape the world in which we will have to live” 
(Enchantment 9). As discussed in roughly the second half of my thesis, the virtues and ethical 
techniques of Margaret Atwood’s God’s Gardeners group in The Year of the Flood and 
MaddAddam (though they seem to only flourish under the conditions of large scale social 
collapse) provide an excellent model for the kinds of interspecies interactions that hint at the new 
kinds of scientific epistemologies of care many are actively pursuing presently and should be 
more widely adopted and which might have the social and economic structural-reformation 
effects Bennett suggests.  
 Bennett explains that the individual’s movement toward cultivating an ability to 
experience a state of wondrous suspension of bodily movement through an immobilizing or 
spellbound encounter with a radical other can be read as an instance in which the 
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“world…sometimes bestows a gift of joy to humans, a gift that can be translated into ethical 
generosity” (175). In a sense, this experience of the other that draws one into the end of the 
narrative of the singular self works as a “catalyst” to “draw sensuous performances toward 
avowed purposes” or ethical actions (29). For instance, a feeling of enchantment might fuel the 
motivation of the self to take the time to carefully study the bodily etiquette, intentional agency, 
and communicative potentiality of the other in order to form a careful and accommodating 
response. Once one develops this mutualistic sensibility s/he is able to discern the fragile 
interdependence, vitality, and uniqueness of all things, which might propel individuals and 
collectives to carefully consider the future consequences of their choices. In particular, this 
enchanted stance toward the natural world might aid the masculine-subject/scientist to see the 
world as vitally alive rather than inert, manipulatable, and controllable disenchanted matter. Such 
an ethical posture by individuals might motivate technoscientific institutions to pursue a more 
intensified project of self-regulation, to reorient themselves “with the modesty that comes from 
acknowledging the independent vitality of nonhuman forms and from admitting corollary limits 
in the capacities of human agents to know exactly what they are doing when they manipulate the 
world in which they participate” (157).    
 While Atwood’s MaddAddam gives us an allegorical image of human-animal relations of 
care only under conditions of social collapse, in reality we are seeing contemporaneously 
positive movement in the direction of a more broad interspecies etiquette and the ethical 
treatment of the objects of scientific study in a fully functioning capitalist society. There are 
indeed, some scientists who “already operate wholly or partially within dialogical and care 
models rather than in the theoretically dominant frameworks demanding ethical and emotional 
disengagement and objectification,” who “find[-] in the nature they study the basis for awe and 
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environmental commitment rather than instrumentalism and an inflated sense of self” 
(Plumwood, Environmental 55). For example, Atwood’s interspecies body politic resonates 
deeply with Dr. Sue Savage-Rumbaugh’s truly “trans-species community” of humans and 
bonobos (Pan paniscus) at the Iowa Primate Learning Sanctuary in Des Moines, Iowa. As 
documented in G.A. Bradshaw’s essay “An Ape Among Many: Animal Co-Authorship and 
Trans-species Epistemic Authority,” in Savage-Rumbaugh’s effort to study the origins of human 
language, she has pioneered a science that highlights “animal agency and new modes of 
communication and models of knowledge” (18), a science that treats “‘nature [as a] participative 
subject in an organic community’” rather than as a “‘pure object’” (Simon Estock qtd. in 
Bradshaw 17).12 Savage-Rumbaugh co-authors a study with the bonobos Kanzi Wamba, Nyota 
Wamba, and Panbanisha Wamba that describes what captive apes consider as important to their 
emotional and physical flourishing. The “animals” are capable of “comprehend[ing] and 
respond[ing] to complex linguistic narration and questioning in a free-flowing manner on 
essentially any topic connected meaningfully to their lives” (24). The methodology employed for 
these interspecies scientists’ study is called Participatory Action Research (PAR), where 
“[i]nstead of the conventional animals-as-object framing, the Pan-Homo community 
participate[s] simultaneously as objects and subjects” (26). Each party’s biases and motivations 
are brought to the fore and “all participants” are guaranteed the intended outcome of the study 
will be beneficial to them specifically. Savage-Rumbaugh composed a list of activities, interests, 
and desirable objects that she saw as significant to the bonobos “self-actualization” and then she 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
12 One might understandably interject here that taking bonobos from the wilderness of the Democratic Republic of the Congo is 
hardly treating them as participatory subjects. On the contrary, kidnapping bonobos forcefully from their home ranges is in fact 
deliberately treating them as objects devoid of self-directed intentions or emotional ties to loved ones and the landscape. Like the 
unexpected, illegitimate birth of the cyborg from objectifying science and technology, I see the birth of this new trans-species 
society in the Savage-Rumbaugh lab as accidently and productively springing from her original objectifying agenda to use the 
animals to make discoveries about human-oriented research questions. My hope is that the scientific culture of her lab, and others 
touched by the important work being done there, will be unable to go back to their highly anthropocentric science motives and 
objectifying conduct toward earth others.  
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says, she “‘solict[ed] their views regarding my thoughts’” (26). The results suggest “considerable 
agreement” but also vast differences in opinion on what is essential to the bonobos well being. 
Bonobos believe they have a right to maintain “lifelong contact with individuals whom they 
love,” to be “able to leave and rejoin the group, to explore, and to share information regarding 
distant locations,” and to “receive recognition from the humans who keep them in captivity of 
their level of linguistic competency and ability to self-determine and self-express through 
language,” among other freedoms (29-30).  
 Such a study should deliver a final staggering blow to human-animal boundaries as 
Bradshaw points out. Neither definitions of personhood, for rights purposes, or “ethical 
arguments…logically fall along species lines” any longer (27). Wary of liberalism’s “moral 
extensionist” rights framework that suffers from an “absolutist,” ecologically “uncontextualized” 
form of “closure” in addition to its failure to question the overall system of animalization and 
commodification (Plumwood, Environmental 153), I find Bradshaw’s idea that “Nature stares 
back” with “agentic” and “epistemic authority” more compelling in that it absolutely requires 
humans to revise their interactions with nonhuman others into a mode of “social justice and self-
determination, where epistemic authority and decision-making may not only be shared with other 
species, but dictated by nonhuman species” (28; my emphasis), which is exactly what Atwood 
prophesizes we might be forced to do in the speedily approaching future. 
 I’d also like to point out how this human-bonobo study demonstrates the concrete reality, 
and therefore applicability to social praxis, of Deleuze and Guattari’s notion of becoming that 
Atwood aesthetically represents in her Toby-Pigoon-Craker encounter, which “can be seen as a 
letting go of the illusory fixity of the conventionally human standpoint and a becoming open to 
otherwise imagined modes of perception and sense” (Clark 198). Lynda Birke and Luciana Parisi 
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interpret “becoming” as a move beyond simple dualisms” in Deleuze and Guattari’s insistence 
on “connections and flows rather than on individual entities” and “transformation and change 
rather than essence” (67). Bradshaw points out that “[a]s several lines of neuropsychological 
research document, different developmental contexts correlate with different social psychologies 
and underlying neural substrates” (21). In other words, in consonance with Deleuze and 
Guattari’s concept of becoming, there is no static, essential identity for any living form; one is 
molded from the ground up according to his or her cultural and environmental context and on a 
more immediate, micro-level the “usual structure of a thing [perpetually] dissolves and the newly 
released bits reconfigure with each other and with other bits of matter in the vicinity” (Bennett, 
Enchantment 51). We are constantly being (re)-made and quickly evolve over generations. As I 
have suggested, just as Atwood’s post-apocalyptic interspecies wondrous encounter opens up a 
“line of flight” from the hierarchical dualistic outlook left over from the patriarchal, homocentric 
ideological framework, so too does Savage-Rumbaugh, Kanzi, Nyota, and Panbanisha’s study. 
Bradshaw discusses how the “bicultural rearing” of humans and bonobos who intimately interact 
on a daily basis is  
producing cross-generational epigenetic effects upon the bonobos and the humans 
at a very rapid rate. Both species are co-evolving toward a new kind of 
understanding of each other with the experience of small biological changes. 
There are arising enlightened insights and a greatly increased ability to 
communicate across the species boundary in each succeeding generation. Both 
species are benefiting, with each beginning to draw upon the best traits of the 
other in succeeding generations. These changes are not occurring through sexual 
transmission, but rather though cultural transmission. (21) 
 
The human-bonobo cultural transmission is an example of Deleuze and Guattari’s becoming-
animal of the human and the becoming-human of the bonobo within a multiplictous pack 
“without filiation or hereditary production” for they are “[l]ike hybrids, which are in themselves 
sterile, born of a…union that will not reproduce itself, but which begins over again every time, 
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gaining that much more ground” (241). Atwood leaves her readers with this very picture at the 
end of MaddAddam. Readers are left wondering whether the co-species cooperation born of a 
kind of “contagious” transmission “spanning the kingdoms of nature” will become the norm in 
the post-apocalyptic world of the interconnected cultures of the Pigoon, Humanoid Craker, and 
Human species. As Deleuze and Guattari argue, beneath the actual world lies a virtual realm of 
potential, there is “room in the [human] for other becomings, ‘other contemporaneous 
possibilities’ that are not regressions but creative involutions bearing witness to ‘an inhumanity 
immediately experienced in the body as such,’ unnatural nuptials ‘outside the programmed 
body’” (273). The genetically distinct yet culturally fluent humans’ and bonobos’ “nuanced 
social psychological” structures that originate from their uniquely intertwined “developmental 
experiences” at the Iowa Primate Learning Sanctuary demonstrate the exciting mutations 
possible in the zones of indeterminacy in one’s enclosed subjectivity. These cross-species 
interactions point toward the possibility for a transformation in one’s accustomed, state-
sanctioned atomistic being into something more inhuman. Atwood’s visionary (cautionary) tale 
about the strange compromises we might have to make with cyborgs can and should be a 
celebratory intercommunicative and interrelational choice we make with a wider array of nature-
made and “artificial” nonhumans now, and one that we can work toward actively constructing by 
encouraging a more intimate proximity between our cultures. 
 Finally, it is important to note that despite the fact that Atwood chooses to craft the God’s 
Gardeners as an unsuccessful coalitional alliance, as a countercultural movement unable to 
reform the seemingly “invincible” Corporatocracy before the tragic pandemic is unleashed, their 
many valuable qualities do provide us with some of the parts for forming a viable model for 
political resistance. Like the Savage-Rumbaugh laboratory, this group’s strange amalgamation of 
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geneticists, engineers, fast food workers, the sons of a Baptist preacher, deserters of elite 
privilege and wealth, etc. demonstrate Haraway’s hope for a “cyborg society, dedicated to 
realistically converting the laboratories that most fiercely embody and spew out the tools for 
technological apocalypse” and “committed to building a political form that actually manages to 
hold together witches, engineers, elders, perverts, Christians, mothers, and Leninists long enough 
to disarm the state” (154-155). Haraway’s cyborg society contains the “dream not of a common 
language, but of a powerful infidel heteroglossia,” and “means both building and destroying 
machines, identities, categories, relationships, space stories,” which human-bonobo society 
certainly does as well as Atwood’s interspecies, interhuman cultures (Simians 181). There is no 
essential unity that holds these subjects together apart from contempt for the objectifying values 
of the “new technologies,” the shared interests in survival, and a respect and joy for all forms and 
expressions of life. The area of “broad agreement” I think that we are all slowly coming to and 
which will have a “world-shaking” (not world-shattering) effect is the notion that we should take 
“responsibility for the social relations of science and technology, and so…embrace[-] the skillful 
task of restructuring the boundaries of daily life, in partial connection with others, in 
communication with all of our parts” (181). The God’s Gardeners’ human-diverse, interspecies 
dialogic ethic of care and accountability, which rejects Cartesian duality and encourages the 
attentive practice of an active effort to discern earth others as intentional, agential subjects who 
can exert as many changes upon humans as humans can upon them, provides a picture of one 
half of Haraway’s cyborgian call for responsibility. The Savage-Rumbaugh group provides the 
other half to Haraway’s political sketch in their modeling of an interspecies, feminist science 
based on the “new-found ideals of respect, solidarity with and advocacy for an actively 
disclosing other to whom the [scientist] attends” (Plumwood, Environmental 54). This new 
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science is intended to substitute the dominating “hard-science” framework that 
“models…disengagement, disrespect, over-manipulation and reductionism” and which has 
caused an unprecedented amount of suffering (54). The combination of Atwood’s vision of 
interspecies alliances, Deleuze and Guattari’s politics of becoming, Bennett’s enchanted stance 
toward nature, and the new techniques for scientific investigation provide us with a viable model 
of resistance to the continued destruction of the planet. While in this thesis I have approached 
large issues without definitive solutions, I hope to have successfully highlighted the importance 
of resurfacing debates about individual socialization within patriarchal societies, the gendered 
politics and economic foundations of scientific methodology and knowledge, and the rich 
political potential of opening individuals and collectives up to the lively world of things.  
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